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FOREIGN  
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SERVICE

# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Central Eurasia**

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***Military Affairs***

# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-011

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23 March 1994

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## ARMED FORCES

### Korotchenko on 'Information as Weapon'

94UM0297A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Major-General Yevgeniy Korotchenko, candidate of military sciences and professor, and Colonel Nikolay Plotnikov, officer graduate student at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, under "A Look at the Problem" rubric: "Information Is Also a Weapon: About What Must Not Be Forgotten in Working with Personnel"]

[Text] It is not without reason that the mass media are called the "fourth power." The resolution of political, economic, and defense tasks depends to a considerable extent upon the fullness of information and its objectivity and dependability.

As everyone knows, however, information can be used not just for creative purposes. It is no accident that in the military-political confrontation of states and in other kinds of foreign and domestic conflicts we are now seeing a tendency toward a shift in the center of gravity away from traditional methods of force and means of combat toward nontraditional methods, including information. Their impact is imperceptible and appears gradually. It is less burdensome economically and is not dangerous ecologically. But the main thing is that it is difficult to get rid of. More and more often they will turn openly to military force when all other available possibilities for influence are already exhausted or military actions will likely be brief and, as they say, certain of victory. A graphic example of this is the war in 1990-91 in the zone of the Persian Gulf.

Thus, today information and information technologies are becoming a real weapon. A weapon not just in a metaphoric sense but in a direct sense as well. Natural questions are: What is the objective of the information action, under what principle does it work, and what kinds of dangerous effects of information are there?

One of the basic targets of the influence of information is the consciousness and mind of man. Depending on the objectives being pursued, the scope of the actions, the nature and content of the tasks being resolved, and the forces and means being applied, these people may be specific persons (state and political leaders, employees of special services, military personnel, workers in law enforcement agencies, scientists, and members of political parties and movements) or particular social groups (workers, entrepreneurs, young people, housewives, etc.). But under the conditions when the system for the management of the state has been disrupted and a situation of public-political and socioeconomic instability has been created in the country or in a specific region, the entire population may be the target of its influence.

The basis of the information action is a specially selected or developed information put into circulation with the help of well-defined and above all psychological methods and means at the proper time by some state or other or

particular political forces against a selected target. Especially great here is the role of negative information or disinformation. Let us remember how the bloody events began in one of the former Central Asian republics of the USSR. A rumor ("They slaughtered our people at the bazaar because of a glass of strawberries") falling on the still-smoldering embers of interethnic disagreements about purely routine matters provoked mass killings of completely innocent women, children, and old men and led to many thousands of refugees.

The events of recent years abroad and in our country show that a special role in the influence of information on the public consciousness belongs to television, above all, apparently, because it gives the viewers the illusion of participating in what is taking place on the screen. Moreover, we live under conditions in which the receipt of information from other official sources is made more difficult. A very dangerous phenomenon in this respect was the crisis in the newspaper and magazine business, the dramatic decline in the circulation of printed publications, and the worsening of their distribution.

Here, for example, is how television was used in the development of public opinion at the very beginning of the bloody events in Bosnia. On one of the days, the television companies of many countries showed the mortaring of peaceful inhabitants of Sarajevo—Muslims standing in line for bread. And it all happened live, as they say, as though those who filmed the chilling scenes were informed of the coming events in advance. And is it possible that this is how it was? They blamed the Serbs for the crime. And many television viewers hundreds or thousands of kilometers away from the place of the tragedy, not to mention the Muslims of Bosnia, certainly believed this. Later, however, UN workers were able to determine that in reality the bloody provocation was the work of Muslim militants who had selected their coreligionists as targets. But the deed, as they say, had already been done.

It is possible to present a great many such examples of falsification and manipulation of facts, including in the public mass media.

Television and radio are becoming the predominant means of information in the army as well. And if one takes into account the growing psychological tension in the society, the loss of moral guidelines and values by most of our citizens, and the uncertainty about tomorrow, then television—if its standards are set by commercial interests as is done here—can also become an agent for social degradation. The scenes of violence on the screen, the propaganda of profit by any means, the permissiveness and disdain for the law, the pornography, and the forgetting of the many centuries of Russian history hardly strengthened the moral foundations of the army.

The techniques for the introduction of negative information and disinformation into the consciousness of people are quite varied. They may conditionally be divided into obvious techniques, unconvincing methods, delayed perception, repetition, argued methods, and techniques for resolute conclusions.

Obvious techniques are those that do not require additional information for the understanding of the basic content of the material being disseminated. Assertions are one example. They represent firm statements presented as obvious facts not requiring proof. Here any complex situation may be simplified to the point where, let us say, the cause of all troubles (economic, political, military, etc.) becomes quite obvious. Thus, for example, the culprit in the economic crisis in a number of republics of the former USSR may be declared to be either persons of another nationality, so-called "migrants," or people with a different political orientation. And this, as everyone knows, was one of the reasons for the national-civil wars in Moldova, the Transcaucasus, and Tajikistan....

Unconvincing methods operate under the principle: "You can believe it or not, I do not vouch for its authenticity." Particularly outstanding among these methods are insinuations employed to establish or evoke in the target of the action doubts about particular ideas, social groups, or individual personalities with the purpose of producing a schism in the midst of the target group. This is usually done through allusions, half-truths, and allegories so that the target of the action will draw his own conclusions but in such a way that is necessary for the one disseminating the information. The themes of the insinuations may be political views, socioeconomic, national, and religious differences, the personal lives of undesirable representatives of the state and military leadership, power structures, leaders of political parties, and entrepreneurs, the sources of their income, and the like.

In the use of methods of delayed perception, the target of the action perceives the basic content of the information only after becoming familiar with secondary materials. The premeditated concealment of certain information until it is no longer of current interest may serve as an example here.

Methods of repetition make it possible, figuratively speaking, to "pound" information into the subconsciousness of the individual, the destructive action of which may subsequently be initiated at the proper time with the help of some slogan, appeal, combination of words, or symbols.

Arguments used in a negative information action are presented as a reason explaining the behavior or thinking of the target of the action. In so doing, it is sufficient to set different accents, remove some "inconvenient" details, and make some selective passes and the same argument can have a different sound to it and accordingly and different effect.

In speaking of the negative information effect on the personnel of the army and navy, it is necessary to pay special attention to rumors. Let us see what rumors represent, what are the reasons for their formation, how they influence the attitudes, behavior, and life aims of the individual, and what measures can be taken to counteract them.

People who encounter something that they cannot understand—real or invented but, as they see it, important—always strive to get rid of mental tension and to obtain the

information necessary for their social orientation and the organization of their behavior in any situation. If for some reason the official information system does not provide satisfactory explanations and remains silent or says too little about something, then the people begin to offer their own version. This gives rise to rumors that spread unbelievably quickly without being subject to practical control. In crisis situations, by the way, it has always been that because of the disruption of the work of official sources of information rumors become the main means of satisfying the society's need for information. In the contemporary information space, they are capable of becoming a kind of "fifth power" when they take over the mass consciousness.

Rumors reproduce themselves and are believed not so much because they appear to be true but because they correspond to the information and psychological needs of people who have not been satisfied with the necessary information through official sources.

In terms of their origin or source, rumors may be spontaneous, conditioned by the objective conditions of the existence of man (a difficult social and economic situation and state of the social consciousness and mass psychology), or deliberately fabricated and purposefully spread for specific purposes.

In accordance with the characteristics of information, rumors may be subdivided into four basic types: Absolutely unreliable; unreliable with elements of plausibility; plausible; and reliable with elements of implausibility.

In terms of the nature of the general emotional reaction that they produce, they are also subdivided into frightening rumors, so-called "wishes" and "hopeful" rumors (during the years of World War II, for example, the propaganda agencies of Germany spread the rumor of a "new secret retaliatory weapon"), and aggressive rumors. The first kind of rumors usually expresses the foresight of some unpleasant events. Such rumors have a favorable psychological basis in an environment with the predominant moods of alarm, uncertainty, and fear and usually substantially block the people's realization of their official duties and disorganize their actions. Rumors of the second kind most often represent the attempt to present what is desired as real. If the desired goes contrary to reality, then there is also a sharp decline in the morale and psychological stability of people. And aggressive rumors upset the interrelationships of people, disrupt the established ties between them, and promote interethnic and interreligious hostility and hatred.

How can one counteract the destructive effect of rumors, including in the army environment?

The most effective means of preventing the rise and circulation of rumors, of course, is the timely, systematic, and, the main thing, objective informing of personnel about events, facts, and problems. The more convincing information is and the more adequate it is from the point of view of quantity, the less reason there is for the rise of different conjectures that put a negative stamp on developing or existing public opinion.

An important role in the prevention of rumors, especially under the conditions of an unstable military-political or socioeconomic situation, is played by meetings of managers of different levels with the mass audience (television and radio appeals, direct contacts, press conferences, briefings, etc.). It is precisely from such people that they expect the appropriate information in a complex situation. Such meetings must be regular regardless of how events develop.

But what should be done if the rumor has already appeared? How should one react to it—remain silent, which amounts to promoting its further circulation, or deny it, which indirectly also serves to spread it? To counteract rumors in an active way, practice shows that the very best thing to do is to put specific undeniable facts up against it. That is, one must strive to fill the lack of information at once.

Probably one ought to include in the category of important educational tasks the development of a culture in service personnel for the perception of information, so to speak. We will not forget that for many years our people were not educated in the spirit of excessive trust in any printed word and any statement made on television or radio. It is necessary to develop in them the ability to analyze information critically and a certain mental outlook, a culture of perception. It is necessary to teach people to orient themselves independently in the flow of information and to assess the degree of authority of some source or other and to develop in them a kind of immunity against clearly unprincipled information actions.

Of course one should not overestimate the role of the mass media and rumors in influencing the consciousness and mind of the individual. Here other factors also play a role. But nor should one underestimate the fact that the behavior and life attitudes of practically all of us is largely determined by the content of the information that we obtain from newspapers, journals, radio and television broadcasts, and direct interpersonal contact. All of this must be considered in daily work with personnel.

### Reform Said To Be on Track

94UM0288A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
2 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Oleg Falichev: "Army Reforms Proceeding According to Plan"]

[Text] Do the Army's reforms reflect reality? Are they headed in the proper direction? What has been accomplished so far and what is planned for the near future? These questions have no simple answers. The questions were addressed at a press conference held by the Information and Press Directorate, RF MO [Russian Federation Ministry of Defense]. Participating in the conference were Colonel General V. Zhurbenko, first deputy chief of the General Staff, RF Armed Forces; Lieutenant General G. Ivanov, chief, Military Construction and Reform, RF MO; Lieutenant General G. Bochayev, first deputy chief, GOMU [Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate], GSh [General Staff]; and representatives of other directorates of the General Staff and RF Ministry of Defense.

The press conference was held in response to a message entitled "Strengthening the Russian State" sent to the Federal Assembly by Russia's President. As reported, a part of the message deals with the analysis and evaluation of reforms in progress in the Army as well as the nature Russia's Armed Forces will assume in the future.

"The Armed Forces are presently undergoing a most difficult phase of their development," pointed out Colonel General Zhurbenko. "At the same time, we must carry out measures for creating the Russian Army and for withdrawing the troops from Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and the Baltic countries as well."

All the above factors cannot fail to affect to some degree or other the processes taking place in the Army. I believe that no other army in the world has had to deal with such large-scale and difficult tasks. And this in the short time since inception of the reforms. Construction of Russia's Armed Forces started on 7 May 1992, when the President issued a decree calling for the creation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In the ensuing period, we have seen the formation of the Ministry of Defense; conduct of an analysis of the actual state of the Armed Forces; development and presidential approval of a concept of their construction; writing of directives governing combat and mobilizational readiness and operational-strategic planning; and preparation of a number of legislative acts dealing with military issues.

Nonetheless, as pointed out in the president's message, the tasks levied have been accomplished in the Armed Forces. The reforms are proceeding according to plan in the Armed Forces. And if they were backed up by the necessary financing, I believe that many problems would be resolved much more readily.

In conclusion, one more fact: Since 7 May 1992, the manpower of the Armed Forces has been reduced by 457,000 men.

### Chief of General Staff Kolesnikov on Armed Forces Issues

PM1603125394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff, by Colonel Anatoliy Belousov and Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Dolinin; date and place not given: "Russia's Armed Forces—Today and Tomorrow. Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff, Answers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents' Questions"]

[Text] [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Mikhail Petrovich, we will soon be celebrating the second anniversary of the creation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. What, in your view, is remarkable about these two years?

[Kolesnikov] The most remarkable point has been that we have indeed set up Russian Armed Forces. And those are not just words. Despite the fact that the bulk of former USSR Armed Forces groupings were part of the Russian

Army, they did not represent an integrated military organization. That was the first problem which we had to deal with.

The results of our work were assessed by the Russian Federation president in his address to the Federal Assembly. He noted that the Armed Forces are combat-ready and capable of carrying out the tasks facing them. This assessment from the supreme commander in chief places a great responsibility on us and, at the same time, attests to the correctness of the approaches chosen by the Defense Ministry toward the safeguarding of security.

As for specific measures, I believe that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers know about them. These include the cutbacks in Armed Forces manpower, the troop withdrawal from other states, and structural changes in administrative organs.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Just how substantive have been the changes to the initial reform concept? After all, two years ago we were all hoping that the country's economic position now would not be so difficult. But the situation regarding Army funding has not improved and there are still big problems, so it seems to some of our readers that under these conditions any break with the existing specific structure of the Armed Forces will inevitably lead to breakdowns in command and control....

[Kolesnikov] I would like to note that the main measures regarding the organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces were drawn up and reflected in the concept and plan for the organizational development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. And although, owing to funding difficulties, we are indeed changing the timetable for the introduction of certain military infrastructure projects and the pace of the technical equipping of the troops has been slowed, the questions of their military and technical provision are being very actively resolved and, on the whole, the main thrust of the creation and reform of the Army and Navy is being maintained. This includes improving the structure and composition of the Armed Forces, reforming the Defense Ministry's military-technical policy and the principle for manpower acquisition, enhancing combat and mobilization readiness....

As regards the second half of your question, I would like to reassure readers—we are being very cautious about changing the structure and combat makeup of the Armed Forces. And decisions are made only after painstaking theoretical analysis and practical checks, and, of course, not to the detriment of the troops' combat readiness.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is well known that the first strategic echelon of the former USSR's defense ceased to exist with the troop withdrawal from East Europe. The second echelon troops remain behind in our nearest neighbors, and our former internal districts—like Moscow and the North Caucasus—have become border districts. What are the prospects for their development?

[Kolesnikov] The demise of the USSR resulted in a fundamental break in the disposition of forces. We lost territories and, correspondingly, a strategic echelon, and

reserve troops formed the basis of the first operational echelon. It was necessary to create force groupings in all the western and southwestern sectors virtually from scratch. The problem was that large strategic formations and combined units were being organized from scratch, and this required the preparation of the relevant infrastructure. This has happened during a period of Armed Forces organizational development and reform, with an acute shortage of material resources and funding. As a result, the tasks and role of the Leningrad, Moscow, and North Caucasus Military Districts have changed substantially....

The Russian Federation border in the west now runs through the western borders of Leningrad, Pskov, Smolensk, Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Rostov Oblasts and, in the southwest, through Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan—as a result of which the Moscow and North Caucasus Military Districts have acquired the status of border districts. Their staffing has been increased somewhat. But I consider it necessary to draw attention to the fact that the increase is taking place in connection with the Russian troop withdrawal from other states. We are proceeding primarily on the basis of the convenience of stationing and providing for those troops on national territory. Several additional combined and other units have been set up in the southwest—in the North Caucasus Military District—primarily with light weapons.

As far as prospects are concerned, these are to conclude the reception of the troops withdrawn from the FRG and the Baltic in these districts, to billet them, make provision for them, and organize planned combat training in them. On the whole, border military districts as newly constituted will have to resolve the tasks of safeguarding Russia's military security in accordance with the changed conditions of the current situation.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The transition which began last year to the mixed method of Army and Navy staffing has shown that contract service is not all plain sailing. In particular, it has not proved possible to substantially use contract servicemen to fill positions which primarily determine the combat capability of units and ships, or positions in troops carrying out peacekeeping missions. This year another 150,000 contract servicemen should join the forces. Will they again find themselves at bases, dumps, and other "hot" spots? What needs to be done to prevent this happening?

[Kolesnikov] The Russian Federation president in his edict No. 166 of 18 January 1994 instructed the Defense Ministry to recruit 150,000 volunteers to fill primarily combat positions. In execution of these instructions the defense minister, defining the tasks for 1994, called for candidates to be taken on for military service under contract as soldiers and sailors with the kind of skills in particularly short supply which determine the combat capability of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. He ratified a list of these positions, and for each of them the qualification requirements which the candidates taken on

under contract would have to meet were drawn up. Moreover, in order to create a material incentive, pay scales for the main posts—including gunnery commanders, pontoon bridge commanders, self-propelled artillery commanders, mine specialists, reconnaissance troops, divers, crane operators, and so forth—have been increased.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Let's talk about alternative service....

[Kolesnikov] There is currently no law on alternative (nonmilitary) service in the Russian Federation, although this kind of service is laid down by the Russian Federation Constitution.

Obviously, in drafting such a law—whose speedy adoption is increasingly being advocated by the public and by spiritual or religious organizations—the provisions of the relevant international acts, and world practice in the organization and implementation of alternative service will be taken into account. At the same time, it must also take account of national interests and, above all, of the need to reliably safeguard the state's defense capability. We have made progress in this area.

I think that it will be necessary to refrain at least until 1997 from adopting or even introducing a Russian Federation law on alternative service. There is a whole host of reasons for this, chief among which is the exceptionally difficult situation with regard to the manpower acquisition of soldiers, sailors, warrant officers, and petty officers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops owing to the severe shortage of draft resources and the still very undeveloped system of contract service, whose formation should have been completed only by 1997-1999.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is understandable that the problem of military-technical policy should have a special place in the organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces. Under today's conditions of tight financial appropriations for defense, what priorities can be highlighted in the development and purchase of arms and military hardware?

[Kolesnikov] On the basis of the main provisions of military doctrine, military-technical policy is aimed at concentrating limited financial resources in order to develop weapons with flexible [mezhvidovoy] applications ensuring the resolution of tasks primarily in local wars and conflicts. The main priorities in developing and purchasing armaments and military hardware are integrated reconnaissance, communications, and battle management systems and weapons.

When buying armaments at the minimum level necessary to preserve a core military-industrial potential, stress is laid on developing the scientific and technical contribution and to working on key elements which will make it possible, when the economic situation improves, to move to full-scale work and to provide timely supplies of the requisite numbers of modern weapons for the Army and Navy.

Currently, as a result of meager Defense Ministry funding, the number of weapons types that are under development

or have been modernized has been severely cut back, along with the total volume of purchases. Any further funding cuts could lead to the collapse of the defense industry, the loss of core scientific and defense potential, and an inability to independently develop [sozdavat] and produce basic competitive high-tech prototypes of weapons and military hardware.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] At the start of the reforms there were a lot of complaints about the inadequacy of the relevant legislative base. How do you now assess the legal backup for Armed Forces organizational development and the provision of social guarantees for servicemen? What new progress has been made in this direction?

[Kolesnikov] The legal foundations for the organizational development and activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces have basically already been created. Eleven laws and more than 100 other normative legal acts have been adopted and are in force in the defense sphere. The main provisions of Russian Federation military doctrine have been ratified for the first time at the level of a normative legal act.

We will now have to bring the legal basis for the organizational development and activity of the Armed Forces into line with the Constitution and the main provisions of the Russian Federation's military doctrine, and to create a clear-cut system of military legislation. We have prepared proposals on clarifying current laws and elaborating new ones in the defense sphere. Above all, these would be laws making amendments and additions to the Russian Federation laws "On Defense," "On the Draft and Military Service," "On the Status of Servicemen," "On Pension Provision for Servicemen".... We will have to draw up and adopt new laws: "On Martial Law," "On the Military Militia (Police)," "On Military Courts," and others—more than 20 draft laws in all.

Moreover, we need a package of normative legal acts to define the procedure for implementing military organizational development as a whole.

As for social guarantees for servicemen, these have been laid down by Russian Federation laws and other normative acts issued by the Russian Federation president and Government. Unfortunately, a number of provisions of the Russian Federation law "On the Status of Servicemen" are not in operation owing to the fact that a mechanism for implementing them has not been defined and there is no funding available. We will have to fully develop a mechanism for implementing the privileges, guarantees, and compensation laid down by law for servicemen, persons discharged from military service, and their family members.

Moreover, on the basis of constitutional principles, we are planning to step up legal protection for servicemen and Armed Forces' civilian personnel in military administrative organs and military units, to charge the military-legal service with the defense of their legitimate interests, and to set up a military advocate's service. These and other changes in the military-legal sphere will be implemented

within the framework of military-legal reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. This is something that the Russian Federation president in his address to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly made one of the main avenues of Armed Forces organizational development.

The Defense Ministry is currently drawing up a concept for military-legal reform whose measures will be implemented in coordination with other military reform measures in 1994-1995 and in the subsequent period.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One last question, Mikhail Petrovich, regarding the press. Or, rather, relations between the General Staff and the press. After all, a lot of people in the writing fraternity have recently been making loud statements on the subject of negative aspects of the Army. And everything in this area is, as the saying goes, grist to the mill—from the publication of unverified facts to out-and-out lying. How do you personally react when you encounter these sorts of articles? On the other hand, to what extent has a link been established between the General Staff and the press?

[Kolesnikov] I would call the relationship between the General Staff and most of the Russian media entirely normal. With the help of the Defense Ministry's Information and Press Directorate, we have organized regular business contacts. We are striving to ensure that all the most important events in the life of the Armed Forces with a direct impact on the General Staff's sphere of activity are covered by media representatives. We systematically invite them to briefings and press conferences, answer their questions, give interviews, consult with them on the most difficult problems, and prepare articles at editorial collectives' request. Field trips by journalists to military units, visits to various Army and Navy installations, military-training establishments, training centers, and so forth are organized with the direct participation of General Staff personnel. This kind of relationship between the press and the General Staff has already become an established system and allows us to make our military policy more open to society. Our fellow countrymen get an entirely objective idea about everything taking place in the Army.

At the same time, certain journalists have clearly failed to cement a relationship with the General Staff. And we are by no means to blame. Certain journalists are trying to make a name for themselves with pseudosensationalistic stories, unconfirmed facts, rumors, conjecture, and sometimes even barefaced lies. Take, for instance, the "report from entirely reliable sources" that there is allegedly already some kind of plan in place for dividing up the General Staff and the Defense Ministry. Totally false! And I could quote dozens of examples like that. How do I personally react to all this? In different ways. Sometimes I just swear, but most often I give instructions for a corresponding explanation or refutation to be prepared if the lies are, as they say, totally off the wall and could have major negative consequences not only for Russian public opinion but also for international relations.

Of course, you cannot muzzle everyone. Freedom of speech has brought to journalism not only greater glasnost, but also irresponsibility when it comes to dealing with information. We at the General Staff are increasingly arriving at the conclusion that the relevant articles of the law on the mass media are not working. If liars and spreaders of disinformation and calumny were taken to court more often, then many of them would probably lose their "appetite" for making a name for themselves through lying. We probably need to stop being always on the defensive. We will combat those who besmirch us in the appropriate manner—following the letter and spirit of the law. But it is better to build civilized relations in the way that is generally accepted worldwide—using the language of truth and mutual respect.

## POLICY

### Grachev Confident of Increased Military Budget

*LD1703165994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1629 GMT 17 Mar 94*

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Kaliningrad, 17 Mar—"Additional possibilities to build up Russia's military budget will be found," Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has announced. Addressing journalists, he said his "prolonged meetings with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets," which took place on Wednesday, gave him hope that the military budget would be increased.

Let us remind you, on the eve of his visit to Kaliningrad, Pavel Grachev sharply criticized the military budget proposed by the Finance Ministry and regards the allocated funds as insufficient. The defense minister also laid great hopes on the State Duma which, in his opinion, "is not indifferent to the fate of the defense capacity of our state."

### Legal Status of Forces Deployed in Near Abroad

*94UM0292A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 2 Mar 94 p 3*

[Article by Vyacheslav Yelagin, branch director of the Department for Information and the Press of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, under "Smolenskaya Square" rubric: "Legal Status of Russian Military Presence: Moscow Is Filling the Vacuum of Power and Is Protecting Russians"]

[Text] Under the conditions of the collective security system that is being established in the framework of the CIS, of particular urgency is the question of the presence of Russian forces in the states that arose after the collapse of the former USSR. As a result of the disintegration of the common military area, a considerable share of the forces along with their military equipment and gear ended up beyond the borders of Russia. Today they exist in the form of groupings of forces or individual military installations throughout practically the entire territory of the former USSR. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences, for

example, of the withdrawal of Russian forces from Tajikistan and of the failure of Russia to fulfill its peacemaking functions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Karabakh, and Moldova. In such an event, the fate of millions of our compatriots and the local population living in the "hot spots" of the CIS will be threatened. Nor should one fail to take into account the essential lack of a dependable defense and protection of the former external border of the USSR. This concern, by the way, is also shared by many national leaders.

In addition, the vacuum would inevitably complicate Russia's strategic military position and unavoidably would be filled by forces unfriendly to Russia. Without doubt this would also change the military-political landscape for other states. The military presence of Russia in those and other regions is essential for the purpose of protecting the economic interests of Russia.

It is quite natural, considering the entire complex of problems, that Russia cannot so easily leave the zone of its traditional and direct influence at once. The risk would be too great. But it cannot remain as an uninvited guest. The minister of defense of the Russian Federation declared that by the end of this year Russian military contingents will be withdrawn from the territory of other states whatever the cost may be. But this certainly does not mean that Russia is renouncing a military presence in regions of its primary attention. From now on this problem will be resolved through civilized methods with the consent of those countries that request this; that is, it is a matter of generally recognized forms of deploying forces in foreign territory on a legal basis.

One of the forms of such a presence is the establishment of Russian military bases in the territory of the countries of the CIS on the basis of mutually acceptable agreements. Overall, they may constitute elements of the general defensive area of the Commonwealth and help to preserve unified systems in the military infrastructure. An example is the protocol signed in the course of B. Yeltsin's visit to Tbilisi that provides for the establishment of military bases of the Russian Federation in Vaziari, Akhalkalaki, and Batumi. In the near future, a working group of both sides will define questions in the support of the military bases, the number of personnel, and the amount of military equipment there. Their task is to guarantee the security of Russia and the states of the Transcaucasian region included in the Collective Security Treaty. The Georgian leadership is making no secret of its interest in the presence of Russian forces in Transcaucasia. It seems that they are also inclined in this direction in Yerevan and Baku. It appears that Armenia will sign an analogous document on the establishment of a military base. There has already been preliminary consultation on this question.

There has been some movement on military questions with Kazakhstan. Experts have been assigned the task of working out a treaty on military cooperation in the very near future, which will reflect problems having to do with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons to Russia. Negotiations are under way on the future of Baykonur and other facilities and test ranges located in the territory of Kazakhstan.

It appears that in the deployment of Russian forces in the near abroad it is necessary above all to define their status. They must guarantee the security interests of Russia without intervening in the internal life of other states. At the same time, with the agreement of the sides, it is possible to utilize Russian forces as peacemaking forces in the settlement of conflicts. There is nothing unnatural in this either, because today only they are capable of ensuring a reduction of armed actions and putting an end to bloodshed in the "hot spots." Examples of this are the Dniester Region, South Ossetia, and Tajikistan. Because of the specific nature of our relations in the scope of the former Union and our knowledge of local problems, it is much easier for Russia to carry out peacemaking actions in these regions than for other states to do so. In addition, it is not in the interests of Russia to allow the presence of military contingents of third countries in the territory of the states of the former USSR. It is a pity that until now no UN mandate has been received, which, in addition to everything else, would reduce the burden of our material outlays for the performance of peacemaking operations.

The military presence of Russia in the near abroad will require substantial subsidies from the state treasury for the support of military and civilian personnel, the payment of rent for the territories and premises, the housing and support of the troops, the establishment of the infrastructure, the repair of bases, etc. The total expenditures will depend to a considerable extent upon the conditions of the deployment of the forces. In the event that some state or other of the CIS is interested in basing Russian forces in its territory, it is necessary to strive for an equivalent distribution of expenditures for their support on a parity basis.

A standard draft agreement worked out by the group could serve as the basis for subsequent agreements on the basing of Russian forces in the states of the Commonwealth. But it must not be perceived as dogma. It is absolutely essential to take into account the peculiarities of each country. In any agreement, however, it is expedient to provide for articles involving the financing of the troops and the interaction and interrelationships of the Russian units with local authorities and their army structures, including in the carrying out of joint exercises and maneuvers, and about the Russian military respecting the laws of the country where they are stationed and the uninterrupted supplying of Russian military units and installations.

It is also important to set forth positions on social and material guarantees for the service personnel and the members of their families taking into account the specific nature of the places where they are deployed. For it is no secret that with the introduction of national currencies the living standard of our military people in service in the armed forces of former Soviet republics declined dramatically, although there are corresponding bilateral agreements in this respect. It is therefore expedient to work out a mechanism for their realization and to provide for sanctions in the event that the agreements are not fulfilled.

In the preparation of documents of this kind, it is desirable to appeal to the experience of foreign armies. Nor should one ignore the experience in the negotiations on the

conditions for the stay and withdrawal of Soviet forces from the countries of Eastern Europe, putting into effect formulas that have already been developed.

In foreign circles, the motives for the preservation of our military presence in the states of the CIS are perceived in different ways. Apparently, the politicians and analysts there do not have a clear notion of the special role of the Russian Army, whereas some are simply suspicious of Moscow's noble intentions to establish conditions of stability along the entire perimeter of the Russian borders. It is important to realize that these bases do not threaten anyone. They are called upon to protect the interests of the contracting states and peacemaking actions. There is therefore scarcely any need to attribute nonexistent "imperial ambitions" to Russia in the geopolitical territory of the former USSR.

The establishment of Russian military bases fits very well into the framework of the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS as well as other bilateral agreements. Today it is merely a matter of the implementation of the corresponding positions. The legal basis for the deployment of Russian forces abroad is the Law of the Russian Federation "On Defense," which permits the stationing of troops and naval forces beyond its borders with the consent of parliament. In addition, a fundamental principle of their basing is the mutual interest of the sides, which does not contradict Article 51 of the UN Charter providing for the right of a state to individual or collective self-defense. The experience of postwar Europe shows that this can have a stabilizing influence on the situation in some country or other and in the region.

## GROUND TROOPS

### Spetsnaz Small Arms Specifications

94UM0287A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Aleksandr Yegorov, under the rubric: "Arsenal"; "Spetsnaz Weapons"]

[Text] Everyone knows the story of the capture of Powers, the American U-2 pilot who was shot down by a surface-to-air missile over Soviet territory. That story preceded the appearance in Russia of weapons that were developed and are being produced under the classification of "spetsizdeliye" [special item]. Powers was armed with a silent discharge weapon—a pistol with a barrel silencer—that was unknown in the USSR at that time.

Because lagging behind in any sphere of weapons was very severely assessed in those years, the model was urgently sent to the Central Institute of Precision Machine Building (TsNIITOChMASh), already at that time a leading scientific center, where they researched, developed and tested practically all models of firearms comprehensively, together with the round. The experience and reserves that had been accumulated at the institute, and also the talent of Engineer and Designer Anatoly Arsenyevich Deryagin, permitted

them to quite rapidly accomplish the task. Soviet "competent organs" obtained a domestically-developed silent discharge pistol system. And at TsNIITOChMASh a new direction of research was opened by this topic—individual protection weapons and equipping special subunits.

One of the results of this research was the acceptance into the inventory of a silent weapons system and a team of designers (I. Kasyanov, A. Deryagin, P. Serdyukov, V. Petrov) was awarded the Russian Federation State Prize for that.

Three models are part of the system: "Vintorez" 9-mm Sniper Rifle, "Val" 9-mm Assault Rifle, and "Vul" PSS 7.62-mm Pistol.

### Tactical-Technical Specifications

	"Vintorez"	"Val"	"Vul" PSS
Caliber, mm	9	9	7.62
Aimed range, m	400	400	50
Weight, kg	2.5	2.6	0.7
Magazine round capacity	10	20	6

### "Vintorez"

Designer Petr Ivanovich Serdyukov utilized the so-called classic silencer design—a barrel silencer—in the development of the "Vintorez" Gas-Vented 9-mm Sniper Rifle. In the process, he dealt extraordinarily successfully with the two main enemies of silent discharge—pressure and temperature. The gases that propel the bullet toward the barrel's end initially end up under the impact of fan-shaped drilled gas ports, through which an intensive pressure drop takes place. Then—in the first chamber of the silencer, an expansion chamber, where the pressure drops even more simultaneously with the lowering of the temperature. And, finally, the so-called separator completely "chops up" the jet that follows the bullet, dismembering it into numerous streams with different directions. A screen completes the cooling. That is the principle.

We need to point out that the round also does its part to lower the temperature and pressure. This is also specifically explained by the large caliber, 9-mm, for a rifle.

"Vintorez" is distinguished from other sniper rifles by its capability to conduct not only single round fire but also bursts. To do this, it can be equipped with 20-round instead of standard 10-round magazines.

The rifle is equipped with a mechanical—front sight and notched rear sight—and also with three optical sights, including a night vision sight. One of the optical sights is the PSO-1 four-power sight with a range finder scale. A special screen has been introduced into its design that permits detection of infrared radiation sources. The sight is equipped with a range and direction adjustment mechanism.

"Vintorez's" stock has a special recess which alleviates the design and forms a pistol grip. This type of stock was "broken in" and proved itself on the famous Dragunov sniper rifle.

And, finally, the rifle can be completely disassembled and carried in a briefcase.

#### "Val"

The silent assault rifle received the name "Val". The silencer type and design is the same. It has been equipped with the identical equipment as "Vintorez", including the optical sights. The differences are primarily external and they are few. Among the most visible are the metal folding stock which slightly increased the assault rifle's weight (by 100 grams) and compelled the designer to return to the traditional pistol grip. The capacity of the magazine has been increased to 20 rounds. We discussed it in the portion that concerns "Vintorez's" automatic fire. "Val" has been deprived of the briefcase which would hardly be appropriate in raids against enemy rear areas.

However, there is a fundamental difference. It is in the round. "Vintorez" has the SP-5 round that was developed by Designer Nikolay Zabelin and "Val" has the SP-6 that was developed by Designer Yuriy Frolov.

How do they differ? The former is a special sniper round. It is designed to destroy personnel.

The assault rifle's round has heightened penetrability. It easily penetrates a 6-mm sheet of high-strength steel at a range of 100 meters.

#### "Vul"

And, finally, the last member of the TsNIITOChMASH family of silent weapons—the "Vul" PSS 7.62-mm pistol that was developed by Yuriy Krylov and Viktor Levchenko.

This model is a kind of surprise for lovers of nontraditional solutions, because suppressing the sound of the discharge occurs in it based upon an entirely different principle: By employing a special round with a powder gas cut-off in it.

We need to say that the idea for the development of this type of ammunition is not new. What is more, such rounds exist and are utilized in the world. But in a very limited manner. In single-shot and double-barreled systems that are hard to call truly combat systems. The reason for that is the imperfection of the design and its low effectiveness that is caused by the inability of the round to support semi-automatic fire.

Viktor Petrov, the developer of the SP-2 (the designation of the new round with the powder gas cut-off) took a fundamental step forward in this sphere when he developed a round that brought the automatic back to life. In the process, the SP-2's combat effectiveness is close to the effectiveness of the Makarov PM [Makarov Pistol] pistol's round and lags behind it only in penetrability: the bullet of the silent round does not stick into the fourth 25-mm pine board like the PM but in the third board which it

enters sideways. That is caused by the ammunition's blunt tip that disrupts stability when it encounters an obstacle. If you consider that a shortcoming of the round, then it is the only one. In the remainder, the PSS is no worse than the PM. Moreover, it is equipped with a series of innovations, one of which is an adaptation for the installation of a modern collimating sight that is indispensable when firing under nighttime conditions. The shining dot on the sight, which is fed by a small battery, is compatible with night vision glasses and creates conditions for firing that are close to ideal. Based upon the big picture, sights of this type are instruments of the future.

The pistol itself provides a decent advantage over its competitors. If we turn to the specifications, it exceeds even "Vintorez" in the primary one—the level of noise suppression.

Russian silent weapons are one more source of pride for the domestic small arms school that is recognized in the world.

## AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### Specifications of Su-33 Fighter


94UM0293A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Pavel Maslov and Valentin Rudenko, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "The Su-33 Attacks From the Sea"]

[Text] There is no more difficult mission today in aviation than for a fighter aircraft to land and take-off from the deck of a ship. Here special demands are made not only on the training of pilots but also on the design of aircraft and combat aircraft-carrying ships.

The Americans, who know carrier aviation, did not anticipate that Russian aircraft builders would be able to develop a fighter aircraft with high tactical-technical specifications, the take-off of which is carried out using a ski jump. In their country, all carrier-based aircraft take-off using steam catapults. But they clearly underestimated our capabilities. That fighter aircraft has already been developed. What is more, it is being series-produced and is being successfully mastered not only by test pilots but also by line pilots. As you have figured out, this discussion is about the Su-27K carrier-based fighter aircraft. (It received the designation Su-33 at the Sukhoi Design Bureau).

Work on the Su-33 program began in 1984. It was conducted under the leadership of "Sukhoi OKB" [Experimental Design Bureau] ANPK [Aircraft Scientific Industrial Complex] General Designer Mikhail Simonov. A team of developers headed by Aircraft Chief Designer Konstantin Marbashev was directly involved with the carrier-based fighter aircraft's design. The Su-33 completed its first flight in August 1987. Two years later, for the first time in our country, Honored Test Pilot Viktor Pugachev carried out a successful landing on a heavy aircraft-carrying ship and a take-off from the ship's deck using a ski jump on 1 November 1989.



#### Primary Flight Technical Specifications of the Su-33:

Crew	1 man
Take-off weight, kg	
Maximum	31,000
Normal	29,940
Maximum speed, kph	
At sea level	1,400
At altitude	2,300
Landing speed, kph	240
Speed when separating from the ski jump, kph	140
Service ceiling, m	17,000
Operational G-load	9
Maximum flight range, km	3,000
Combat payload, kg	up to 6,500
Armament	
Air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, unguided rockets, aircraft bombs, incendiary drop canisters and expendable cluster bomb canisters, and a 30-mm aircraft cannon	

The Su-33 was developed based on the Su-27 fighter aircraft that is well known in our country and abroad and therefore preserved its best qualities. However, if you compare them from the point of view of combat capabilities and design peculiarities, they are essentially different aircraft. The Su-33 has an integral aerodynamic layout and has been manufactured according to the triplane design. Movable foreplanes, which substantially improve the aircraft's maneuvering capabilities, especially controllability and stability during separation from the ski jump, have been employed on it for the first time. This is the first fighter aircraft of the Su-27 family that is equipped with an aerial refueling system. The wing, tail plane panels, and tail

and nose fairings are folded upward to decrease the aircraft's dimensions in the parking area.

The fighter aircraft has a very high thrust-to-weight ratio—greater than one. Two AL-31F bypass turbojet engines that were developed under the leadership of A.M. Lyulka have been installed on it.

Aircraft take-off from the ship's deck is carried out using a ski jump from one of three positions equipped with gas-deflecting shields and special restraining devices which are retracted after the engine reaches the ChR mode (emergency power mode). Even from the shortest distance, a length of 105 meters, the fighter aircraft easily takes-off with a full fuel load and a full weapons load.

There are glidepath beacons, a radar landing system, and also an optical landing system installed on the ship to support landing on a ship which can be accomplished both in the automatic, directed, or manual modes. The fighter aircraft descends along a very steep glidepath and carries out a landing without the traditional leveling off. After touching the ship's deck, the arresting hook engages one of the arresting gears, which ensures rapid braking and stops the aircraft. A special emergency barrier can be utilized in non-standard situations.

The aircraft's landing gear has been reinforced as a result of the fact that take-off and landing are carried out at adequately high G-loads. In the event the arresting hook does not engage the arresting gear, the aircraft has the capability to safely circle around a second time.

The Su-33 is designed to defend Naval ships from air attack weapons—aircraft and helicopters, cruise missiles, remotely piloted vehicles, and also to destroy ground-based and surface targets and to support amphibious assault landings. The weapons control system consists of a powerful pulse-Doppler radar that is capable of carrying

out search while tracking targets in the background of the earth and water surface and an optical-electronic radar with a helmet-mounted target designation system.

At the present time, as KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently reported, the mastery of the Su-33 is being conducted at an accelerated rate by Northern Fleet Aviation personnel. Not only test pilots but also line pilots are already successfully carrying out landings on the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov Heavy Aircraft-Carrying Cruiser. Soon, long ocean cruises await the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser and, therefore, the Su-33 carrier-based fighter aircraft.

## NAVAL FORCES

### Reform of Naval Infantry, Coastal Troops

94U M0250A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Vladimir Maryukha, under the rubric: "Timely Topic": "The People Guarding the Sea and Coast"]

[Text] Today the naval knitted shirt that has faded to the color of the sky is worn in the VDV [Airborne Troops] and in the internal troops, in any subunit whose name contains the prefix "spets" [special] and even in private guard-investigation agencies. And at times the attention to this possessor of the "naval spirit" is somewhat greater than to those whose knitted shirts were later saturated with salt but did not lose their natural color. The "winged" infantry, by way of illustration, is always being heard from: Airborne troops "are mandatorily dropped" for honored guests and journalists at demonstration field training exercises and UN blue helmets are issued only in "exchange" for blue berets, yes and simply at a difficult moment, the first appeal is—to the Airborne Troops.

While not detracting from the Airborne Troops' accomplishments and only for the sake of fairness, I must point out that the naval infantry surpasses the "winged" infantry, both in age of service to the Fatherland and based upon the intransigence of traditions and, finally, based upon the number and variety of missions being carried out. The 289th year of service with small breaks, from the time of Peter the Great's Edict on the formation of the first naval infantry brigade—that is a great deal of time! All the more so that in its official history alone, the Russian naval infantry is seven decades older than the famous American Marines. And we don't intend to award only the age laurels.

A similar "imperceptibility" of the "black devils", as they still quite recently called naval infantrymen, probably lies in a different structure of subordination than the American structure and in the variability of the names. After a number of organic changes, the Naval Infantry became a part of the Navy's Coastal Troops which are led by Lieutenant-General Ivan Sidorovich Skuratov, incidentally, as far as I know the only doctor of military sciences among servicemen of his rank.

"We don't need to make the country poor with the ideal variant of Armed Forces organizational development."

Ivan Sidorovich thinks out loud on the problems of reforming the army and navy and the troops entrusted to him.—"We need the optimal variant."

The Coastal Troops can also serve precisely as a model for that optimal variant. The three components of the Coastal Troops—the coastal missile-artillery troops, the coastal defense troops and the naval infantry—naturally do not cover all of Russia's sea coasts like a fence. However, due to maneuverability and the capability to concentrate on a threatened axis in a very short period of time, including through reinforcements from another naval theater, the Coastal Troops accomplish the missions of combating surface combatants and assault landing detachments in the nearby maritime zone, defending naval bases and other important facilities on the coast, and landing amphibious and air assault forces. In the latter case, the Russian Naval Infantry has a great deal of experience from the period of the last war (3 amphibious assault operations and more than 100 amphibious assault landings) and the experience of prolonged performance of combat duty in remote areas—the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and off the Western coast of Africa. And a Black Sea Fleet reinforced naval infantry battalion has acquired the experience of peacekeeping forces operations—in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict area. In general, in the context of combat accomplishments, coastal defense divisions and naval infantry brigades on the scale of the Russian Federation Armed Forces are hardly unique. As, for example, the Northern Fleet Red Banner Moskovsko-Chernigov Guards Division, in which at one time were a battalion of cavaliers of Soldiers' Glory and a company of Heroes.

Today, reforms are occurring in the Coastal Troops, just like in the other services and types of troops. Troops are being reduced numerically, some portions of them are completing their infrastructure in new locations after their withdrawal from the near abroad—Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, and Turkmenistan. We need to create a training facility all over again and, first of all, for training the Coastal Troops officer corps.

The fact is that, with the current outward commonality of specialties in the Coastal Troops, there is a multitude of distinctions and nuances that, if they are not taken into account, a BRAV [Coastal Missile-Artillery Troops] or MP [Naval Infantry] officer can be a good missileer, tank officer, and even an airborne troop but... he cannot in the process be a representative of the Coastal Troops. They have taught this specific feature or spark, if we can say it that way, at the special departments of schools that have now turned out to be outside Russia's borders (in Odessa, Sumy, and Sevastopol).

"Experience has shown," Lieutenant-General I. Skuratov told me, "that even the best graduates of 'ground forces' military schools were lost for a minimum of two years as commanders and specialists in our units due to the lack of knowledge of our specific features, the navy and, finally, the terms that are customary for us."

The American experience, to which we have become accustomed to citing on any grounds in recent years, also convinces us of that. There, across the ocean, they have long understood that each person who has arrived to serve in the marines must have first of all the spirit of a marine. This spirit is nurtured and is sometimes "driven into" a young warrior with something resembling our course. You were not broken, you did not succumb to weakness at the first obstacle—therefore you will be a marine, is the advertisement of the advantages of service which in the United States is no less aggressive than the advertising for chewing gum or Camel cigarettes. And only later do they train the "prepared" marine as a specialist, be he a reconnaissance platoon commander or a regimental cook. The Russian Naval Infantry and other Coastal Troops units were always strong in a similar kind of elitism. This specific feature is being lost when vacant positions are filled with random people from disbanded units and that's too bad. It is due to that loss of "elite" qualities in a Pacific Ocean Fleet Naval Infantry division subunit that recently practically all of the officers had to be replaced.

Last year, the problem of cadres for the Coastal Troops, which extended to the statewide level, finally found its solution. St. Petersburg Combined Arms and Kolomna Artillery schools were added to the two schools that remained in Russia that trained officers for the Coastal Missile-Artillery Troops and Naval Infantry—Blagoveshchensk Tank and Far East Combined Arms Schools. This year, a coastal department will open at Pacific Ocean Higher Naval School imeni S.O. Makarov, although the first enrollment, only two classes for the time being, had already been conducted in 1993. And what an enrollment! The competition—7-8 people for each place! The batteries at Kolomna Artillery School, where the first but unofficial enrollment was carried out already in 1992, were recruited with no less competition. Aren't these the prospects for the creation of really elite units?

It's no accident that when, in the context of military reform, the conversation turns to the creation of mobile forces in Russia, the naval infantry and Coastal Missile-Artillery Troops units were first among the candidates for their foundation. The Coastal Troops will live up to the confidence that has been placed in it if the question on mobile forces is brought to its logical conclusion. But what we in the Coastal Troops disagree with is the resubordination—the "closing" of individual units only to the command authorities of the mobile forces. And here once again everything depends on the specific nature of the Coastal Troops: The training system will change with a change of the structure of subordination. Therefore, a naval infantryman will become an ordinary motorized rifleman or airborne troop after 2-3 years of service in the mobile forces, maybe a high-class one but, not a naval infantryman. And they essentially conceived the mobile troops to be made up of units that are capable of accomplishing those specific missions which the Coastal Troops and only them, are capable of handling. To drive a tank or a BMP [armored infantry vehicle], by way of illustration, along rugged terrain is one thing. But it is altogether something

else to negotiate a strip of surf and to seize a beachhead on a sea coast in that same vehicle.

They do not in the least oversimplify such missions in the Coastal Troops. On the contrary, for example, they can be deployed only in Kaliningrad Oblast on the Baltic but a threatened axis can emerge there where no Russian units are left on the Baltic seashore. In this matter, "Bereg", the latest self-propelled artillery system which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already discussed under the "Arsenal" rubric, could become the support for coastal missile-artillery units. But with the economy's current disastrous situation, years could pass until its acceptance into the inventory. That is why the Coastal Troops commander-in-chief frequently reminds his subordinates of late: There's no point in hoping and the center will give everything in a saucer with a blue border. Old equipment will also serve in the hands of masters of their profession. Hence Ivan Sidorovich's ideas on the optimal, but not ideal, variant of troop reform.

Yes, it is difficult for unit commanders to accomplish the entire complex of missions facing them under conditions of the shortage of personnel and the infrastructure at the new location along with maintaining the prescribed combat readiness. But no one else will do that for them. Therefore, people are not taught to complain about everyday difficulties in the Coastal Troops (maybe, that is why they write so little about them?). If they say anything about them, it is in jest but they seriously talk about the absence of a holiday. There is a tank crewmen's day. There is also a border troops day—but there is no naval infantry day in Russia. Unofficially, the Coastal Troops celebrate their professional holiday on 16 November. Peter the Great issued his edict on the formation of the naval infantry on that day in 1705.

According to the big picture, the Coastal Troops need not a only holiday and the national recognition and respect which they quite deservedly enjoyed. Publicity in the good sense of the word is needed to attract people for active duty service on contract. We need centers like those in the Airborne Troops to train those same contract personnel, sergeants and warrant officers. During the course of reform, we need to renew the arsenal, especially of the Coastal Missile-Artillery Troops.

And we also need incentives in the service. In the Coastal Troops, these words are understood to be not so much money and certificates of award as... real work. This especially concerns the naval infantry which previously regularly performed combat service on ships at sea and currently can get dirty in housekeeping duties. It is one thing to train for the sake of training, it is quite another thing to breathe in a chest full of salty sea air on an actual cruise, even if it is a peacekeeping or humanitarian cruise. That's how it was at the very beginning of the revival of the Navy's naval infantry during the postwar period. For example, at that time, in 1976, it was our naval infantry that was the first to come to the aid of the starving population of the Island of Sokotra. And the naval

amphibious landing troops had quite a few similar operations, right up to last year's landing under a smokescreen at Poti.

And if there is a need—the Coastal Troops will be the first to meet a threat to the Fatherland. Incidentally, not only with the current incomplete contingent but also with that reserve that underwent training here, in the navy. And that won't be a problem for the heroic large units—if the Fatherland just doesn't forget its defenders in peacetime.

#### BPK 'Admiral Chabanenko' Advertises for Contractees

94UM0281A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
3 Mar 94 p 2

[Advertisement: "Baltic Fleet Large Antisubmarine Warfare Ship 'Admiral Chabanenko'"]

[Text] Baltic Fleet Large Antisubmarine Warfare Ship "Admiral Chabanenko", the Russian Navy's latest ship which is equipped with the best models of modern weapons and which will be sailing thousands of miles while defending the interests of the Fatherland at various points of the World Ocean, INVITES men from 18 to 40 years of age to conclude a contract for military service.

The ship's command authorities are prepared to conclude a contract for the following specialties:

Helmsmen, signalers, gunners, miners, radio communications specialists, engine room personnel, electricians, radiometer operators, acoustic specialists, chemists, and others.

The ship's command authorities guarantee the rights and benefits defined by Russian Federation laws that are in force to each servicemen who performs service on contract.

Address to the editor. Telephone: 941-19-13, 941-31-64.

#### 'Self-Service' Maintenance Guarantee for Submarines

94UM0258A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 11, 1993 pp 8-11

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Pavlyutkin, under the rubric: "Distress Signal": "The Elite... Has Been Left With Nothing"]

[Text]

#### To Reduce Like We've Never Reduced Before?

Nuclear Submarine Commander Captain 1st Rank A. Shchurenko, a generally unworried and smiling man, looked tired and tense during these last days before putting to sea. Among the multitude of commander's concerns, one especially did not give him any peace: An important piece of equipment had recently malfunctioned during operations. Under conditions of the large amount of work required to repair this mechanism, it would be best of all to replace it or, in the worst case, to call in the repairmen. But it turns out that the base does not have the required spare parts and the specialists are far away. Well commander,

rely just on yourself and also on your subordinates who have been exhausted by evening watches.

"By the way, the submarine is under warranty but it is currently practically impossible to eliminate the defect through the efforts of specialists," you couldn't even sense the irritation in Aleksey Grigoryevich's voice and, obviously, how much he hated everything. "And this while the guarantee enterprises have special maintenance teams. However, try to summon these specialists, especially from other republics!"

"We receive the following telegrams in response to our requests: They say, so, the warranty is still in effect but, since we can't send specialists, do the repairs yourselves," Submarine Task Force Deputy Commander Captain 1st Rank V. Kotomkin entered the conversation. "Excuse me, what kind of strange warranty is that?", Vladimir Ivanovich shrugs his shoulders in bewilderment. "And the fact is that, having found themselves in a difficult economic situation, the enterprises have stopped paying temporary duty assignment expenses to their specialists. These people even receive their salaries on an irregular basis. The navy is simply incapable of assuming responsibility for all of the expenses, including the mandatory prepayment although that is what the guarantee enterprises insist on. In a word, a dead end..."

Unfortunately, right now no one can say: Ultimately, how long will this "self-service" maintenance continue? Today it is senseless to count on appeals for order that aren't backed up or for the accomplishment of obligations. The current military-industrial complex's main argument is the economic slip-knot that is being increasingly tightened by the government. Moreover, many of its enterprises have turned out to be isolated from each other by the impenetrable fences of the sovereign states. And if we can still somehow solve the problems that arise using Russian producers and repairmen, matters are significantly more complicated with the "near-abroad". Indeed, the unregulated market relations in Russia also engender paradoxes. A simple example. A plant that specializes in the manufacture of fluorescent bulbs unilaterally reduced deliveries to the navy. It seems like a minor detail but try to find a replacement for them! A similar situation exists with spare parts kits and with many other things.

The traditional question: "How can that be?"—still requires a legitimate answer. It's quite obvious that neither the navy nor the Ministry of Defense can independently untie that knot. But we think that this problem is quite solvable at the intergovernmental level. Conclusion of the necessary agreements is the only rational solution to the situation today. Only, will we be able to find the resources to carry out those agreements?

We recall that, after the "Komsomolets" tragedy, there were many conversations and many decisions were made to improve warranty maintenance of submarines that remain unfulfilled. As a result, the state of affairs has deteriorated even further today. Yes, and how could it be otherwise if the resources that are currently being allocated do not cover even minimal requirements? In our country

at each step we have examples of borrowing experience from the West but for some reason this approach is not being employed with regard to the navy. For example, in the U.S. Navy, the strength of support subunits exceeds the number of shipborne specialists by a factor of 5-6. In our country, where we traditionally follow our own path, previously we did the opposite and even more so right now. In one nuclear submarine task force, while following the regulation to reduce so-called noncombat subunits, they eliminated the coastal base and are disbanding two maintenance crews. Well it turns out that sentries, the guard, galley details, policing the area, alert duty at the entry control point, patrols, and so on and so forth—all of this will lie on the shoulders of submarine combat crews and one more or less important plan—preparation for winter—hangs in the task force commander's office in a visible place alongside the BP [operation order] plan. And yet hope flickers within me that maybe matters are somewhat better in other garrisons? Alas....

"The situation is serious and there is an extreme shortage of material resources and financing," Rear-Admiral M. Motsak, commander of another task force, told me. "We are trying to allocate those crumbs that we do have in such a manner as to support at least the most combat capable ships. But that is difficult to do. We are increasingly delaying routine maintenance and the number of submarines with overdue periods between repairs is increasing. Today, only one of four warranty equipment repair and maintenance organizations is in full-fledged operation. But on the other hand, commercial structures and small enterprises are growing like mushrooms after the rain. These commercial structures and small enterprises are splitting off from the ship repair plants that are also experiencing hard times. They are enticing the best specialists to their organizations. The navy has been compelled to turn to their services in order not to remain without any repairs at all. And although they are asking high prices for work, the quality of repairs is not increasing because of this and the time periods for repairs are being continuously dragged out. Judge for yourself, under these conditions is it easy to maintain the required level of technical readiness of ships?"

"The duration of submarine service is drastically declining as a result of the disruption of their operating cycle (the most important element of which is maintenance). We are 'doing everything we can' to maintain submarines at the combat capable level for as long as possible..."

"Objectively, the navy's qualitative level has deteriorated." Nuclear Submarine Task Force Chief of Staff Captain 1st Rank V. Avlastimov said. "New models of weapons and equipment have nearly stopped entering the inventory. Those that were in the developmental stage at one time have remained drawings. Test ranges and NII [scientific research institutes] are being closed and high-tech production is being shutdown. Promising developments and experience and unique specialists are being lost. Before our eyes, we are retreating from formerly leading positions in this sphere. What will the navy be like tomorrow?"

That question is far from rhetorical. According to some data, in recent years the number of technical developments has been reduced by nearly a factor of ten. The most important priorities have been lost, for example, in the sphere of the utilization of titanium, where domestic shipbuilding had far outstripped foreign shipbuilding. We continue to finish building certain series of nuclear submarines probably because that is cheaper and easier than to completely shutdown production.

As for strategic submarines, here the situation is even worse. Existing future developments of submarines have practically been frozen when the time for medium repair is approaching for the submarines that we have in operation and for which we do not yet have resources nor do we have resources for their modernization. Meanwhile, in accordance with the START treaties, the strategic forces naval component is emerging in first place. Won't it turn out that Russia will be left without its nuclear shield?

#### ... But We Have Nowhere To Go

"How do you like the wardroom?", Captain 2nd Rank S. Fedorychev, deputy task force commander for personnel, sympathetically asked me. Having noted my embarrassment, he cleverly added from the reply: "Of course, the food is terrible and, as they say, we are switching over from millet to pearl barley. Standards are not being maintained but it's difficult to blame the supply people for that—there's nothing in the warehouses. Even if some submarine or other is being prepared to put to sea, it is a problem to supply its crew with the most basic necessities. There is also a certain 'innovation': There are frequently shortages in the boxes of provisions that are packed at the plants."

We sat in a small cabin, we drank tea, and we talked "about life" at a leisurely pace. Sergey Anatolyevich has devoted 25 years of his life to the navy. He has primarily served in the surface fleet—on combatants, on diesel ships, and later—on nuclear submarines. He has performed 12 combat tours.

"I have something with which to compare this," continued Fedorychev. White-haired, good-natured, and kind, he completely corresponded to the customary model of a man whom life has made wise. "In general, the people have not changed during this time but the attitude toward them has become worse. Many junior officers frankly say: You have no place to go, you have already served for so long, but we do not want to repeat your path. They see quite well in people like me the example of what prospects await them. If I am released into the reserve—where will my family and I end up, without housing? Crowd ourselves in with my elderly parents? And the majority are finding themselves in that situation... That is why people are increasingly leaving the navy."

"We had Senior Lieutenant Nikolay Matrosov—commander of the mine-torpedo department—on our submarine. A hard to find kind of specialist. And he served well and he showed great promise but, having written his request for release, he departed. Acoustic Team Commander Captain-Lieutenant Sergey Vasilevich is also planning to leave for the civilian sector. You could say he is

going nowhere, he doesn't have any rear services support but even that, in his opinion, is better than continuing to serve. Right now it is not prestigious to be a submariner and the material position obviously does not correspond to the labor spent and to those dangers and deprivations that seamen experience. It's not surprising that, at the slightest opportunity, officers and warrant officers are leaving the navy for business. Yes, that's what I'm saying! My son finished school but he doesn't want to hear about any advantage whatsoever about becoming a submariner and I myself do not wish his fate to repeat mine with the possibility of finding himself left with nothing..."

Having been silent for a while, Sergey Anatolyevich considered it necessary to add: "But then again, no matter how much we in the crew argue or are indignant, or how much we discuss, when the ship puts to sea—everything else becomes secondary. For the time being, duty and the Fatherland is not an empty sound for people. The question is—for how long? The social experience of the older generations is not passing without a trace and if today much is being maintained in the old mode, it's hard to say what will happen tomorrow..."

The cause of that concern is understandable; already right now the cadre shortage is tenaciously grasping the throat. The loss of the Baku and Sevastopol naval schools hit the Russian submarine fleet especially hard. The shortage of people naturally is reflected in the combat readiness of ships; before putting out to sea, they have to be brought up to full strength with the required specialists, having immediately activated several crews. The number of temporary duty personnel sometimes reaches one fourth of the assigned strength! And, in violation of the requirements of guiding documents, replacements and transfers are being conducted until the very last moment.

Commenting on the situation, Nuclear Submarine Task Force Commander Vice-Admiral A. Shevchenko stated in that same vein:

"No matter where you go now, we are being held to that old strength reserve. But if the state does not change its attitude toward defense in the near future, the decline will continue. And this will be reflected most of all in cadres—a real collapse can occur in a couple of years. We, military personnel, have completely performed our duty but the politicians must also understand: If there will be a reliable defense—there will also be strong statehood..."

I agreed with Anatoliy Ivanovich that it seems that this understanding is already beginning to force its way through. For the first time in many years, officers have sensed a real increase of their monetary salary. Although also relative—with the current insane inflation!—but still an improvement. The long-awaited law "On the Status of Servicemen" has been adopted. The law is good but (literally everyone has talked about that!) the overwhelming mass of its provisions still remain only on paper.

"Why is this occurring? Well, because the law does not have the proper legal and financial support," thinks Northern Fleet Deputy Commander for Personnel Rear-Admiral M. Sviridov. "Let's take a specific example like

supplying garrisons. If you believe the law, servicemen and their families can obtain goods and foodstuffs at beneficial prices through the military sales store system. But to do that, it seems the appropriate state subsidies, credits, and the state order are needed, in a word—financial support. In the absence of that, we have what is available: Commercial sales have inundated the navy with alcoholic beverages, chewing gum and expensive, low-quality, consumer goods. In order to survive, the military sales store is also increasing prices which are becoming even higher than in ordinary state stores. What are the benefits here?

"Or," continued Mikhail Ivanovich, "one more problem—transportation. According to the law, servicemen are supposed to get free travel on all types of city and municipal public transportation. But in our area, people are paying full price on inter-garrison routes to get to their duty locations: We don't have our own buses and we have to lease them from oblast transportation organizations. Where do we get the money to pay? There is only one solution—pass the hat."

I will be frank: Only the lack of housing and the illusory hope for improvement of their situation holds many of the officers whom I've managed to meet on this temporary duty assignment in the service. But increasingly after release into the reserve, officers have been compelled to leave the military garrisons where their service that was full of concerns and deprivations occurred...

#### A Little Bit Goes a Long Way

I drove with apprehension into this military garrison where the submariners' families live: I had spent quite a bit of my childhood here. Much had changed in a little over 20 years. The garrison had deteriorated since that time and had become sort of lacking in comforts. Alongside the apartment buildings that had still not been subjected to the test of time are empty five-story buildings with gaping windows without panes, piles of garbage on untidy small streets, the dilapidated Officers' Club, and the boarded up swimming pool. There was the mark of desolation and neglect on everything. But there was a time when Party and state leaders were brought here on "tours", to a village that shined with cleanliness and tidiness. Since that time, as the village was transferred to the balance sheet of the local Soviet, it has not become a real caring owner. More precisely, there aren't resources for its full-fledged maintenance. Maybe the seamen could also help but they themselves, as they say, have deficiency after deficiency. What resources can reach the village right now, say, if we can't always manage to paint the submarines?

Degrading poverty, like rust, is eating away all of the pores of the navy organism. It would seem that the nuclear submarines that are at the piers would be provided with the complete standard of high pressure air, feed water, steam and electricity... That is in theory. In fact, the submariners frequently have to count on only their own resources, more precisely, on the ship's service life. Mechanisms are wearing out much earlier than they should and numerous breakdowns are becoming inevitable.

"There are submarines," says Nuclear Submarine Commander Captain 1st Rank M. Ivanisov, "that have fired 'bubbles' for an entire year due to the shortage of practice torpedoes. Torpedo training schools and the struggles for survival of the ship are being lost..."

"Recently, the intensity of cruises, including combat service, has been reduced by a factor of 2-2.5," says another Nuclear Submarine Commander Captain 1st Rank O. Gorelov. "The cruise time per year for any crews does not exceed 2-3 weeks. And actual sea cruises are the primary type of training for us."

"Today we are striving to resolve on shore part of the problems associated with the limited number of times ships put to sea—by training crews in simulators. But we need to improve the MTB [logistic and technical support facilities]; that is, to once again invest resources to do that," Northern Fleet Headquarters Department Chief Captain 1st Rank M. Kolbunov comments on the situation. "But where do we get the resources? There is primarily obsolete equipment at the task forces' training centers and we can't even talk about computers. And in order to acquire them—you yourself can imagine what kind of resources we need to invest. We don't have money for ordinary light bulbs. Previously there was a powerful training center in Estonia's Paldiski where crews underwent between-cruise training twice a year. Now the center is not functioning. They plan to withdraw all of its equipment which is very complicated and terribly expensive."

Currently all the problems of basic support of the navy's vital activities have deteriorated to the maximum extent possible. Say, we need to reload torpedoes but, as frequently happens now, there isn't a crane. But the neighboring construction unit has one. Well, the nuclear submarine commander goes over to beg to use it. Of course, they simply won't give him the crane just for that but they can probably come to an agreement for a couple liters of alcoholic beverages or for two or three boxes of food. It can also be carried to absurdity. The one and only tugboat, and it is not always in working order, serves an entire task force of attack submarines. But according to the standard, three tugs are required to moor other submarines. But then again, if there were three, it still isn't known which KPD [efficiency] they would manage to utilize: Right now diesel fuel is worth its weight in gold. An important problem is to tow a nuclear submarine to the neighboring bay (to do that, in turn you need to refuel the tug). It's sometimes easier and faster to start the nuclear reactor which they occasionally do. A truly Russian scale!

It's not surprising that everyday life has also turned out to be in an extraordinarily neglected state. The temperature in some barracks did not rise above 10 degrees all last winter. All of the crew's officers have one cabin to work in and the warrant officers don't even have one. Essentially, the barracks has been turned into an ordinary flophouse. Poverty "has been able to touch" even here. They don't even have any cleaning supplies. When one of the submarines left on an endurance cruise, a surprise awaited its

crew: The base had allocated a total of 1.5 boxes of soap! They intended, as they say—to make a little bit go a long way...

Before leaving the military garrison where the submariners' families live, I came to pay my respects at the monument erected on the summit of a small hill in honor of the seamen who died on the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets". Just like the crucifixion, it's as if it floated in the cold sky that was covered by storm clouds. I thought that the submariners, true sons of the Fatherland, had ascended to Calvary on behalf of it. Their comrades serve today for the sake of the Homeland's welfare. Will Mother Russia make it so that this service requires not titanic efforts from Northern Fleet seamen to overcome frequently unresolved problems but would make them happy and would nurture pride in the fact that they are defending a truly great state?

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#### **Naval Press Center Statement on Nuclear Dumping**

94UM0258B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 11, 1993 pp 16-17

[Unattributed article, under the rubric: "Official Department": "Naval Press Center Statement"]

[Text] The Naval Press Center has been authorized to disseminate the following statement as a result of articles in the mass media on radioactive waste dumping problems:

The decision on radioactive waste dumping at sea from naval facilities was made at the end of the 1950's, based on the results of a series of scientific investigations and while considering the practices of the majority of "nuclear" countries that existed at that time. The organization of dumping wastes at sea stipulated the reduction to a minimum of the possible unfavorable impact of the wastes on the population as a whole and on the critical group of the population who reside in coastal areas. During the resolution of organized issues of waste dumping at sea, a policy was also conducted toward the reduction of the possible unfavorable impact of the wastes on the environment. Dumping standards had a significant hygienic reserve and took into account the accumulation of radionuclides by aquatic life and their entry into the human organism as food. Permissible concentrations of man-made radionuclides in seawater were adopted that were 1-2 orders of magnitude lower than permissible concentrations for drinking water. Based upon the results of a number of expeditionary studies of the radioactive situation in waste dump areas, the actual concentrations of radionuclides in seawater turned out to be lower than the permissible levels by 2-3 orders of magnitude. They also did not detect any radioactive contamination of aquatic life.

The practice of dumping wastes at sea was the only possible step that supports the vital activities of ships with nuclear power plants in view of the absence of effective processes for reprocessing radioactive wastes. France and

Great Britain adhere to a similar practice for dealing with radioactive wastes until the present time.

Since 1991, the Navy has ceased dumping solid radioactive wastes at sea. The dumping of liquid wastes has been reduced to the lowest possible level.

Based upon the results of radiation-hygienic and radioecological research of solid and liquid radioactive waste dumping areas that have been conducted by the Navy and also by a number of scientific research institutions (RAN GEOKhI [Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry imeni V.I. Vernadskiy] and "Tayfun" NPO [Scientific Production Association]) during the period from 1967 to 1992, no cases were detected of dangerous radioactive contamination of the sea environment both directly in the dumping areas and also in the water areas adjacent to them. The levels of radioactive contamination of the seas of the North and the Far East do not indicate any dangerous increase of the content of radionuclides in seawater. Specifically, the concentrations of Strontium-90 in the surface waters of the Barents Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Pacific Ocean (the coastal waters of Eastern Kamchatka) total  $1.6 \times 10^{-11}$  Ci/l [Curies per liter],  $1.0 \times 10^{-11}$  Ciuries per liter, and  $0.9 \times 10^{-11}$  Ciuries per liter, respectively, which is four times lower than the concentration of Strontium-90 in the surface waters of the Baltic Sea ( $4.4 \times 10^{-11}$  Ciuries per liter).

At the international conference of experts on the assessment of the existing and potential consequences of dumping radioactive wastes in Arctic waters that took place in Oslo in February 1993 in which the representatives of 12 countries and also IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] experts participated, based on the materials examined, they arrived at the conclusion that there is inadequate evidence of a dangerous impact of sources of radioactive contamination on the maritime environment of the Arctic Seas at the present time, except for the entry of radioactive wastes from Western European spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants and global fallout of the products of nuclear detonations.

An expeditionary study of waste dumping areas in the Karsk Sea was conducted on the "Kovrayskiy" OIS [Experimental Research Ship] to assess the impact of radioactive wastes on the naval environment during the period from 16 August through 10 September 1993. The expedition's work was conducted by experts of Russian Federation profile scientific-research institutes ("Radiyevyy Institute" NPO and "Kurchatovskiy Institute" RNTs) and of a number of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense institutions. At the present time, the initial processing of samples is being conducted and an express-report has been prepared based upon the expedition's results. The amount of research accomplished permits us to arrive at the conclusion that the radioecological situation in the areas studied is without anomalies and can be characterized as normal. There have been no cases detected of radionuclides leaking into the environment from dumped containers. The yield of gamma radiation

doses on the surface of the water area, on land surrounding the bays and on the ground does not exceed background levels and is 4-12 microroentgens per hour. Concentrations of Cesium-137 in seawater do not exceed the sensitivity of instrument measurement methods ( $2 \times 10^{-12}$  Ciuries per liter). An international expedition that operated on the "Akademik Mstislav Keldysh" NIS [Scientific Research Ship] obtained similar results. Final data on the content of radionuclides in seawater, algae, ground and sea organisms will be reported after radiochemical and spectrometric research has been conducted in the laboratories of the institutes that participated in the expeditionary research.

Two international expeditions (Russian-Norwegian—on the "Viktor Buynitskiy" NIS and on the Jigofs [Transliterated] project—on the "Dmitriy Mendeleyev" NIS) are continuing the study of the radioecological situation in the Northern Seas. Expedition work will be concluded at the end of October 1993. The final results of the radioecological research can be obtained after processing, under laboratory conditions, of the samples of the environment that were taken and also after the comparison, summarization and analysis of the data obtained during the course of the study of maritime areas which will require a certain amount of time.

It seems to be advisable to note that this problem, being universal, can be resolved only at the state level within the framework of the realization of a purposeful Russian Federation State Program for dealing with radioactive wastes and spent nuclear materials and for writing them off and dumping them.

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
**Electronic Support to Combat Command and Control**  
*94UM0259A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian*  
*No 11, 1993 pp 33-35*

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Luzgin and Retired Captain 1st Rank, Lecturer S. Smirnov, under the rubric: "Questions of Theory": "Electronic Support to Combat Command and Control"]

[Text] Electronic situation coverage occupies a special place in the series of measures for the support of command and control of combat and everyday activities of naval ships. The sphere of its operation extends in space from the surface of the sea to its bottom, on the one hand, and to near space, on the other hand.

At the present time, various guiding documents and official publications contain a certain inconsistency in the interpretation of the concept "electronic support", including the electronic situation coverage process as the initial component of this type of support. At the same time, there are certain theoretical and practical accumulations here. As a result, normalization of the existing views is becoming an urgent task. In our opinion, we can most graphically present the entire process of electronic situation coverage in the form of the structural diagrams that are depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 3.


Figure 1. A Graphic Algorithm of the Electronic Situation Coverage Mission Accomplishment Process



It is customary to proceed from the fact that, as shown in Figure 1, this process objectively consists of the successive resolution of the following missions at any level of command and control (of a ship and its weapons, a task group, a task force, etc.):

1. Continuous surveillance of the surrounding situation, using electronic detection and identification systems, that consists of three stages—target search, target detection and identification and also target tracking during a specific period of time.
2. Gathering information on the situation and the reciprocal exchange of information among task force (task group) ships and also with external sources via radio nets and radio lines of automated VZOI systems. There are two stages present here: Gathering information on the situation from internal ship sources and the reciprocal exchange of information with other sources.
3. Processing all initial information that has been obtained on the situation (What? Where? In what quantity detected?); contact plotting (electronic tracking) of target movement with detection of target motion and maneuvering and formation of the target history in MRO systems or in STVS [specialized digital computer system] in BIUS [Combat Information Command and Control System] loops or in BITs of ships; identification of all information on the situation and depiction of models of tactical situations with their extrapolation for the immediate future. That is, operational data is divided into three stages—initial, secondary and tertiary processing of information on the situation.
4. Analysis of the situation that has developed in the BITs of ships. (An assessment of mutual location, target motion and maneuvering, and detection of the composition of the enemy forces is the first stage; discovery of the operating tactics, the degree of threat and the enemy's intentions is the second stage).
5. A report from the BITs of ships and presentation of the initial and processed, analyzed information on the situation to the command authorities in graphic form on ARM [automated work station] screens; to the GKPs [Primary Control Station] of ships, the command posts of task forces, and to other command posts—consumers of information on the situation. The initial abbreviated report with the information: What has been detected and is being observed, the numerical composition of the group targets and where they are located—coordinate data; a more precise report with indication of certain target motion and maneuvering parameters; and, finally, a complete report with the addition of target tactical composition, the proposed nature of operations and the degree of threat, and revealed enemy intentions.

**Figure 2. Recommendations for Combat Command and Control That Have Been Developed Based Upon the Results of Electronic Situation Coverage and the Stages of Their Implementation and Electronic Support**




Based upon the theoretical bases that assume the gradual nature of the resolution of each electronic situation coverage mission that is depicted in Figure 1, the algorithm reveals existing communications and dependence between the stages examined above and displays a definite symmetry in the dynamics of its implementation.

Based upon the results of the electronic situation coverage, information processing support must be attained using the MRO systems, combat information command and control system loops, BITs equipment or PU-N recommendations. Taking these into account, the Primary Control Station and other command posts of ships or the task group or task force command post make decisions on the command and control of the electronic situation coverage systems themselves, electronic jamming systems, weapons systems, ships, task forces and coordinating forces. The process of carrying out each of the possible decisions also entails a number of consecutive conditional stages. The majority of these stages, in turn, require electronic support through the utilization of target identification and target designation

systems and schemes, weapons fire control systems, electronic warfare systems, shipborne aircraft take off, flight, vectoring and landing control systems, diagrams and shipborne combat information command and control system loops, navigational radars, etc. The composition of the command and control missions, based upon which the recommendations indicated above can be developed according to the electronic situation coverage and also the primary stages of electronic support of the resolution of these missions is shown in Figure 2.

Consequently, based upon electronic situation coverage, we can totally achieve the required level of electronic support of command and control during combat and everyday activities of ships and task forces (Fig. 3) ONLY as a result of ALL of the examined processes. What has been set forth above is called upon to ameliorate to a certain extent the existing inconsistencies in understanding and interpreting the issues of "electronic support" and "electronic situation coverage".

Figure 3. The Content of Electronic Support of Combat Command and Control



In conclusion, it is appropriate to point out that the examined provisions can be accepted as a sort of methodological basis of the scientific and academic discipline being formed—"Electronic Support of the Command and Control of Ships, Their Weapons, and Coordinating Forces". In our opinion, this discipline must follow the content and patterns of the resolution of various electronic situation coverage missions and electronic support of combat command and control on the whole and, through its stages, the patterns of interrelationships and the dependencies of these stages. The development of recommendations of a technical and organizational context for the effective electronic support of combat command and control of naval ships and task forces must be its practical solution.

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## REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

**Armed Forces Mass Media Reorganization Viewed**  
944F0451A Moscow *OBSHCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian  
11-17 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Kiselev: "You Will Learn of Their Fate from the Order"]

[Text] ITAR-TASS has sent a report: reorganization of the Armed Forces' mass media has begun. Which is not entirely correct. They have simply begun speaking about this at last. But the reformers had a different intent. To prepare a draft order by the minister of defense without unnecessary fanfare. He would sign it hastily without considering it carefully. And the deed was done, the reorganization took place.

**Who needs this? One viewpoint.** "We have three central organs for the Ministry of Defense—KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the weekly SYN OTECHESTVA, the semi-monthly journal ARMIYA, and 13 travel and other magazines. Altogether, 102 editions. At the same time, for example, the Pentagon publishes about 400 magazines and 1,000 newspapers. In the FRG they publish about 100 military newspapers and magazines, and Britain publishes

more than 110. A subsidy of 1,241,462,000 rubles [R] is required. As a comparison, it costs the state budget roughly R1.5 billion to publish just the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA alone." (From an interview last year with Vladimir Kosarev, chief of the Information and Press Administration of the Ministry of Defense.)

The following episode took place last year in one of the MO [Ministry of Defense] collegium meetings. "Is a large amount of money required to support our press?" the minister asked. They answered him. "And how many houses can be built with this?" Pavel Grachev asked. "Three or four," the general in charge of finances reported. "Well, we should build them," the minister sighed. "The housing for officers is really a catastrophe." As we know, any sigh by the chief is interpreted as a directive in the Army.

**An arithmetic lesson.** Speaking of the need for reform, all the military officials say the primary cause is the shortage of money (at the same time, though, they prefer to call it "optimizing" the press or "putting it in order"), stating more specifically that most of the funds go toward the wages of editorial staff collectives. The conclusion is obvious—to be squeezed. Some of the large-edition publications will really disappear soon. This amounts to kopecks, however. You cannot shut down the district newspapers. They decided to fill up the Ministry of Defense's empty purse at the cost of the Moscow editions. Asking that his name not be given, an officer from the Information and Press Administration said the finance people simply ordered straight out at first: leave only one newspaper and one journal. But their ardor was restrained. It looks as if only the SYN OTECHESTVA and six magazines are being sent for the slaughter in the end. But two new ones are being established (we have to pay to order them, by the way).

No one could tell me if there is a substantial economic gain from such deviations. There are probably no such assessments at all. But according to my estimates, it is very questionable. The most profitable military publications

which are issued regularly and are not losing subscribers are on the list of the ones curtailed. At the same time, CHEST IMEYU (formerly SOVETSKIY VOIN), a literary and artistic journal with excessively inflated staffs (55 officers and 63 employees, with 12 correspondents stationed in the districts), turned out only six issues last year and is up to its ears in debt. The supplement to CHEST IMEYU—BOYEVOY TOVARISHCH—has not been issued for a year. Aleksey Petrenko, who heads the supplement, implores: "Dismiss us in the staff reduction." "No, stay," they respond.

Altogether, about 100 officer-journalists are being released in the publications being abolished. A few more than the number left in the Information and Press Administration. But not many more. Even during the times of the unforgettable GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate], the octopus which squeezed the Armed Forces, the entire military press was headed by a department with under 10 soldiers. But now the official category of chief of the administration is a lieutenant general, his deputy is a major general, and the heads of departments are colonels, who are in charge of more colonels. According to my information, the administration is staffed by 62 persons. There are 40, according to its chief. Although this does not change the point.

**The prime mover of the reform.** When I expressed my doubts to one of the administration's employees, he just smiled: "Everything runs smoothly as long as our lady is with us." The boss of the military press today is Yelena Agapova. The new administration—information and press—was established in the Ministry of Defense precisely because she asked for it. According to Grachev's order, "The chief of the administration is subordinate to the Russian Federation minister of defense's assistant for public and press relations," that is, to Yelena Aleksandrovna. She was formerly the deputy editor in chief of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Her subordinate, Vladimir Kosarev, who has headed the administration and received his general's shoulder boards with the speed of lightning, also comes from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

And there are no mysteries for military readers with respect to CHEST IMEYU. When Nikolay Ivanov no longer wished to head the journal after the tragic October, and Aleksandr Tkachev, who headed the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA cultural department, took his place, Agapova was still a reporter for it.

So the encirclement is being reinforced, step by step, "with her own people." As General Kosarev explained it to me, his administration will decide which publications to shut down and whom to appoint as editors of the new ones. They do not even intend to consult with the Ministry of Defense collegium about the publications being abolished (they include two central organs of the Ministry of Defense: SYN OTECHESTVA and ARMIYA, the only military-political journal in the Armed Forces). "This matter is too minor to divert the collegium's attention."

But I know not all the minister's deputies and commanders in chief of the service branches are prepared to be content with the role of extras.

### Reasons Behind Reform of Military Press

94UM0254A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 17 Feb 94 p 6

[Article by Nikolay Gogolev under the rubric "The Press": "Reform of Military Publications: Official Version and Hidden Agenda"]

[Text] In accordance with an order from Russia's minister of defense a reorganization—or rather, a reduction—of educational structures is being conducted in the army. A number of the functions of educational structures are being transferred to other agencies and services. For example, law enforcement and the strengthening of discipline will now be headed by... The Directorate of Routine and Service of the General Staff.

The military mass media are also being reformed. The fairly rare ranks of military journals (there are only 14 with a single, combined edition of around 200,000 copies) is being reduced by half. Even publications popular not only with the military but also the civilian readership, such as ARMIYA, the central organ of Russia's Ministry of Defense, AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE and the weekly SYN OTECHESTVA are going "under the knife." Even at a time of massive loss of readership, these publications have kept their subscribers. ARMIYA has even increased its portion.

The magazines VOYENNYY VESTNIK and VOYENNO-EKONOMICHESKIY ZHURNAL with their great popularity and rich history are also undergoing reform. As is usually the case in the military structure, this is being done without taking into account the opinion of those assigned the functions of founders and without the agreement of the journalist teams.

The official version of the reform is that the Ministry of Defense wants to establish a more optimal structure of the military mass media. It is also prompted, as it were, by the informational processes occurring in the society and by the reform of the armed forces themselves. The main factor, however, is the fact that the funds for publishing the journals are lacking, and they have to economize.

At first glance it all seems convincing. Especially for one who has no concept of what is taking place in the military's top echelons today and believes sacredly that the taxpayers' money to support the armed forces is being spent prudently and thrifitily.

The journalists themselves believe that there are other reasons for the reform of military publications, however. They are revealed in part by an article published in the 2 February issue of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The author, military journalist A. Petrov, writes of the danger of eliminating the weekly SYN OTECHESTVA. The weekly (like a number of military magazines—N.G.) was not included in the catalog for the first half of this year, which actually means that it no longer exists.

SYN OTECHESTVA is well known in the nation. It has been published since 1812. The weekly provides an interesting and vital account of the armed forces. Like the military magazines, it performs an important role in the

information flow. It firmly holds to a course of military-patriotic indoctrination of the army and navy youth and contributes to the shaping of the best qualities of defenders of the homeland in the servicemen.

The weekly may now suffer the sad fate of its companion journals. The author of a KOMSOMOLKA article bitterly laments the fact that the number of military newspapers and magazines is being cut, but not the army of press officials. That army actually exists. Judge for yourself. During the communist era the mass media were run by a press section of the well-known GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council], fewer than a dozen members (four officers, two Soviet Army employees, headed by a major general).

The military press is run today by an entire directorate of information and the press of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense. Major-General Vladimir Kosarev, its chief, naturally has a higher position rating (lieutenant-general). Like any self-respecting directorate this one has several sections and groups headed by colonels. Each section has two or three officers, of course.

Nor could we fail to mention the press centers of the branches of forces, troop arms, districts, groups of forces and fleets, which also contain not just a single dozen press officials.

And so, the military press is being "optimized" through a reduction of its small staff.

But even this is not the whole truth, as they say.

Many reformers like to refer to Western models—when it is to their advantage, of course. Let me make reference to some foreign examples. The Pentagon publishes around 400 magazines and 1,000 newspapers with a total circulation of 12.5 million copies. In Germany there are around 100 military publications; in Great Britain, more than 110. We have only 102. To the same extent we accede to the leading countries of the world in the concentration of the mass media on the armed forces in the information arena. And is it not strange that we are presently artificially cutting these means, actually constricting the sphere of influence upon military personnel?

The army is rightly considered to be one of the guarantors of the state's stability. This accounts for the desire of far-sighted leaders to strengthen not only its structure but also its spirit, to see to the moral and spiritual state of the servicemen. The military press is also expected to perform this mission. Will it be capable of doing this effectively, however, after it is reformed?

In an interview with the magazine ARMIYA, Major-General V. Kosarev commented that the military press is living through far from the best of times. According to him, this is primarily due to lack of financing. But our directorate has been given hope, they say, in seeking a way out, a way to get the money, in close contact with the Main Directorate of the Budget and Financing....

And they have found it. They are cutting the popular publications which do not require significant outlays,

while retaining the unprofitable ones with small circulations. Where is the logic? If, as V. Kosarev asserts, the solution to the problem lies in funds, then how does one explain the fact that for almost a year now the magazine CHEST IMEYU (the present name of SOVETSKIY VOIN) has not been published while continuing to exist in good standing? And its staff has more than 100 members, 55 of them officers. This is truly a "golden magazine." But inaccessible to the reader, and not just due to the high subscription price. The main cause of the "inaccessibility" is otherwise. Last year the subscribers received only 6 of 12 issues. Incidentally, without any kind of explanation or compensation. Furthermore a subsidy of 40 million rubles was required to publish these six issues.

It would be difficult to say how much will be needed this year. Obviously, no less than required to publish the reduced list of military journals. Nonetheless, the matter of reorganizing and particularly of eliminating the former SOVETSKIY VOIN is not at issue. Furthermore, plans are in the air at the "upper levels" for publishing this journal jointly with a Finnish printing enterprise. Can this really cost the Ministry of Defense less in the present situation?

If "money determines all," do the reformers of the military press know how to count it? Their most potent argument is that two publications will replace the seven being eliminated. They will take on the functions of the former publications.

The number of slots in the military journalists' shop will indeed be reduced somewhat. Along with this, however, outlays for publishing the new journals will undoubtedly substantially increase various registration costs, subscription fees and so forth. Most important is the fact that these publications will turn out to be impotent and ineffective, therefore unprofitable.

In general the reform contains a number of paradoxes. Take just the journal ARMIYA. Its editorial board includes Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, chief of General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov, advisers to the President of the Russian Federation, and the current chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, Sergey Yushenkov. One has to ask whether the elimination of ARMIYA does not mean that the editorial board has "led the magazine astray"? If that is the case, however, then where is the guilt of the editorial board whose fate is presently in question?

All of this raises the question: What is the objective of the reform of the military press? Common sense suggests that no reform is justifiable if it is detrimental to the interests of the people and the cause. A reorganization of the military press is inevitable, of course. It is politically justified, scientifically substantiated and economically expedient. But do the higher military officials understand this?

And all the time someone continues with enviable persistence to destroy the military press and the informational arena in the armed forces. It would be difficult to predict the effects of this destruction. I shall risk one suggestion, however. If you agree that a good half of the military members were backers of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy during

the parliamentary elections of December 1993, how many of them might there be by the time of the presidential elections?

**Fuel Directorate's Fire, Rescue Chief Interviewed**  
*94UM0248A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*18 Feb 94 p 2*

[Interview with Colonel Yevgeniy Olkov, chief, Fire-fighting and Rescue Service, Central Missile Fuel and Fuel Directorate, Ministry of Defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Petr Altunin: "Standing on a Rim of Fire: More Frequent Fires Causing Alarm"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

**[Text] Colonel Yevgeniy Olkov is chief of the Firefighting and Rescue Service, Central Missile Fuel and Fuel Directorate, MO [Ministry of Defense]. He is devoted to his work and a patriot to his service. Below are his thoughts on this service which he expressed in an interview granted in response to a request submitted by the editors.**

[Altunin] Yevgeniy Pavlovich, if you do not mind, I will start off with an old humorous saying: "Firemen do nothing but fall into and out of snoozing."

[Olkov] There is an element of truth in that saying. The truth is, it came about at one time in a rural area, where long intervals would pass before a fire would break out. People were lulled into a false sense of security, and firefighters themselves would become lax. However, someone eventually would take it into his head to "put the torch" to something, and a breeze would come along to help the fire burn down half a village.

Today, a time of technical revolution, the situation is different. At one time, the means of starting a fire were a match or flintstone. Now, no matter where you go, there are these means: electricity, gas, fuel, oils. Just look at the numbers: There are 5.5 million fires occurring every year in the world; that is more than 500 fires an hour. In this connection, incidences of fire in industrially advanced countries are increasing by 5 percent a year, with the damage caused growing by 10 percent. People lose their lives. In the month of January in Moscow alone there were 34 deaths and 37 persons suffering burn injuries.

[Altunin] It may be said that your service is highly involved with fires, what with fuel stored in depots and bases and highly flammable liquids present there. How do you cope with that?

[Olkov] It is not easy. What we have is described by the words in the song: "We are standing on a rim of fire." We - firefighters and fuel people - are subjected to conditions peculiar to us. While most people can get along with putting out fires with water, we have in our inventory special apparatus and means, equipment to lift and deliver foam, foam generators, and various powders. In addition, we are organized differently. For example, take the mutual cooperation with firefighting teams of the MVD, activities which are governed strictly and responsibly in compliance with the

respective orders issued by Russia's ministers of defense and internal affairs. Plans for combined operations also exist.

It is quite a matter for firefighters to work in casemate tanks. They use special tools - ones that do not produce sparks. In the former ZakVO [Transcaucasus Military District], for example, why did a fire and then an explosion occur in a casemate? Safety rules were not observed. One enlisted man died, three suffered burns of various degrees of severity, and the fuel burned up.

We are involved with lightning protection. To do this work, one must possess knowledge and know how to perform special calculations. But what can happen? Commanders, in their desire to "take their chances" in the good old Russian way, weld some pieces of a pipe together and stick it into the ground without much ado. This was the case in the ZakVO when lightning entered a casemate space to set off saturated fuel vapors, thus wreaking havoc on a fuel tank.

We also provide static electricity protection for filling and draining devices, pipelines, and pumping and storage tank facilities. This also pertains to a fuel truck, which should drag a chain on the ground.

[Altunin] Is there something new with which to extinguish fires?

[Olkov] The traditional substances are the chemical and air-mechanical foam mixtures. At our recent training sessions held in St. Petersburg, we demonstrated the Shlem fire-extinguishing substance, a "light water" type, which is delivered by hose directed to the base of the tank, directly to the fuel layer. Combustion abatement of the kerosene in the 25 cubic meter tank started five minutes after inflammation (the same time required for firetrucks to arrive), with the flames extinguished in one minute.

What is noteworthy here is that the new substance is simple, inexpensive, and, most important, the fluorine-containing foam is inert with respect to petroleum products, does not mix with the latter, is not contaminated by hydrocarbons, and does not harm the environment.

[Altunin] How do you organize your work?

[Olkov] We observe all the rules. We mount firefighting guards to provide a 24-hour watch; they maintain a log by entering into the latter all their observations and call out a firefighting team in the event a fire breaks out. If an occurrence is serious, they contact local teams and report to me.

[Altunin] Have there been any serious occurrences recently?

[Olkov] Knock on wood, no. Since I took over my post - in 1989 - there have been no major fires.

[Altunin] How demanding are you of commanders in your inspections of fire safety in military units?

[Olkov] We demand, without exception, that fuel depots and bases be equipped with fire warning systems; aboveground tanks, with stationary fire extinguishing equipment; and that firefighting teams be kept up to strength.

Nonetheless, Minister of Defense Order No 450 presently in effect is often violated. Teams are made to do irrelevant jobs and trucks are used to deliver water for flushing drainage systems. There is poor supervision over manpower required for observing monitoring devices and checking on the condition of electric power systems.

I tell you frankly that everything depends upon the commander. For example, Colonels A. Makarov and A. Kustov and Lieutenant Colonel A. Remeshevskiy took over facilities where there were many violations, but they soon took matters in hand such that their bases are in excellent shape with respect to fire safety. This cannot be said in the case of the enterprises commanded by officers A. Pobegayev and V. Bogatov.

My subordinates and I accept no compromises in our inspections - that is the kind of service in which we are. All one need do is realize that a single spark is sufficient to start a flame, and a big one, at that!

[Altunin] Does the Central Directorate's leadership support you in your demands?

[Olkov] Absolutely. And in deed, not word. The directorate chief, among other things, remains constantly in strict compliance with the defense minister's order, which stipulates that fire safety constitutes a major criterion in performance evaluation. Any unit given the "unsatisfactory" rating is rated "unsatisfactory" in general, regardless of the ratings it earns in other areas of activity.

[Altunin] Are there any problems?

[Olkov] The principal one is that of understrength firefighting teams. The defense minister's order calls for at least 12 men per team, but some of them consist of only four. How much can be done with that kind of manpower? Putting out a "small" fire, perhaps. We are thinking about modern firefighting teams in garrisons and introducing alternative service (something which does not yet exist) - something must be done.

[Altunin] Yevgeniy Pavlovich, now for the last question. Many servicemen have an automobile, dacha, or garage, and they constantly face a problem: Where and how to store fuel?

[Olkov] I am fully aware of their difficulties; it is a fact that motor fuel prices are rising every month and everyone wishes to stock up. The men often store fuel in amounts you could not imagine. They forget about safety measures, and the consequences are fires. Just look at Moscow, at its fire-damaged balconies and burned-down garages: they are places where fuel is traditionally stored.

The fire safety rules (PPB) strictly forbid the storing of fuel-filled containers on balconies, loggias, and in corridors. Storage in garages is permitted, but in amounts not

exceeding 20 kg of motor fuel and 5 kg of oil in metal (never polyethylene) containers that are tightly sealed.

It is forbidden to paint motor vehicles in parking areas or garages, refuel vehicles, wash parts in kerosene or gasoline, and dump used petroleum waste products into sewer systems or in the proximity of a garage.

In the case of dachas and small houses located at small garden plots, fuel may be stored only in facilities so designated, with the metal containers tightly sealed, in amounts up to 10 kg. In this connection, it must be kept in mind that the use of gasoline in kerosene, Primus, and pressurized-kerosene stoves is strictly forbidden. The approved product is lighting-grade kerosene, which is sold in special outlets located in villages and rural settlements.

#### Specifications of MTP-A2 Wrecker

94UM0248B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Oleg Vladykin under the "Arsenal" rubric: "An Essential Item"]

[Text] We recently (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA No 14, 1994) presented information on field service vehicle MTP-A4, which is designed for field servicing and evacuating disabled heavy vehicles. This present article deals with another "essential item" - one employed in the event of breakdown of lighter vehicles. The MTP-A2 is used when it is necessary to render assistance to drivers by eliminating malfunctions of vehicles belonging to the families UAZ, GAZ, ZIL, Ural, KamAZ, and MAZ; supply the vehicles with fuel, oil, and automotive fluids; and, if necessary, recover a mired vehicle or set one on its wheels. It can also tow immobilized vehicles weighing up to 10 tonnes by means of a tow bar or by employing the semi-loaded technique.

MTP-A2 Technical Characteristics	
Basic Vehicle	KamAZ-4310
Maximum recovery force, kgf:	
Without cable and pulley equipment	5,000
With cable and pulley equipment	14,000
Maximum load on tow bar, kgf	3,104
Mass of towed vehicle in semi-loaded position, kg	12,000
Mass of towed vehicle, kg:	
On all types of roads	8,500
On paved roads	10,000
Maximum lifting capacity of manipulator, kg	4,500
Disabled vehicle recovery preparation time, min	15
Crew, number of men	2
Curb weight, kg	12,240

With what equipment is the MTP-A2 fitted? It carries a standard winch; lifting device (manipulator); devices to tow a vehicle by means of tow bar or semi-loaded technique; ground anchors; repair and grappling devices; an assortment of spare parts and materials; and containers carrying fuel, oil, and automotive fluids. All the above equipment is designed to rescue a vehicle which is in dire need of assistance.

**Specifications, Performance of 'Shmel' Flamethrower**  
*94UM0283A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
25 Feb 94 p 2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Vladimir Berezko, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "This 'Bumblebee' Stings With Fire"]

[Text] Flamethrowers have been known as effective and at times irreplaceable incendiary weapons for a long time. In the light, portable variant, they were one or several tanks with a flammable mixture that are connected to a nozzle shaped like a gun. The pressure required to discharge the flammable mixture was created either using compressed gas or a powder charge. The shortcomings of this type of flamethrower are obvious. Their combat employment has been associated with a series of difficulties and limitations.

Today, we are familiarizing our readers with a new generation of flamethrower—the capsule flamethrower.

The "Shmel" [Bumblebee] Rocket Infantry Flamethrower is designed to destroy enemy protected firing positions, disable lightly-armored vehicles, create fires and blind the enemy using the smoke of fire points.

"Shmel" was accepted into the inventory in 1984; series production began a year earlier. The flamethrower is in the inventory of special flamethrower subunits and also in the inventory of the airborne assault troops, naval infantry, and combined arms subunits. "Shmel" underwent serious testing in Afghanistan where it was utilized as a close combat weapon. By way of illustration, if an artillery projectile made a hole in a wall, "Shmel's" thermobaric munition destroyed the wall to its foundation. The flamethrower demonstrated high effectiveness while suppressing firing points in bunkers-caves, etc.

Today, a flamethrower is a multipurpose weapon that is capable of not only destroying using high temperature and pressure but it can also lay a smoke screen which permits the crew to change position. Incidentally, under average weather conditions the length of the impenetrable smoke screen created by one round is from 55 to 90 meters.

It is interesting that the flamethrower can be utilized even for peaceful purposes. They plan to study the possibility of employing "Shmel" to combat snow avalanches, slush, or ice jams near bridges. Experts think that "Shmel's" thermobaric munition permits it to accomplish these missions.

**Technical Specifications of the "Shmel" Rocket Infantry Flamethrower**

Firing range, m	1,000
Aimed Range, m	600
Weight of the flamethrower, kg	11
Length, mm	920
Weight of the thermobaric flammable mixture, kg	2.1
Weight of the incendiary mixture, kg	2.1
Weight of the incendiary-smoke mixture, kg	2.3
Number of flamethrowers in a pack, units	2
Crew	1 man
Weight of the pack, kg	22

**Housing Crisis: North Caucasus MD**

*94UM0280A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
3 Mar 94 p 2*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Astashkin and Lieutenant-Colonel Yakov Firsov, chief of the North Caucasus Military District press center: "Housing Problem: Number of Servicemen Without Apartments Not Getting Any Smaller"]

[Text] There is no more serious problem in the North Caucasus Military District than that of providing housing for servicemen's families. Only recently, you could count on your fingers the number of officers without apartments in the few units stationed in the district, which was jokingly called the health-resort district. Today the situation is different. In a brief period of time, units and large units from the Western Group of Forces, the Transcaucasus, and the Baltics have been withdrawn to the territory of the North Caucasus Military District. Troop trains continue to arrive here from the ex-Soviet republics and foreign countries, adding to the already large army of officers and warrant officers without apartments. Their number now exceeds 22,000.

Many of the officers without apartments are asking a natural question: Do the people "at the top"—the Ministry of Defense and the government—know about the housing crisis in the North Caucasus Military District? They not only know about it, but they are doing everything in their power to solve the problem. The district was recently visited by a group of generals and officers from chief administrations of the Armed Forces branches who are in charge of construction and quartering, led by Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Solomatin, chief of construction and quartering of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

An operational conference was held right at the military airfield where the plane bringing the high-ranking commission from Moscow landed. It was attended by Colonel-General Aleksei Mityukhin, the district troop commander, and Viktor Anpilov, first deputy administration chief and chairman of the Rostov Oblast government. The first community that the commission visited to study servicemen's housing problems was the village of Yegorlykskaya. The helicopter regiment stationed there was withdrawn

from the Transcaucasus last year. And the aviators went from the frying pan to the fire, as they say.

"We were unable to bring back from the Transcaucasus everything we had acquired," said regiment commander Lieutenant-Colonel Vitaliy Makarov in a conversation with us. "We essentially arrived at a place where no preparations had been made. People are tired of living out of suitcases and tired of being unsettled."

We would like to add that most of the unit's soldiers served in Afghanistan, many of them more than one tour, and helped deal with the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. Many of the officers have 20 and more calendar years of service.

Needless to say, the situation in which the aviators find themselves cannot be called easy. And so at a construction site here where three apartment buildings with 147 units are being built, adjustments were made in the official plan in view of the garrison's actual housing needs. It was decided to appropriate additional funds to a foreign firm that is building a housing compound in Rostov-na-Donu so that it can construct another 400 apartments here. And rural construction workers, with a pro rata contribution from the military, will help eliminate problems arising in connection with the construction of a boiler house and treatment facilities.

The regiment commander said that this news, which spread through the aviators' compound instantaneously, will give the airmen and their families a more optimistic outlook. And it is also sure to have a positive effect on the unit's combat readiness.

In connection with the well-known events in the Caucasus, the soldiers of the North Caucasus Military District are having to solve the problems side by side with personnel from internal and border troops. This significantly complicates the already difficult situation with respect to providing housing and other accommodations for the troops. But it is characteristic that the soldiers, regardless of the color of their stripes, are working to solve the problems without red tape and on a mutually beneficial basis. We saw this for ourselves when we visited Vladikavkaz.

This city is the focal point of the economic, political, ethnic, and social (including housing) problems that undoubtedly require solutions. In our view, the people endowed with authority are not only approaching these problems in an effective fashion but also exhibiting a can-do attitude, foresight, and an ability to foresee possible developments five to six steps ahead.

Consider this concrete example. On the outskirts of Vladikavkaz, next to a construction site where housing is being put up for the garrison's soldiers, is a vacant tract of land belonging to the Russian Defense Ministry. The command of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs internal troops asked the Ministry of Defense if it could station an internal troops brigade on the site. The commission visited the site and did some reconnaissance, as it were. It decided to let the internal troops lease the land, but not indefinitely. Who knows what could happen three, four, or five years from now? If the situation stabilizes, and let's hope it does, the internal troops brigade will be transferred to a new location. And if it is, the land and its structures built there will remain under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense.

During their stay in Vladikavkaz, the inspectors from Moscow could not, of course, fail to see its "pearl"—a housing compound built by the German firm Philipp Holtsman.

A frank conversation that Lt-Gen A. Solomatin and district troop commander Col-Gen A. Mityukhin held with the commanders of the garrison's units touched on many issues relating to providing accommodations for the troops and apartments for the servicemen's families and building social, cultural, and consumer-service facilities. It would seem that the commissioning of the closed compound with 1,500 apartments built by the foreign firm should solve the garrison's housing problem. Nevertheless, a waiting list of people without apartments has formed once again there. Needless to say, this problem has to be solved. And so the district troop commander, after announcing the construction of 12 apartment buildings, told the officers of another decision he had taken: About 60 families of servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves or who will be discharged this year and who have apartments in the compound will be allowed to make equivalent trades for housing that foreign firms are building in Krasnodar or Rostov-na-Donu.

"The North Caucasus District ranks first in the Armed Forces in terms of the gravity of the problems associated with providing accommodations for troops and apartments for servicemen's families," Lt-Gen A. Solomatin said in a conversation with us. "It's no accident that the housing problem in the district is being monitored by the defense minister. Military construction workers have been assigned the task of building 15,000 apartments here in 1994. We are prepared to accomplish that task. But everything will depend on financing, and so the last words rests with the government."

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Forces, Armaments on Crimean Peninsula

94UM0251A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Vladimir Pasyakin and Anatoliy Stasovskiy, Sevastopol, under the rubric: "Military-Political Survey": "The Crimean Peninsula: Armed, But Is it That Dangerous?"]

[Text] The presidential elections in the Crimea are an accomplished fact. What is more, Crimean President Yuriy Meshkov has already managed to visit both Kiev and Moscow and to make quite a few ambiguous statements. It's not an exaggeration to say that each of his words have been heeded, first of all, because he spoke about the Crimea—"the peninsula of discord". The nature of the contradictions there have long ago exceeded the bounds of the diplomatic. It's no secret for anyone that there are men and equipment on the peninsula that are capable of resolving the dispute, alas, not only in words. And the "sortings out" of late are a sufficiently convincing confirmation of that.

Analysts warned that arms could start "talking" already during the course of the election campaign.

That was the kind of picture that was drawn. And although fortunately the gloomiest predictions were not realized, a potentially explosive situation remains on the peninsula.

The Crimea is becoming increasingly saturated with Ukrainian troops, weapons, and armed formations. The following facts attest to that.

A more than 650-man Ukrainian naval infantry battalion has been deployed near Sevastopol (that, as we know, is the Black Sea Fleet's primary naval base) near the village of Tylovoye. It has up to 40 BTR-70's [armored transport vehicles], 120-mm mortars, mount-type antitank grenade launchers, and portable surface-to-air missile systems in its inventory. Even though it is called a naval infantry battalion, this formation has an imaginary tie to the sea. No one is undergoing naval training here. In fact, it is not even being tasked with that mission. And the servicemen are first and foremost being trained based upon the spetsnaz [special forces] program. It is also remarkable that the battalion has been manned primarily with conscripts from Western Ukraine. Incidentally, these "naval infantrymen" have already displayed a curt disposition with regard to the local population on more than one occasion and have completely lived up to their sleeve emblems in the form of a gray predator-wolf.

A mechanized brigade is located in the area of Perevalnyy, northeast of the main Black Sea Fleet base. It consists of two mechanized infantry battalions, two tank battalions, and artillery, antitank and air defense battalions. The authorized strength is 1,800 men. But today there are actually 2,100 men. For comparison: The Black Sea Fleet naval infantry brigade, which recently appointed Ukrainian Navy Chief of Staff Rear-Admiral Aleksey Ryzhenko called a "foreign formation", is actually much smaller in strength.

A full-fledged spetsnaz [special forces] brigade that is training saboteurs has been deployed in Staryy Krym [Old Crimea] (the western portion of the peninsula). It numbers approximately 900 men. The brigade is organizationally part of the 32nd Army Corps which is currently commanded by Major-General Aleksandr Kuzmuk who came here from the Carpathian Military District.

A 350-man traffic control service battalion has been deployed within the city limits of Sevastopol itself. There are approximately 15 BTR's in its inventory. This battalion, like the one located in Tylovoye, is continuously growing and being augmented by equipment which, according to some data, is arriving from a storage base near Dzhankoy.

A patrol-postal service regiment is also deployed here. Its commander is Aleksandr Kostyukov. The regiment, just like yeast, literally grew from a recent battalion. Incidentally, the famous "Berkut" [golden eagle] subunit has also become a part of it. Right now it is small—15 men, but we anticipate that it will be brought up to a company strength of 60 troops.

A Ukrainian Armed Forces PVO [Air Defense] regiment with the well-equipped Belbek airfield is located to the north of Sevastopol. It can receive any aircraft, including reserved [literally] aircraft. The regiment itself has Su-27 fighter-interceptors in its inventory. Incidentally, fully-graded emplacements were recently dug at Belbek.

It's possible that someone has undertaken to prove the need for these and other units and large formations on the peninsula. As we know, you can find the advisability in everything. Let's note only that in the recent past they planned to reduce the Ukrainian armed forces on the peninsula. Meanwhile, the strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces formation has increased from 15,000-18,000 to 51,000 men during the last 1-2 years.

It is curious that Ukrainian Minister of Defense General of the Army Vitaliy Radetskiy responded with the following to Yuriy Meshkov's statement on the initiation of demilitarization of the Crimea precisely from the withdrawal of Ukrainian units: He said that this issue is not within Meshkov's competence. Therefore, it seems the opposite reaction has also not been excluded—not demilitarization but a further, drastic reinforcement of the Ukrainian troop formation in the Crimea.

One spark is sufficient to start this "mechanism". And it's good that the verbal attempts of Rukh [Popular Movement of the Ukraine] leaders (we must recall at least Aleksandr Lavrinovich's recent statement that the results of the elections are a step toward the initiation of a confrontation in the Crimea and in Ukraine), and that also the threats of certain representatives of official Kiev and the leaders of the Crimean Tatars' mejlis to begin the countdown toward a new cycle of tension have not been carried out. Predictions with regard to a nearly automatic annulment of the results of the presidential elections in the Republic of the Crimea by Leonid Kravchuk and also the shipment of a "punishing expedition of the Ukrainian Army" to the "disobedient" peninsula have also not been confirmed.

The events of recent weeks in the Crimea have occurred under the banner of the widely known but somewhat differently interpreted sentence in reality: "Everything flows but nothing changes".

The experience of recent years, when the replacements of some political leaders by others or some reformers by others have introduced practically nothing, indicates that we have become accustomed to the replacement of the decorations in the "political theater" and that we can already relate quite calmly to them. That calm in the Crimea can, at first glance, appear to be strange. But political tension did not erupt immediately here once again for several reasons.

We think that one of the main ones is that this is an attempt of certain prestigious experts to prevent the possible development of the situation. It is clear, even to a devil-may-care person, that warnings about careless steps that could simply transform the Crimea into a "hot spot" similar to Karabakh would have to take effect.

One more reason is Kiev's unexpected reaction, for some people, to the events in the Crimea. It becomes quite understandable if you look intently at the internal problems of Ukraine itself. The Republic of Crimea's independence attempt is already not that original. If you recall, Donetsk Oblast was the first to set out on that path. And the principle of "don't shake up" is not the most appropriate with regard to people who are striving for a better life. It seems that they understood that in Kiev. Furthermore, there are also concerns that are somewhat more important than the Crimean presidency—elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Today the distribution is as follows: Here for the time being no one can provide guarantees that events will not follow the "Belarus scenario". The population of Ukraine is now judging its leaders based upon specific matters. And there aren't many of them... It is no accident that Ukrainian Parliament Speaker Ivan Plyushch said that if Yuriy Meshkov manages to do anything at all for the residents of the Crimea, he will "be green with envy of him".

A very important reason for the relative calm in the Crimea is the fact that the political activity of the residents of the Crimea, who invested the last, so to speak, political forces in the elections of their president, has "petered out". It's as if the peninsula's population has become frozen in anticipation, having dwelled for the time being on one, let's state it frankly, "delicate" question: Where do we go from here?

But meanwhile Meshkov himself,—and we need to admit this—has become involved, in the opinion of many people, in a hopeful political game with quite a deceptive economic result. At least his first steps on the political scene did not give trump cards to the radicals from both camps. The meeting in Kiev and the constructively conducted negotiations in Moscow open quite real prospects to the Crimea. And, if nothing interferes, the "unsettled peninsula" could become a unique bridge for the establishment of closer economic cooperation of the two states. Partial

support on the Russian ruble is a more than obvious advantage for the people of Crimea themselves.

And the main aspect. We all know: Weapons are quiet where money "works" and where a mutual economic interest is being realized.

In a word, there aren't grounds to incite passions for no reason but still it is impossible not to state the obvious. The Ukrainian nationalistic wing that finally lost in the Crimea and part of the Crimean Tatars will hardly reconcile themselves to defeat and will stand in fierce opposition to the president. At a low level of general and political culture, it is quite probable that this confrontation will be far from constructive. This will certainly add to Yuriy Meshkov's problems since it will be easy to find inadequacies in his first steps, especially while considering the inheritance he received. We can predict with a slight margin of error that the opposition will throw "its" mass media into the struggle with Meshkov and will attempt to utilize its ties with Ukraine's supreme authorities. In a word, today the residents of Crimea should in no way succumb to euphoria. They must understand that rapid changes are simply impossible.

The hottest heads are still attempting to accelerate the process. Neither the methods nor the consequences are important. A blockaded Sevastopol and Black Sea Fleet with their "oxygen cut off" in all directions will appear on the maps. Red and blue lines will appear—the axes of someone's proposed strikes...

But nothing better will become of this for anyone. Therefore, the highest responsibility, thoughtfulness and care in making decisions and the ability to resort to compromises are required from the politicians and from the leaders of various levels, including of the military departments. We need to finally understand that we should in no way cut the Crimean knot. We need to patiently and painstakingly untie it.

#### **Ukrainian Military Cooperation with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Discussed**

94UM0273A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
22 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Serhiy Zhurets, NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent: "Through Bilateral Contacts—Towards a Mutually Advantageous Cooperation. Ukrainian Military Delegation Visits Almaty and Tashkent"]

[Text] A military delegation, headed by Colonel General Ivan Oliynyk, deputy minister of defense for armaments of Ukraine and chief of armaments of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, returned to Kiev from Central Asia. The delegation visited Almaty and Tashkent, where it held talks on a wide range of subjects with representatives of the war offices [viyskovi vidomstva] of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Among the topics discussed were the modernization of already existing equipment and weapons and the development of new models, scientific research, cooperation in the rocket and space research field, and the effective use of the capabilities of the military-industrial complexes of these sovereign countries. The parties expressed interest in

cooperating in all these areas. In today's situation, this is understandable—the shortest route to attaining our objective is by combining our endeavors.

Summarizing the outcome of the talks after the conclusion of the Ukrainian military delegation's visit to Kazakhstan, Colonel-General Ivan Oliynyk underscored:

"These talks not only enabled us to bring our positions closer together but also to lay a long-term foundation for a series of joint measures in the field of military cooperation. These meetings should have been held a year ago. We have lost time and certain opportunities, which we now have to make up for."

Obviously, this applies not only to the talks with the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan, but also to Ukraine's relations with Uzbekistan. After all, the armed forces of all three independent young states find themselves in a similar situation. On the one hand, this means a huge inventory of equipment and weapons, which very often cannot be utilized to their full potential due to a shortage of component and spare parts, and, on the other hand, a complete lack of certain kinds of weapons that are essential for ensuring the military security of a sovereign state, difficulties in settling accounts between states for services of a military-technical nature (the national monetary units have not yet been made convertible and there is a catastrophic shortage of hard currency in the republics' budgets), and a decline in the output of the defense industry, whose task it is to supply the army of each state with everything it needs to maintain a high level of combat readiness [boyehotovnist].

Today, however, the situation is such that precisely because of prevailing economic conditions, the primary task facing the defense industry ["oboronka"] is not developing and producing new kinds of weapons (although this, too, must not be ignored), but rather modernizing and uniformizing existing inventory with a view to improving its tactical features. This is the sphere in which there are wide-ranging opportunities for cooperation on the part of Ukraine's defense industry enterprises with both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—above all, on a bilateral basis. The advantages of this are quite obvious, both in political and economic terms. Bilateral treaties and agreements are a real foundation for genuinely equal, mutually advantageous interstate relations that are free of the so-called older or younger brother syndrome. It was, after all, rather strange to learn during the talks that at one time Russia had offered to sell Ukraine weapons, which, as it turns out, are being produced not in Russia but by Kazakhstan's defense enterprises. And, as was to be expected, Russia offered its services in exchange for rubles. Would it not make more sense for Ukraine to deal directly with Kazakhstan, just as Kazakhstan should not need to look for products of Ukrainian manufacture in Russia, but should come directly to a reliable partner, who is guided by principles of trust and mutual economic benefits?

It seems that after the talks this point became quite clear in both Almaty and Tashkent. The position of the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan is quite

telling in this respect. Despite the fact that, unlike Ukraine, Kazakhstan is a member of the Agreement on Collective Security of the CIS, Major-General Alibek Kasymov noted:

"A state always has its interests. And if we build the relations between our states on the principles of mutual respect, mutual trust, and mutual economic advantage proposed by the Ukrainian side, there will never be any misunderstandings between us. The further strengthening of our relations and anything we do to broaden and deepen them—and I regard the meeting of the representatives of the defense ministries of Kazakhstan and Ukraine as a step in precisely this direction—will only benefit the defense capabilities of both countries."

We should regard as quite logical the desire by the respective war offices to speed up the work of preparing the Treaty on Military Cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine that is reflected in the concluding protocol. There is indeed a great deal that we can work on together.

Apart from modernizing and uniformizing armaments, an important role in the relations between Ukraine and Kazakhstan consists in cooperation directed at developing the rocket and space research potential of the two countries, both of which possess a real foundation and the necessary capabilities for this endeavor. Evidence of such cooperation will be Ukraine's Zenit carrier-rocket with a Ukrainian satellite, which will be launched from the Kazakh space center in Baykonur.

Kiev's military is also interested in obtaining access to the proving grounds located in Kazakhstan to use for their own needs. The effective military training of anti-aircraft and rocket forces is next to impossible without such access, and it is much more difficult to modernize certain kinds of military equipment. What is interesting, however, is that although de jure these sites clearly belong to Kazakhstan, de facto they are quite actively controlled by Russia. In reference to this matter, Col-Gen Ivan Oliynyk stated:

"The issue of using the military proving grounds and the space center located on the territory of Kazakhstan has to be decided on the basis of a tripartite agreement between Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. It is unlikely that we will be able to attain our objective without such an agreement. I think that at the outset Russia may oppose the signing of such trilateral agreements, but we have enough arguments at our disposal to ultimately succeed."

As regards Uzbekistan, the visit of the Ukrainian military delegation to Tashkent will also produce fruitful and mutually advantageous results. For example, Ukrainian industry is in a position to offer the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan a broad range of products and services that are needed to refurbish and modernize the military equipment of the national armed forces of Uzbekistan. There exists a real basis for joint scientific-military projects and for establishing a mutually beneficial system of training military personnel. It is not unlikely that in the very near future

Ukrainian enterprises will receive orders for the manufacture of cloth for Uzbek Army personnel, with Uzbekistan supplying our enterprises with cotton...

Most of the plans based on the bilateral agreements, which are now interstate and intergovernmental in nature, are expected to benefit the armed forces in particular and the defense potential in general of all three countries—Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan—in the very near future.

#### **Deputy Defense Minister Kondratyev Visits Caucasus**

*94UM0279B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
2 Mar 94 p 3*

[Article by Petr Karapetyan: "Tskhinvali Option' For Nagornyy Karabakh—Colonel-General Georgiy Kondratyev Continues Working Visit to Yerevan and Baku"]

[Text] The working visit of the Russian deputy minister of defense, Colonel-General Georgiy Kondratyev, to Yerevan and Baku is a logical continuation of the Moscow meeting of the defense ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia and representatives of Nagornyy Karabakh. At that meeting, which was mediated by Army General Pavel Grachev, a protocol was signed on a total cease-fire in the Republic of Nagornyy Karabakh, a withdrawal of troops, and the creation of mutual security zones manned by mixed forces and a joint staff consisting of representatives of Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Republic of Nagornyy Karabakh.

If Col-Gen Georgiy Kondratyev can secure the parties' final consent to implement the protocol's provisions, a joint staff of about 250 men will be created. Sixty-nine Russian servicemen will serve on that staff. They will be dispatched to the conflict zone only after a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops and heavy equipment.

It should be pointed out that Col-Gen Georgiy Kondratyev traveled to Tskhinvali with a similar package. The mechanism for a cease-fire in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone proved successful. Will it work in Nagornyy Karabakh?

#### **Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan**

*94UM0289A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 94 p 5*

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Boris Vinogradov: "Specter of a 'Second Afghan': CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan"]

[Text] Dushanbe-Moscow—In Tajikistan I did not know whether the spring offensive about which the experts had spoken for such a long time had actually begun. The cause of it all is the contrast between imposed and personal concepts. The specter of a "second Afghan" now loomed up in the framework of alarmed reports from the border, now disappeared in the presence of calm, impoverished Dushanbe.

A flare-up of activity in the spring is as natural as the changing of the seasons, Colonel Ivan Malevich, chief of the information service at the headquarters of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (KMS), told me. It has always been that way. They have come out of Afghanistan and continue to come not in order to sit around in trenches. One does

not have to be clairvoyant to anticipate an invasion as soon as the passes are opened and the roads dry up. Only one's imagination can predict what will follow....

#### **"I Do Not Capture Transgressors; I Kill Them."**

Colonel Nikolay Malofeyev, chief of the Panj border detachment, was more to the point in answering this question. Expressing dismay at the unexpected arrival of the journalist, he said that he was not giving interviews, that this was forbidden and he did not want to give any. He was more concerned by the shortage of personnel and the refusal of new recruits to go from Russia to Tajikistan in a situation in which the Tajiks themselves are not burning up with a desire to serve.

Replenishments come through the requisitions of local military commissariats, who frequently place young citizens of independent Tajikistan onto busses by force and haul them from the hamlets and villages to the detachment of Russian border troops, turning them over, as they are, without equipment or medical examination. There the young recruits, who sometimes do not know Russian, take on the appearance of a soldier in a situation approaching frontline conditions and acquire the military science of defending their fatherland.

From the legal standpoint it is difficult to say who they are—mercenaries, since they are serving in a foreign army but on their own territory, or trainees under Russian instructors. They say that there is a gentlemen's agreement on this matter but not formalized in a contract. At the outposts they receive the same pay and provisions as Russian border troops, which is equal to ten times the minimum wage of the Tajiks. The material incentives have little effect upon morale, however.

Deserters are apprehended and returned to the bank of the Panj in the same way. Not all of them, to be sure. Some of them are still being sought. According to KMS intelligence, the Tajiks have trouble mastering the skills and are not distinguished by special valor in the conduct of combat operations. They account for more than half of the personnel at some outposts, and the Russian officers can foresee the day when they will be commanding Tajiks exclusively.

The Panj sector is considered to be under the greatest pressure. It experiences mortar shellings and penetration attempts practically every day. Tajik militants and Mojahedin are concentrated at the juncture of the third and fourth outposts in the Afghan community of Bagrikul. They have tanks and artillery. If they wanted to, I was told at headquarters, they could wipe out any fortification within a half-hour.

They could not get along without the support of the 201st Division, even though the border troops have acquired Grad rocket launchers, tanks and armored personnel carriers in recent months. The main thing is communication and constant control, which did not exist last summer,

when the tragedy occurred at the 12th outpost of the neighboring Moscow detachment. The artillerymen keep the Afghan bank constantly in their sights.

Groups of up to 40 men slip through, aware that the border is guarded only during the day in the area of the outposts. In the morning patrols frequently find underground passages for an electronic signalling facility, which has not been set up over the entire length of the system by far. If the system has been activated in the night, they go out at dawn, and then only if there is gasoline and the vehicles are running. In such cases it is already too late to demonstrate fire power. One would not find the violators even with dogs.

"Do they frequently come through during the day?" I asked Colonel Malofeyev. "They could be refugees."

"No less frequently than at night. Refugees do not come through here, though. I do not take prisoners. I kill them."

#### **It Will Obviously Not Be Necessary to Dye the Helmets**

Vehicles with light-blue tags are one of the prominent indications of Dushanbe. They are given the right-of-way by peasants, and elders bow respectfully to them. Decorative work with a pretension of good intentions was performed in the 201st Motorized Rifle Division in October of last year, when the CIS heads announced the creation of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan. The commonwealth thus overcame a system of mutual distrust in a move toward a military alliance. More than 100 staff members from Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzia and Kazakhstan were once again arm in elbow as in former times.

Friendship is one thing, but they all have different zones of responsibility. The demarcation is indicated with a heavy felt-tipped pen on a map on the desk of Boris Pyankov, commander of the KMS. The allies gather there and hold council. UN observers from the UNMOT-1 mission sometimes look in in the hope of hearing the answer to a burning question addressed to them by Western journalists: What is Russia after in Tajikistan, peace for peoples or an opportunity to revive the empire?

The generals reply that the KMS is there in accordance with the UN Charter at the request of the Tajiks to ensure stability and arrange a dialog. And it would not be a bad thing for the Security Council to be given such a mandate, since the conflict here threatens universal peace. In this case, not just the licence tags but the helmets too could be painted light blue.

The UN members reasonably object that Russia cannot claim a mandate since Andrey Kozyrev himself has recognized the area as one of political and military interests. Furthermore, never before in the history of the world community have the "blue helmets" guarded the border of a state where an operation is being conducted. This is the consensus in Tajikistan.

Troops of the country in which they were located have never yet been among the UN troops engaged in operations to maintain peace. The peacekeeping forces must separate the sides of the conflict, not take them on as allies. Whom to separate, though, and along what line? Dushanbe alone has 4,500 underground opposition supporters, Kulyab Oblast has around 2000, Kurgan-Tyube 3,500 and Gornyy Badakhshan 7,000. This totals an army equaling half of all the power structures.

The situation is truly out of the ordinary. Peres Ballon, personal representative of the UN Secretary General, said in a talk with Boris Pyankov that he could advocate through the Security Council the sending of 300 military observers to Tajikistan. Head of state Emomali Rakhmonov seemed to agree, but the commander of the KMS cut him off, saying: Your spies will not be sitting in my headquarters. Give some status to the UN and gain access to operational reports. Or, as Pyankov proposes, we could withdraw 100 kilometers from the border and your troops could assume control over this zone. Anything but that, Peres Ballon replied.

In general, it is clear that there is no love lost between the KMS and the UN. There should be no illusions about this. Russia and its partners interested in the solidarity of the Tajik borders will obviously have to count more on the status of the regional coalition and on the Tajik talks on collective CIS security.

The KMS presently has 25,000 soldiers. They have at their disposal modern combat equipment, including aircraft and space communication stations. An impressive force, equal to the cost of peacekeeping. Russia has assumed 57 billion of the 65-billion ruble cost of semiannual expenses. Tajikistan is the poorest relative in this family.

#### **Lesha Gorbatyy Gives the "Green Light"**

An Uzbek battalion of 350 men has taken up the rear area of the Panj border detachment, covering the southwestern part of Khatlon Oblast. The population there is half Uzbek, and they greeted the KMS personnel as their own. The bands of Ali Bespalov, former director of the motor vehicle directorate at Shartuz, are located beyond the Amu-Darya. They say that when he left Afghanistan he took with him a large quantity of stolen gold, built a home in the area of Mazari-Sharif, deals in drugs and has more than 200 men under arms. In December of last year his militants blew up a train on Tajik territory. Uzbeks in the KMS repelled him, and he has not appeared again.

One would not envy the Kyrgyz. They have one of the most difficult sectors in the Pamirs. The battalion of 286 men delayed its departure slightly and was forced to make its way through snow-filled passes, dragging its weapons with it. The starving Badakhshan people greeted the defenders well but asked them not to interfere with the smuggling of drugs from Afghanistan to the CIS. Lesha Gorbatyy, head of the Mafia in Iskashim Rayon generously agreed to the presence of the peacekeeping forces. His caravans of opium and marijuana freely travel the Khorog-Osh road.

Another problem of the Kyrgyz is that they have no money and no food. Badakhshan is in the ruble zone, and you can buy nothing to go with the local fish there. And the situation with Russian currency is tight in Tajikistan. There is not enough even to pay the ministers. Kyrgyz officers in the KMS receive wages of 2,500 rubles per month, that is true. Nothing is provided for the soldiers. In the future, I was told by Colonel Aleksandr Usatenko, Bishkek's representative, these are potential bandits. For now, though, they are eating out of the pot of the Russian border troops.

There are no problems with the Kazakh battalion of the KMS, because there actually is no such battalion. Saken Zhasuzakov, Almaty's emissary at the Joint Command headquarters, told me that it has been formed and is supposedly in waiting at some railway station. They need only the order. There is no one to give it, though. The parliament is dissolved and a new one has not been elected. Nursultan Nazarbayev, who signed the agreement in Moscow on 24 September, lacks the authority to send the guard to Khorog, where, incidentally, they are not anticipating it too greatly, since the GBAO [Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast] Ismailites spare neither the Muslims nor the Kazakhs.

And then, my partner in the conversation told me, Russia has its own interests here: uranium, gold, land.... Next year, you know the Badakhshan people are planning a luxurious celebration of the 100th anniversary of their joining the Russian empire. The Kazakhs, however, do not have any special plans for this....

#### Airborne Hussars as a Morale Factor

Coincidence or not, the day Tajikistan's National Army was formed falls on the same day as Defenders of the Fatherland Day in Russia, that is, 23 February. The first anniversary was celebrated in Dushanbe with a military parade in Ozodi Square. Tajik soldiers dressed in Russian overcoats marched past the reviewing stand, tanks rumbled and cannoneers fired salutes of rockets brought from Orenburg. The pirouettes of four Su-25 fighters evoked particular excitement. The air aces were brought in from Kubinka near Moscow. The "airborne hussars" flew brilliantly, for which they were thanked by Aleksandr Shishlyannikov, republic minister of defense. The Dushanbe people had a good time.

Clearly it is difficult to build an army in a devastated state within a year. The authorities are more concerned with strengthening the security committee and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. In numerical strength these two departments surpass the young Tajik Army four-fold, which, judging from everything, Russia will have to outfit.

Right now the army constitutes a fairly strange formation. Around half of the 6,000 men are in the separate Brigade imeni Fayzali Saidov, established in July 1992 at the very height of the bloody events as part of the Popular Front. "Bachai Fayzali" was a companion-in-arms of Sangak Safarov and was killed by the latter as punishment for pillaging. Sangak himself was done away with by a guard, to be sure.

The ethics of those days still live. The Fayzali people feed themselves in Kurgan-Tyube by collecting quit-rent from local kolkhoz members, most of whom are Uzbeks. Another settling-up occurred among them a month ago, during which dozens of soldiers and peasants died. A usual thing, unfortunately. Few take the killing in Tajikistan over spheres of influence and access to material benefits as a sign of activeness on the part of the opposition.

With less basis for relying on Minister of Internal Affairs Yakug Salimov, who has 20,000 men at his disposal, I was told by informed people, Rakhmonov sees his support precisely in the army and the KNB [National Security Committee]. There is a lot of talk about the procurator's office and investigative agencies not being particularly zealous in exposing crimes. Nothing is known at this time, for example, about who killed Lt. Dmitriy Kuts, a Russian border trooper, near a roadside post close to Kurgan-Tyube.

More than 60 workers with the procurator's office in the city of Dushanbe have been discharged in the past three months. The September law on the surrender of weapons is not being observed. Kalashnikov semiautomatic rifles are more and more being used as the final say in sorting out relations with a rival or a claimant for a lucrative job.

When you speak to the Tajiks about this, they point to Russia, where detective subjects are sometimes far more drastic. Nonetheless, they put their trust in its support.

## UKRAINE

#### START Provisions Discussed, Dependence on Nuclear Weapons Denied

94UM0265B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
5 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Serhiy Zhurets: "Nuclear Weapons for Ukraine Are Like a Suitcase for a Drowning Man—Both Too Heavy to Hold, and a Pity to Let Go"]

[Text] That which we have long been waiting for has come. The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine has finally decided to define its attitude toward the trilateral declaration of the presidents of Ukraine, the United States and Russia. As official sources have indicated more than once, this document proclaims the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and defines the mechanism for compensation and security guarantees for our nation.

All of the nuclear warheads, according to the trilateral declaration, will be removed from the territory of Ukraine to Russia for their subsequent dismantling in the shortest possible time. Russia will provide compensation in the form of deliveries of fuel rods for the requirements of Ukrainian nuclear power engineering.

Ukraine will provide for the destruction of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive weapons, deployed on its territory within seven years, and all of the SS-24 missiles will be deactivated within ten months through the removal of their nuclear charges.

Russia will in turn guarantee the technical servicing and safe operation of the nuclear warheads. The United States will provide technical and financial assistance for the reliable and safe dismantling of the nuclear weapons.

Everything that is contained in the trilateral declaration and the addendum to the declaration, from the point of view of President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, conforms to the requirements posed by the Supreme Soviet regarding ratification of the START-I treaty and satisfies the restrictions advanced by the people's deputies. There were 13 such restrictions, and they talked chiefly about the aforementioned security guarantees and the granting of financial and technical assistance directed toward the elimination of the nuclear arsenal.

Life has confirmed once again, however, that there are as many ideas as there are people. And when we are talking about politicians, then they could have even more.

There were meetings the day before the recent session of the Supreme Soviet by the commissions on questions of defense and national security, questions of legislation and legality, foreign affairs and the working deputies' commission to study the START-I treaty. The aim of the session was to prepare findings regarding the conformity of the trilateral declaration signed on January 14 in Moscow. Since there was not a quorum at the session, they did not come to any unified findings, but each commission came to its own findings separately. Since it would be out of place to cite those findings, we will address the results of the working commission to study the START-I treaty.

According to the statement by President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, the members of that commission indicate, he has confirmed his "commitment to the fact that Ukraine join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NNPT] as a state not possessing nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time." The Supreme Soviet, at the same time, had earlier considered Ukraine to be the possessor of nuclear weapons, and only the realization of START-I "would open up the way for the resolution by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine of the question of joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

Another detail is connected with the fact that the trilateral declaration indicates that "Ukraine will provide for the destruction of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive weapons, deployed on its territory," even though the Supreme Soviet has stipulated the destruction of only 36 percent of the missile delivery systems and 42 percent of the nuclear warheads. Moreover, this presidential wording obligates Ukraine to destroy not only all nuclear weapons within seven years, but also all strategic offensive weapons along with their infrastructure. After all, as was indicated on this score in a memorandum of the U.S. embassy, "any preservation of deployed SS-24 ICBMs after the seven-year period of cutbacks under the START treaty would be in contradiction to the obligations of Ukraine, whether those missiles are fitted with nuclear or conventional warheads," and the United States "will not agree to any weakening of this obligation." This categorical American attitude signifies that the prospects for the

creation of high-precision weaponry with conventional warheads based on the SS-24 delivery system as a means of strategic deterrence are quite uncertain.

The terms of compensation for tactical nuclear weapons, financing for inspection activities, the possibility of using launch silos for peaceful purposes, the use of weapons-grade plutonium, and expenditures for the social support of officers and warrant officers of the missile forces who will be discharged from the army owing to the cutbacks all remain uncertain in the trilateral declaration.

I am citing all of these contradictions in great detail in order to give a better sense of the tension that was present in the hall of the Supreme Soviet during the discussion of the trilateral declaration, the ratification of the START-I treaty and the joining of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The speeches by President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetskyy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Zlenko stressed once again the fact that nuclear weapons are no guarantee of security for us, we are not able to maintain them, and to go against the world opinion, even if you are correct, is a hopeless matter. Nuclear weapons for Ukraine, in the current economic difficulties, are almost a suitcase for a drowning man—too heavy to hold on to, but a shame to let go of.

The fate of the nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine was resolved in two hours of discussion by the two paragraphs of a Decree of the Supreme Soviet, namely:

1. Bearing in mind the specific steps taken by the President and Government of Ukraine with regard to the fulfillment of the provisions of the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of 18 November 1993 and the reciprocal steps on the part of the United States and Russia, to remove the restrictions with regard to Article 5 of the Protocol to the START Treaty that was signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1993.
2. To authorize the Government of Ukraine to exchange letters on the ratification of the START-I treaty and to make more active the actions of the Government to reach a concrete agreement that flows out of the restrictions of the Supreme Soviet regarding the ratification of the START-I Treaty.

What do the two paragraphs of this short decree mean?

First, that very difficult and painstaking work lies ahead. At least five treaties or agreements will have to be reached, which translate or at least should translate the declarative substance of many provisions of the trilateral declaration into the area of concrete, detailed and documented mutual obligations. This pertains first and foremost to a schedule for the dispatch of the first lot of nuclear warheads to Russia, an agreement pertaining to the procedure and conditions for monitoring their dismantling and salvaging on the part of Ukraine, an agreement on compensation for the value of the nuclear weapons transferred to Russia, and an agreement on guarantor's and originator's oversight of the status of the warheads that are still in Ukraine, including their transport to "S" facilities and plant yards.

Second, that it is still too soon to put a period to the resolution of the problem of the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine, since a thing or two remains that is not entirely clear or resolved. Although the removal of the restrictions pertaining to Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol also envisages Ukraine's joining in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, after all, the deputies were still disinclined to the possibility during the voting. Ukraine, under legal canons, does not have the slightest right to demand compensation for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in joining the NNPT. The United States and Russia, however, as indicated in the trilateral declaration, will provide Kiev with security guarantees only in the event Ukraine joins the NNPT. So the circle closes. And only time will tell what the way out of this legal-political stalemate will be...

#### **'IZVESTIYA' Report on Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons Security Disputed**

94UM0265B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
25 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Volodymyr Knyshev: "Not a 'Sensation' ..."]

[Text] IZVESTIYA of February 22 of this year published an article by the newspaper's military correspondent, Viktor Lytovkin, under the title "RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces] Command Disavows Responsibility for the Security of Nuclear-Missile Armaments in Ukraine." Referring to confidential sources in the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the author cites the content of an official letter of the commander-in-chief of the strategic missile forces, Colonel-General Igor Sergeyev, to Minister of Defense of Russia General of the Army Pavel Grachev.

The article, with reference to this letter, discussed the fact that "under the prevailing circumstances Russia can in no way have any impact on the security of the nuclear-missile weaponry in Ukraine and its non-sanctioned employment." This is connected with the decision of the commander of the 43rd Missile Army, Colonel-General Volodymyr Mykhtyuk, the commander of the 46th Missile Division, Major-General N. Filatov, and their subordinates to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. It also talked about the "gross violation of the Agreement on the Status of Strategic Forces" signed by the heads of the CIS and the like.

The facts set forth in the article were commented on at a briefing at the MZS [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] by Deputy Minister of Defense Ivan Buzhan and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk.

It was pointed out in particular that the Minister of Defense of Ukraine does not need to coordinate his actions with the head of the Russian military agency. Assertions that the command of the RVSN of Russia have been deprived of the possibility of exercising operational command and control over the troops of the 43rd Missile Army were categorized as a fabrication. The operational control remains with Russia, and Ukraine has in no way disrupted it and does not intend to do so, emphasized Colonel-General Ivan Buzhan.

The presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the United States signed a Declaration in Moscow on January 14. The appearance of this article has thus elicited, at the very least, surprise.

The fact was stated in particular that no one forced the commander of the 43rd Missile Army, Colonel-General V. Mykhtyuk, and the commander of the 46th Missile Division, Major-General N. Filatov, to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. The generals, as well as the other officers, did this entirely voluntarily. Assertions of some gross violation of the agreement on the status of the strategic forces were categorized as untrue, because CIS strategic forces do not exist. As Colonel-General I. Buzhan reported, Russia unilaterally subordinated all of the units of the Strategic Missile Forces to itself in the summer of 1992. It is thus impossible to violate an agreement on something that does not exist.

The manpower levels of the units of the 43rd Army are at 85 percent for officers and almost 100 percent for conscript servicemen. The high-quality officer corps thus permits the complete fulfillment of the tasks of combat duty and the maintenance of nuclear security.

*The press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine made a statement with regard to this feature that emphasized, in particular, the steadfast upholding by our country of all international agreements signed by it.*

#### **Russian Peacekeeping Action Seen As Security Threat**

94UM0244 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian  
11 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Volodymyr Oliynyk under the rubric "Topical!": "Ukraine Must Not Step on the 'Pan-Slavic Rake'"]

[Text] One need not be a people's deputy to notice that the development of the military-political situation in Russia is calling into question the guarantees of President Yeltsin with regard to the security of Ukraine, which signed the trilateral declaration. The example of Georgia, which has agreed to station Russian troops on its territory as a consequence of its policy of hand-wringing, testifies to the fact that the Russian Federation has set about in practice the realization of its great-power intentions, and more precisely the realization of a plan of peacekeeping activity that has been approved by neither the UN nor the CSCE.

There would be no grounds for alarm if we were to be guided by the logic of official Kiev. The more so as Ukraine, with its quite powerful army, is not the Baltic republics, which are raising an international hubbub about recent statements by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev with regard to the defense of the Russian-speaking population of the former USSR. The Baltic republics have not yet recovered from the shock of this imperialist declaration.

An analysis of the changes in the military-political situation in Russia that was performed on the eve of the New

Year by specialists at the National Institute of Strategic Studies [NISD], however, does not instill optimism and is confirmed by recent events.

Ukraine has come to be in an arc of strong pressure on more than the common border with Russia, which is 1,270 kilometers, alone; add to it the uncertain situation in Crimea, and the activation of the 14th Army of General Lebed in the Dniester region, who—while in the latest twist calling his former comrades-in-arms from the leadership of the unrecognized Dniester Republic criminals—has actually confirmed suspicions of the transformation of this part of Moldova into an area of *ad hoc* Russian military autonomy.

The southern region of Russia is taking on greater insecurity for Ukraine after the agreement of Yeltsin and Shevardnadze on the Russian military bases on Georgian territory. Russia has up to now had a common border here with Ukraine through the Krasnodar Kray region, with access to Black Sea ports. If, as has been announced, Georgia agrees to protect external borders along with Russia, then Russia will expand considerably its naval presence on the Black Sea, notwithstanding the joint—and *de facto* Russian—control of the Black Sea Fleet. The elections in the Crimea have energized the Don Cossacks, who recently openly declared their claims on a portion of the territory of Ukraine. Analysts at the NISD do not rule out possible military conflicts in the future with the participation of the Don Cossacks, who feel themselves to be the defenders of the national interests of Russia.

The statements by Minister Grachev regarding the conflict in Yugoslavia, and the army that Russia is creating today, also arouse no less alarm.

The accelerated creation of Russian operational-strategic formations (something along the lines of the rapid-deployment forces), which have already received the name of the Mobile Forces of Russia, is attracting the particular attention of analysts.

These formations, at first glance, are being formed up only for use within Russia. According to the latest reports, however, the Mobile Forces will be able to carry out assigned tasks "in any theater of military operations" as early as 1995.

Russian Minister of Defense Grachev has indicated, not without satisfaction, that Russia has long dreamed of a "mighty combat fist," which could effectively restrain an enemy until the deployment of the main forces, in case of an incursion onto its territory.

Doubts regarding the exclusively domestic employment of the Mobile Forces, however, are confirmed not only by the military, but also by Russian diplomats, who are trying to show the world at every opportunity that Russia is still ready to perform "specific" tasks in zones of ethnic conflicts under the aegis of the CIS or as a "peacekeeper" with the authority of the UN.

The structure of the mobile forces testifies to their nature and long-term aims. Several helicopter regiments of ground-forces aviation, three battalions of marine

infantry, PVO [air-defense] and communications units and fighter and bomber squadrons, as well as military-transport aviation, are subordinate to their command, for a start. All of these constitute a formation at the highest degree of readiness—the immediate-response forces. Sixty percent of the composition of the Mobile Forces is airborne-assault units, and the other forty is motorized-rifle and special forces, surface-to-air missile and helicopter units, a mobile communications center and space communications gear, fighter, bomber and military-transport aviation units, battalions of marine infantry and airborne-assault battalions.

As we see, at a time when the Ukrainian people's deputies consider nuclear weapons, which cannot be physically used against any aggressor, to be a guarantee of the security of Ukraine, Russia is purposefully, as any normal nation should, and actively rebuilding its armed forces in parallel with the disarmament of Ukraine. Today, therefore, when a knot of contradictions and mutual offenses has accumulated between Russia and Ukraine, the activation of military organizational development in Russia is forcing Ukraine to define a qualitatively new conceptual framework in relations with its northern neighbor. A wager on the stability of Yeltsin could lead to the fact that Ukraine, as in the times of Khmelnytsky, could once again step on the "pan-Slavic rake."

#### **Radetskyy on Progress in Establishment, Training of Forces**

94UM0266 Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
25 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army Vitaliy Radetskyy: "Start of the Year: Building, Educating, Peacekeeping"]

[Text] The third year in the building of the armed forces of Ukraine has begun, encompassing questions of the composition and structure of the troops (forces), their training for military action, their technical equipping, manpower acquisition, mobilization and strategic deployment, the training of reserves, the performance of active duty and other issues.

There is every reason to assert today that we have chosen the directions of military development correctly. The basic laws on military issues have already been adopted, the Military Doctrine has been approved, and the conceptual development of two interconnected state programs is underway—the building and development of the armed forces, and the development of weaponry and military hardware. The efforts of the leadership personnel of the armed forces of Ukraine and the work of our military intellectuals facing the knot of problematical tasks pertaining to military organizational development are directed namely at that.

The scientific development of the force composition of the armed forces within the limits of the size stipulated for us, and the organizational structure of command and control elements, large formations and units with the aim of the most efficient utilization of the weapons systems and

military hardware, firepower and striking power of the troops (forces) has gained particular urgency.

Questions of equipping the armed forces of Ukraine with advanced weapons systems and military hardware and reducing the variety of logistical matériel have also not escaped the attention of military scholars and specialists. Keeping in mind the systematic restructuring of the economy of Ukraine that is underway, they are not failing to pay attention to questions of the structural convergence of the military-industrial complex and the armed forces.

Paramount attention is being devoted therein to the use of our world-class achievements in the realm of missile and space technology, which will make it possible in the future not only to equip the armed forces of Ukraine with all types of modern missile hardware, but also for our state to take part in international space programs in the interests of the national economy and science. We can thus state with confidence that Ukraine can and will be a missile and space power.

The search for solutions continues with regard to the problems of the Black Sea Fleet.

We feel that the first and main task that must be resolved pertaining to this problem, and on which the success of all further work depends, is a complete verification of all of the property and military hardware of the Black Sea Fleet on hand, both on water and on land, as well as the assurance of regulation law and order in Sevastopol and the Crimea as a whole. The building of our own fleet for Ukraine is continuing at the same time. The small ASW ship Lutsk, whose crew is today continuing their teamwork, has completed sea trials and has been commissioned in the force composition of the Navy of Ukraine.

Tasks pertaining to raising the combat readiness of the elements for technical and rear support of the troops (forces), at the same time, have not lost their significance as well. A constant search is underway for ways to increase the maneuverability and survivability of support and servicing units. A search is underway for sources of extrabudgetary financing for the measures being carried out in the armed forces.

One problem in military organizational development was bringing the system of training and indoctrination of the military cadres into conformity with the considerations of the requirements of troop practices, the views of the nature and methods of waging modern possible wars, operations and battles.

The Military Collegium of the Ministry of Defense met in order to solve this important problem, and reviewed problems and issues of military education and the rectification of errors. Concrete measures were instituted in accordance with their decisions with regard to improving the qualitative composition of the leadership elements of field education and the performance of paramount measures aimed at building an efficient system of military education and indoctrination, as well as the organized holding of graduating exams and the distribution of young officers among units and subunits.

Work was continued to refine future improvements in the Army and Navy, the draft and the performance of military service by those obligated to serve.

Attention has not diminished in this regard toward the activity of the military commissariats, through which all of the personnel of the armed forces pass twice—the first time during their conscription into active military service, and the second when they are discharged into the reserves. The principal interaction of the Army and the civilian population of Ukraine and the reservists takes place through the military commissariats. The reputation of the armed forces is thus formed in the citizenry based on how the military commissariats operate today.

A council was held at the Ministry of Defense with the command personnel of the military commissariats, with the aim of further strengthening the local elements of military administration as an important echelon in military organizational development; the council discussed concrete ways of raising the quality of the conscription of the youth and improving mobilization readiness and the official activities of the military commissariats at all levels.

The commanders and elements of educational and socio-psychological work and the chiefs at all levels have been conducting a search for ways of improving the socio-psychological climate among the troops, and for more effective forms for the indoctrination of the personnel with a regard for historical and national traditions in the interests of strengthening military discipline and order.

Our planned work among the troops and measures to monitor it have shown, at the same time, that such deficiencies as excessive formalism in the organization of combat training, education and indoctrination of the personnel, an inability to organize service and order under the new conditions and to know the most important things in work continue to exist in the units and subunits.

The Military Council of the Air Forces has thus still not defined its place and role in preserving the battleworthiness of aviation and improving morale and the psychological conditions of the servicemen, and has gotten tied up in the resolution of secondary tasks, which has affected the activity and overall status of the military collectives.

A certain sluggishness and inconsistency in the performance of work to strengthen military discipline has been typical in general of a certain quantity of larger formations and units; that has kept them from achieving any noticeable improvement, reducing the number of instances of non-regulation relations or absences without leave and eradicating other negative phenomena. The quantity of servicemen who have deserted their units also remains too high.

We have taken concrete steps, aside from measures on a disciplinary plane, to improve the situation in the ranks by improving the food and everyday living conditions for all categories of servicemen and making a transition to a new style of dress, along with more active work with regard to improving standard legal documents and the organization of interaction with the bodies of internal affairs, as well as

the entry into force of the Temporary Statute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The state of military discipline and provision of good living conditions in subordinate units and subunits is considered to be one of the principal indicators of the professional ability of commanders and superior officers at all levels.

The start of the new training year in the armed forces of Ukraine was devoted by and large to the practical rehearsal of questions of bringing the troops and forces to combat readiness, studying areas of combat application and routes of access to them, and improving engineer measures and the combat interaction of subunits. The Ministry of Defense also conducted several important measures over that brief period.

The problem of training individuals for higher military-political leadership to fulfill their constitutional obligations under conditions of crisis and conflict situations has existed for nations at all times. This problem has gained particular urgency during the period of building our young state.

Its resolution is complicated by the necessity of training higher personnel in the organizational unity and interaction of all power structures that constitute the military organization of the state.

Joint strategic staff exercises were conducted in the interests of solving this problem, new to us, from January 24 through 28 of this year under the leadership of the President of Ukraine and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, with the involvement of the commanders of the Border Troops, National Guard, National Security Service, Minister of Internal Affairs and chief of staff of Civil Defense of Ukraine with the corresponding command and control elements. The fact that the improvement of knowledge and skills of the higher military-political leaders endowed with the functions of ensuring external and internal security was accomplished for the first time against a uniform strategic background and on a uniform plane and intent was a principal feature of the exercises.

The results of the training confirmed the necessity of utilizing forms of strategic training, in the process of which questions of the joint resolution or elimination of crisis and conflict situations that affect the vital activity of the state and the administration of its power structures and regions are practiced. The organization of such strategic exercises will require additional scientific refinement in this regard in the interests of further improvements in them, which will provide an opportunity of devising the corresponding nationwide official documents.

The great amount of training work that was performed by the Ministry of Defense, along with the other ministries and agencies, with regard to resolving problems connected with the deployment of the elements of the former strategic nuclear forces of the Union in Ukraine, as is well known, have already gained practical realization. The Supreme Soviet approved on February 3 the trilateral declaration of the presidents of Ukraine, the United States and Russia on the removal from our territory of all nuclear weapons. The declaration contains provisions for Ukraine pertaining to

guarantees of the military security of Ukraine on the part of the United States, Russia and Great Britain, which voluntarily joined the declaration as a nuclear power and additional guarantor of the security of our state. The declaration also guarantees compensation for Ukraine for the value of the highly enriched uranium that is contained in the nuclear warheads that will be removed from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling.

The political gain that was won therein has allowed us to make international activity, including in the military spheres, more active.

Relations are being expanded, on a bilateral basis, with regard to military-technical collaboration among the military agencies of the CIS nations. Working meetings have been held over this brief period by delegations of Ukraine with delegations from Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

A military delegation headed by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, over the brief period of February 8-9, made a friendly official visit to the Hungarian Republic, where they were received by prominent state and military figures and held negotiations on the further development of fraternal relations and mutually advantageous military-technical collaboration on a broad circle of issues.

We will now have two battalions in Yugoslavia, each of which will have three special companies, one combat-engineer company and rear and medical support companies, owing to the fact that the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine adopted a resolution on 19 November 1993 to increase the size of the Ukrainian contingent in the peacekeeping forces there to 1,220 people. This decision was made by request of the UN Security Council.

Work was performed over January-February of this year pertaining to manpower acquisition for the first battalion, training of the rotation personnel and its dispatch by aircraft and railroad.

We expect that our soldiers will fulfill their peacekeeping duties in a worthy manner.

The crisis situation in the economy, and the lack of a military-industrial complex in the country that could structurally meet the needs of the armed forces of Ukraine for weaponry and military hardware, continue to have a negative impact on the logistical status of the troops, and are reflected in the pace of their development. The personnel of the armed forces are utilizing all available opportunities to preserve the battleworthiness of units and formations of the command and control elements under the difficult economic conditions.

I would like to emphasize overall that the difficulty of the problems that have arisen cannot diminish our persistence in the organizational development of the armed forces of Ukraine. The fact that the army needs help in other areas in these difficult times, and first of all on questions that pertain to the youth and, in particular, instilling in them a feeling of national pride and readiness to serve in the ranks of the armed forces of their Fatherland, also cannot be concealed.

The new state has to have its own army. This is undoubtedly a state matter, a matter for all the people. I thus appeal not only to the leaders of state structures, but also to civil society, to the mothers and fathers of the pre-conscription youth. We must all together with the army, after all, prepare from among our youth the reliable defenders of the independence of Ukraine, prepare them with full responsibility. The results will then be substantial, and the benefits from them will be felt.

### Failure of Ukraine's Military Reform Examined

94UM0269A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian No 5, 30 Jan 94-6 Feb 94 p A9

[Article by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Military Commentator Aleksandr Zhilin, under the rubric: "Army": "A Yellow Trident on Rusty Armor"]

**[Text] The hope that the CIS States would be able to preserve the common armed forces died at that moment when Ukraine announced its intention to build its own army. "Having nationalized" the troops located on its territory, Kiev destroyed the once unified defense complex but it didn't manage to properly utilize what it obtained as an inheritance. Today, the Ukrainian National Army (UNA) is that same mirage that it was two years ago.**

Ukraine always played a key role in the Union's defense system. The Soviet General Staff proceeded from the concept that the primary threat to the country's security emanates from the West and therefore Moscow did not begrudge the resources to strengthen the western borders. The newest military equipment and the most effective weapons were first and foremost supplied to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and also to the Carpathian and Odessa military districts. Ukrainian military-industrial complex enterprises, which composed 30% of the USSR's defense potential, received enormous investments from the center.

Ukraine obtained a truly luxurious inheritance from the Soviet Armed Forces. Besides 176 RS-18 (SS-19) and RS-22 (SS-24) intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1,280 warheads and more than 40 Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers with 600 air-based cruise missiles, Ukraine "privatized" second strategic echelon regiments and divisions—the most combat capable military units. This is 20 motorized-rifle and tank divisions, coastal defense forces, several airborne assault formations, three high-powered artillery divisions, and hundreds of special purpose units and subunits. Add to that four air armies armed with 230 fighter aviation aircraft and 620 ground attack aircraft. And, furthermore, Ukraine obtained 330 strike helicopters; units and formations of an independent PVO [air defense] army; missile attack warning system, intelligence, and communications facilities and so on. Taking into account the personnel of all military structures, the strength of the units and formations totaled approximately 700,000 men.

This enormous quantity of troops had a powerful technical base at that time. Its inventory consisted of new T-64 and

T-72 tanks; BMP-1, BMP-2, BTR-70, BTR-80, and BRM-1K armored vehicles; 2A65, 2S19, BM-21, and 9P140—artillery and missile systems; "Tochka" tactical missile systems; S-200 and S-300 air defense missile systems; Mi-6, Mi-8, Mi-9 and Mi-24 helicopters; and, MiG-25, MiG-29, Su-24, Su-25 and Su-27 aircraft.

However, in the final analysis this mighty military potential did a disservice to Ukraine, having hung heavy weights on its economy and budget.

According to the experts, when it began creating its own army, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense initially permitted several elementary errors. First of all, it did not assess the actual expenditures associated with the maintenance and storage of weapons. Second, it did not resolve a fundamental issue: What is reasonable sufficiency of military equipment and personnel, taking into account the capabilities of the economy and the state budget. Third, it did not become involved with the immediate sale of excess equipment to the national economy and excess weapons and military vehicles—abroad. As a result, today all of the military equipment is in such a deplorable state that it can be sold only for scrap.

### Reform According to Morozov

In 1992, Ukrainian Minister of Defense General Morozov announced that he was beginning a four-stage military reform. The mechanisms for command and control of the troops would be established in the first stage (1992-1993), a strategic plan for the employment of the armed forces would be developed in the second stage (1993-1994) and, a mobilized deployment and reserve training system would be developed in the third (1995). By that time, they assumed the strength of the Ukrainian National Army would be reduced to 400,000-450,000 servicemen and to 200,000-250,000 servicemen by the year 2000 (the fourth stage).

At that time, it was announced that the Ukrainian armed forces would consist of three types of troops—ground troops, the air force and the navy. They proposed creating two operational commands—Western and Southern—based upon the military districts.

In Morozov's words, 1993 was to have become the key year, during the course of which they would have to "resolve the primary group of issues associated with the qualitative transformations of the army". Alas, this year turned out to be "key" only for the minister of defense who was forced into retirement.

General Vitaliy Radetskiy, who replaced Morozov, openly announced at an 18 January press conference that "the armed forces still do not have a unified command and control system and mastery of military terminology is an important problem". In other words, the new minister of defense admitted that he will have to begin military reform practically from the beginning.

According to observers, the fact that the former minister of defense was too dependent on the political situation was the primary reason for the failure of "reform according to Morozov". This may have been explained in part by the

fact that the "Russian general" at the head of the military department was immediately perceived by certain circles as a potential "traitor of Ukrainian national interests". Therefore, from the first day in the minister's post, Morozov was compelled to be less involved with the organizational development of the army and more involved with maneuvering among the president, parliament, the government, nationalists, communists, and Democrats...

The aspiration to immediately please all political forces did not leave any chances to achieve any definite concept of military reform. And essentially all innovations were reduced to the fact that the commanders began to appoint those who had "Ukrainian" written on their military identity cards and knowledge of the Ukrainian language became the main criterion of professional training.

"A regimental commander told us frankly: Henceforth the main thing for us is not to fly well but to issue commands and to conduct radio exchanges in the Ukrainian language", says Military Pilot Aleksandr Serdyuk. "As they say, we got the message and began to master Ukrainian. And no one

really knows military terms, other terms simply do not exist in the Ukrainian language, and therefore we communicate primarily in obscene international slang..."

"The most horrible thing is that from the beginning the Ukrainian Army began to be built on the most loathsome Soviet principles," says former Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Central Staff Associate Colonel Vasiliy Osipenko. "Total window dressing, eye wash, corruption and absolute indifference to the actual state of combat readiness of units and subunits. The chain reaction of deception began with Morozov's optimistic reports to the president in which it was argued that the difficulties in the army were temporary."

Characterizing the state of the army, one highly-placed Ukrainian Ministry of Defense bureaucrat pointed out that the level of combat readiness had been reduced by more than 70%. In his words, pilots who do not at all know how to fly as a pilot in command are being graduated from military flying schools. "Taking into account the extremely unfavorable situation with nuclear weapons storage and the critical social tension in the troops, the Ukrainian armed forces are dangerous first and foremost for their own country."

**The Deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the Republics**

Republic	Divisions	Aircraft	Intercontinental Missiles	Heavy Bombers
Russia	71	2,380	1,035	70
Ukraine	20	850	176	43
Belarus	10	470	72	—
Kazakhstan	4	340	104	—
Uzbekistan	1	290	—	—
Turkmeniya	4	160	—	—
Kyrgyzstan	1	—	—	—
Armenia	3	—	—	—
Azerbaijan	4	130	—	—
Georgia	4	240	—	—
Moldova	1	—	—	—
Estonia	1	110	—	—
Latvia	1	180	—	—
Lithuania	4	70	—	—

**Numerical Composition of the Strategic Forces on the Territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine**

Countries	Intercontinental missiles		SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missiles]		Heavy bombers		Total	
	Platforms	Warheads	Platforms	Warheads	Platforms	Warheads	Platforms	Warheads
Belarus	81	81	—	—	—	—	81	81
Kazakhstan	98	980	—	—	40	240	138	1,220
Russia	912	3,970	788	2,652	79	271	1,779	6,893
Ukraine	176	1,240	—	—	43	372	219	1,612
Total	1,267	6,271	788	2,652	162	883	2,217	9,806

**An Army of Turncoats?**

Having an inadequate number of its own skilled command cadres, Ukraine at one time attempted to entice them from the CIS countries. Already in 1991, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers adopted a decree on increasing staff salaries by a factor of 2.5 and rank salaries by a factor of 1.5. At that time, officer salaries in Ukraine significantly exceeded the salaries of their colleagues in the near abroad. The widely advertised law "On Pension Support of Servicemen and Command and Rank and File Individuals of the Internal Affairs Organs" played its role. Officers, army and naval warrant officers, and extended service military personnel who agreed to take the Ukrainian oath were promised: For 20 years service, a pension—50 percent of the salary and, those released due to illness—55 percent plus three percent of that sum for each year of service over 20 years.

Currently, all of these benefits have worked out so that the salary of the Ukrainian minister of defense in coupons is equivalent to the salary of a Russian major in rubles. But at that time many officers were bought by the generous promises and rushed to be transferred to serve in Ukraine.

Today, the situation has drastically changed; of ten military academy students, only one agrees to go serve in the Ukrainian National Army. But then again, the reverse process is gaining momentum before our very eyes.

"Recently, officers are running from Ukraine to Russia nearly in entire subunits," asserts Reserve Colonel of Justice Sergey Borisenko. "Previously, it was as if they sought a plausible pretext to change their duty location. Now they drive to Moscow without notice and knock on every door of the Russian Ministry of Defense."

This is the sad result of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense leaders' reliance on officer-turncoats. This is entirely legitimate since a serviceman who has once betrayed the oath for the sake of a higher salary is entirely capable of betraying it ten more times for that same reason.

Noting the decline of morale and the moral potential of the Ukrainian Army, psychologists think that the enormous gap between the promised material benefits and the beggarly (in real life) state is the reason for that. The situation is worsened by the fact that the officers and generals who took the Ukrainian oath in exchange for the promised material welfare (and they are 63% of the Ukrainian National Army) are least of all concerned about Ukraine's national interests or the ideology of national revival. They were prepared to serve here for good money. But there is no money and there is no obligation. Those are the rules of the game that the Ukrainian authorities themselves set.

**The Half-Life**

The fact that the military equipment that the Ukrainian National Army obtained is rusting and being destroyed is not so terrible. The moral "corrosion" of the personnel is far more terrible.

"If I lived on the salary that I earn in the army, I would have long ago lived by begging," says Military Pilot Senior Lieutenant Yaroslav Fedoseyev. "All the more so that they delay payment of the paltry sum of this salary to us for 2-3

months. Therefore, I run a business in my off-duty time (and we "serve" from 0900 to 1300—there's nothing to fly in). Previously, my wife and I rushed to Poland to buy things. Today, I am involved in smuggling gasoline from Russia."

And here is the revelation of Junior Aircraft Technician Senior Lieutenant A.R.: "The most widespread business among junior officers is narcotics trafficking. All officer dormitories are overflowing with "grass". Commanders prefer to sell materiel, fuel, and construction materials. Everything that enjoys the slightest demand is being sold. Our regimental commander contrived to purchase two automobiles and to build three garages during the three summer months."

The pilots of an air base in the city of Artsiz told us about a noteworthy incident. In the middle of the night, they reported to the unit duty officer that the entire guard detail was drunk. While the officer went up to the guard room on foot, the drunken soldiers grabbed assault rifles and cartridges and left in a motor vehicle to go see some girls. The duty officer and several other officers rushed off in pursuit in their Zhigulis (there were no other serviceable vehicles in the regiment). They caught up with the soldiers. And... the situation drastically changed. Now the already armed soldiers began to pursue the officers. Rushing back to the garrison, the duty officer and his assistants barricaded themselves in the duty office. The soldiers attempted to take the building by storm but they couldn't pull it off because of their drunken state. Then they shot up the Zhigulis. This emergency situation ended with the punishment of the duty officer for... having driven to work in his own vehicle.

Of course, there are enough similar stories in the Russian Army. The shortage of soldiers is worsening the situation both in Russia and in Ukraine. In a recent interview in SHCHIT I MECH newspaper, Military Procurator Major-General of Justice Vasiliy Melnichuk said: "No more than 12 out of every 100 young men are serving in Ukraine... The number of evasions of service in the army is 35% of all military crimes in the western region of the republic."

Military analysts think that only urgent military reform can stop the decline of the Ukrainian Army that has not yet been born. But it must take into account not only the aspiration for independence but also the state of the economy. Otherwise, the question will arise already tomorrow, who will die earlier: The army or the economy?

**Development, Role of Ukraine's Civil Defense****Civil Defense Activities Reported**

94UM0242A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
12 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Major Vladimir Knysh, NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent: "'Unknown Troops'—This Is the Way Many Still See Formations of Civil Defense of Ukraine"]

[Text] Many recall that the civil defense existed in the former Union. They will probably tell you how they fled from lectures on protection from a "sudden nuclear,

chemical, or bacteriological attack by the probably enemy." The attitude toward civil defense, formed on the basis of "brilliant" training films and busy practical classes was, and in some places still is, one-sided. Incidentally, there would be nothing surprising in this if they still practiced that extremely simplistic, even dilettantish approach to the perception of everything that was included in the concept of "civil defense."

Today, possibly, such a phrase might seem somewhat pretentious to some. Others might even doubt the very fact of the existence of civil defense in Ukraine. Both types should recall that 3 February 1993 marked the adoption of the Law "On Civil Defense of Ukraine," which says that "citizens of Ukraine have the right to protection of their life and health from the consequences of accidents, catastrophes, large fires, and natural disasters and to demand of the Government of Ukraine and other organs of state executive power and the administrations of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of their forms of ownership and management, a guarantee that it will be enforced.

"The state, as the guarantor of this right, creates a civil defense system whose objective is to protect the population from dangerous consequences of accidents and catastrophes of a technogenic, ecological, natural, and military nature."

During Cold War times some of the most zealous military analysts of the West tried to include USSR civil defense forces with the full-fledged infantry troops. They used this as an argument for letting the appetites of their military department grow. Still, it was impossible not to advertise the semantic difference between the words "defense" and "protection" (contributing to defense, which, undoubtedly, expresses more precisely the character of the tasks performed by civil defense).

According to the law in our country, "civil defense forces are troops and specialized and nonspecialized formations. Civil defense troops are under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Their direct leadership is provided by the chief of staff of civil defense of Ukraine." This is Lieutenant General Viktor Grechaninov.

The civil defense of Ukraine and its troops are still very young—they are not even a year old. Nonetheless their "combat path" began considerably before the official date of the adoption of the law. The stages of this path were Chernobyl and work in the "off-limits zone," the rendering of aid to the population of western rayons of Ukraine which ended up in the flooded zone, participation in putting out the forest fires in the Crimea where, largely thanks to the efficient interaction between civil defense forces and local formations organized by the State Commission on Emergencies (it included the first deputy chief of staff of civil defense of Ukraine, Major General Nikolay Kapustyan), areas where fire broke out were localized and considerable areas of forest were saved. There was work for radioactive decontamination of areas in the city of Korosten and constant excursions for mine clearing.

Finally, the last example: Work in the flooded areas of Transcarpathia. All this was done by civil defense forces...

But nonetheless, its formations are still "unknown forces" to many of us.

A bright burst and the thunder of an explosion—an accident at a chemical enterprise. It is located on the edge of the city, which is living its ordinary life and not suspecting that the countdown to a possible tragedy had already begun.

Major Vladimir Mukhanov's first emergency-rescue battalion with its attached subdivisions (a fire-fighting company, an excavator company, and a chemical protection company) arrived in the region of the accident. The task was to reconnoiter the site, to rescue and evacuate the wounded, and to localize individual outbreaks of fire.

Since the source of the explosions was a container of prussic acid, the military servicemen of Captain Grigoriy Khablov's rescue company, the firemen of Captain Grigoriy Piven's fire-fighting company, and the military servicemen of other specialties work with individual means of protection.

Evacuation of the wounded was organized immediately. The firemen of Sergeant Nikolay Prisyaznyuk's compression section, Privates A. Kramaranko and I. Pogrebnyak and Junior Sergeant E. Gavich, had to put out the fires and remove obstructions in order literally to beat their way through to the victims.

According to information from the enterprise's chief engineer, a work shift consisting of three people was in one of the shops. The entrance was blocked. Emergency evacuation was necessary. And the jack hammers of the compressor team were again put to work. Within 20 minutes they had drilled through a concrete structure about 40 centimeters wide and the workers were released from their captivity.

The troops operate smoothly and efficiently. Excavators and other specialized equipment are used. The rescue workers carefully inspect the premises of the shops and conduct searches for workers who may have fallen under the rubble. The victims are given first aid and quickly evacuated out of the danger zone...

This time it was a demonstration class in the organization and actions of emergency-rescue battalions at the facilities, which was conducted at the final training sessions for commanders of civil defense units. But if, God forbid, all this had really happened, it would be they—the men of the "unknown forces"—who would be first to enter into hand-to-hand combat with danger.

As for the officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men of the first emergency-rescue battalion, they have to their personal credit participation in the search and rescue work after last year's well-known disaster with the Ruslan aircraft. For three months this year the troops worked to decontaminate areas around the city of Korosten. When there was an accident with the Kiev purification installations they conducted the decontamination—they removed

the coastal earth to a depth of 40 centimeters, loaded it into containers, and transported it to the place designated for it. They worked quickly, knowing what an important task had been assigned to them. Is there any need to mention that they performed the hardest ecological work on the Lybed River, on an area of three or four kilometers?

Overall, in Kiev alone there are 47 potentially dangerous facilities that have been "assigned" to civil defense forces. They are prepared at any time of the day, under any weather conditions, to come to our aid and spare us from disaster.

And problems—civil defense forces have them too. They have inadequate means of small-scale mechanization and sometimes a very serious shortage. They do not even have enough rack jacks. Even though in Donetsk there is an enterprise which produces very good pneumatic equipment—convenient, practical, and small, which could lift concrete slabs weighing up to three tonnes. This is something that is needed. But, alas, they are expensive and there is no money. Just as is the acquisition of new instruments for chemical reconnaissance. So they use what they have, or what they have so far. Some are also manufacturing their own. And they do not complain about life. Even though theirs is not very sweet. Most of the officers of civil defense units do not have housing either; they take care of their families as well as their financial capabilities will allow. Here in the first emergency-rescue battalion, half of the 14 officers and warrant officers do not have apartments.

It would seem that formations directly under the Cabinet of Ministers should not have to go begging. Alas, local authorities at all levels are rather stingy in dealing with their civil defense.

But if there is ever any natural disaster or large emergency—the State Committee on Emergency Situations convenes, possibly headed by a deputy prime minister (the main person in charge of civil defense) right in the situation room (the President of the United States in the White House is not the only one to have such a thing, there is also one in the headquarters of the civil defense of Ukraine), in order to make important and crucial decisions. And there they receive exhaustive clear information about emergency situations. Incidentally, this room is an object of legitimate pride. And especially for Grigory Dovbysh—the chief of the department for the automated control system of the staff of the civil defense of Ukraine. It is equipped with computers, and their memory contains, for example, a program of the five main prognosticatory-modeling systems for emergency situations. They include Proton (nuclear power plant accident), Zaryad (for chemical facilities), Vulkan (earthquakes and their consequences), Kaskad (catastrophic floods), and Buran (nuclear strikes). All these names were given not to frighten people but as a confirmation of how serious and crucial is the work entrusted to civil defense. They are the first to be sent to the most dangerous places—to clean up after accidents, catastrophes, and natural disasters. And they are frequently forgotten when the time comes to solve their problems—even the most immediate ones.

### Chief of Staff Grechaninov on Civil Defense Tasks

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3 Feb 94 pp 1-3

[Interview under the rubric "Crucial Interview" with Lieutenant General Viktor Grechaninov, chief of staff of civil defense of Ukraine, by Colonel Valentin Dmitriyev, NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent; place and date not given: "Our Specialists Are Always Ready!"]

[Text] [Dmitriyev] Viktor Fedorovich, a year ago, on 3 February, the Law of Ukraine "On Civil Defense of Ukraine" was adopted. This day has now become a holiday for a large number of people who see the entire meaning of their work in the protection of the life and health of people, preventing emergencies and catastrophes, and cleaning up after them. What are their daily tasks like?

[Grechaninov] According to that law, for a year we have been living, working, and reforming the civil defense system, fulfilling the requirements and tasks contained in that document for creating a system for defending the life and health of people in Ukraine. During that time we have done a great deal of work for reorganizing the structure of the staff itself, we have published statutes on the civil defense staff of Ukraine and on regional civil defense staffs, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is now considering a draft we submitted of the Statute on Civil Defense and a number of other documents that would make it possible to create the legal base necessary for successful performance of the tasks set for civil defense. And here they are. The main one is to prevent emergencies, and namely accidents and catastrophes of a technical nature. And if they occur anyway—to clean up after them skillfully and quickly, to render aid to the victims, to provide life support systems, etc. From this follows an entire complex of tasks, beginning with prompt notification and ending with aid to the suffering population after the cleanup. This is a long list of jobs which require special forces and means. Therefore, the civil defense forces consist of civil defense troops of specialized formations and nonmilitarized formations.

There does not seem to be any need to explain in detail just what civil defense troops are. But their specialized formations are worth discussing. They include highly qualified specialists—rescue workers who provide guaranteed service for various dangerous enterprises. We in Ukraine have 1,693 of these enterprises in the chemical area alone. The country has too many sources of danger: Among them are nuclear power plants and water reservoirs, which in the right circumstances could be the cause of great catastrophes. There are also possible earthquakes. Or, for example, the danger of secondary consequences—a break in the dam of the sedimentation pond at a chemical enterprise, etc.

[Dmitriyev] Do you have a certain kind of specialists or is it possible to teach just any soldier to do the job?

[Grechaninov] It is difficult to train the same soldier psychologically for action in extreme situations when, for example, there has been an earthquake or a landslide and it is necessary to look through the heaps of rubble and rescue people, to drag the victims out, etc. And it cannot be

ruled out that it will be necessary to deal with the dead, the wounded... This is far from easy. Therefore we have special training aimed at developing in the individual the necessary qualities and psychological stability in the most difficult of situations.

We have a very broad scope of training. The main thing is that we must have specialists who are capable of working while wearing the necessary protective clothing, depending on the nature of the production and the accident. They include people capable of working under water, of jumping from the air in a disaster zone; they include specialists capable of evaluating a situation on the spot, making a decision, and correctly carrying out what they have decided, which is very important. Because if a mistake is made in emergency rescue work, the consequences can sometimes be irreparable; for example, if you disturb a pile of rubble and do not manage to save the people. A high level of professionalism is achieved through constant training. And we are now placing our hopes in the idea of having our people work under contract, that is, for several years. Because it is very difficult to train a skilled specialist in a year and a half: His training is long and varied.

Further. We have specialized subdivisions—like the Spetsat [expansion not indicated], the Poltava detachment for cleanup after accidents at petroleum deposits, the Dneprodzerzhinsk and Zaporozhye chemical detachments, and others. These people under today's conditions (let me note that they are excellent specialists) must have good wages and proper social protection. Otherwise they will go to commercial structures. And there are truly dedicated people among them... This is one of today's problems.

[Dmitriyev] But your people need not only a high level of mastery but, frequently, also courage, heroism...

[Grechaninov] Our people never think about whether it is heroism or not. Suffice it to recall that at the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant the first readings of the radiation around the destroyed reactor were taken by our officers, particularly Aleksandr Tomlenov. It was a civil defense specialist who took the first helicopter flight to take readings over the reactor.

We have a lot of problems, for example, with the little "presents" left on the land after a war. Most frequently they are large-capacity aerial bombs which are beyond our specialists' range of competency. And, as a rule, all of them have the kind of device and are in a condition that they can be neither lifted nor transported—they must be defused on the spot. Well, you can imagine the difficulties our specialists encounter when they discover explosives in densely populated residential areas of cities or on the site of an industrial enterprise. And in spite of the fact that in such situations it is very dangerous to work with the "rusty death" that has been discovered, our people defuse them, raise them to the surface, and take them to a safe place, where they are exploded.

Literally a couple of days ago an ammunition depot from the war was discovered in Kiev. And what is to be done with it? Next door is a residential building. Accompanied

by the president's representative in the city and the rayon, we inspected the place. A decision has now been made to clear the mines from the depot without resettling the residents of the nearby buildings.

It is possible to give many examples of our people's heroism. Especially in gas rescue work. Let us face it, accidents occur at our chemically dangerous enterprises. And here our brave specialists, as soon as they hear the alarm, boldly go to clean up after the accident and fulfill their mission.

Or recall Chernobyl. Very many officers and enlisted men of civil defense units put their best foot forward there. In particular it was our specialists who removed the heavy water from the destroyed reactor.

Today our people are working indefatigably in spite of all the objective and subjective difficulties. First among them I would like to note the civil defense chiefs of staff of Lvov Oblast Colonel Damir Shafigulin, Kiev—Colonel Vladimir Zinkin, and Poltava—Colonel Leonid Martyniko, and the leader of the Zaporozhye specialized formation—Boris Udom. I can give the names of many self-sacrificing workers and highly qualified specialists. But even among them there are those who are the best. There are especially many of them among the subordinates of Boris Petrovich Udom. Several days ago this collective had occasion to participate in the cleanup after the collapse of the concrete ceiling of the building of the Zaporozhye Oblast trade union association. No mechanized equipment could be used there. Therefore the specialists did everything by hand. And in three hours the aftermath of the accident had been cleaned up, supports had been placed under the vault of the building, and everything necessary had been done to make sure that it did not collapse completely.

This formation has very wide-ranging tasks. It is meant to perform emergency rescue work at metallurgical and chemical facilities. Its specialists perform difficult jobs for prevention, including those that even the personnel of the facility refuse to do—they are so difficult and dangerous.

Brigade commander Colonel Aleksandr Yevdin, regiment commander Yevgeniy Konov, chief of the brigade's engineering service Major Vladimir Potapenko, and many other officers enjoy well-deserved respect.

[Dmitriyev] Few of our readers understand what the words "civil defense" really mean. What do your formations do, what is the principle of leadership of the country's civil defense?

[Grechaninov] The principle of civil defense is territorial-production. The chief of the country's civil defense is the prime minister, and the civil defense chiefs in the oblasts and rayons are representatives of the president of Ukraine. At enterprises they are the managers. Each of them has a commission for emergencies and nonmilitarized formations. Because the volume of work that must be done constitutes a whole complex of measures. If, for example, it is necessary to resettle people to evacuate them somewhere, someone has to provide them with shelter, clothing,

food, and medical assistance. Finally, jobs must be found for them. And all this is the responsibility of the civil defense. Therefore it is the task of the civil defense staff and the regional staffs to coordinate the actions of the ministries, departments, various structures, enterprises, and all organs of power for organized work according to a single plan.

[Dmitriyev] Well, who is the first to receive the alarm in the localities? How is the mechanism for your reaction engaged?

[Grechaninov] The existing civil defense system, which is now being restructured, makes it possible to react rapidly to all cataclysms that arise. We have people on duty in our civil defense staff headquarters. Plus, in a number of regions (in Lvov, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, and other oblasts) special groups have been created which, if necessary, go to the site and report on everything to the civil defense staff and then immediately organize the work that is necessary in such situations.

Now, according to predictions, the strong winds in Transcarpathia are supposed to get up to 40 meters per second. We too are preparing for this. Instructions have been given to the local areas to reinforce the special repair groups of electricians, communications experts, etc. so that it will be possible to promptly correct any damage caused by the elements. In general, all the work is being done for prevention in Transcarpathia.

[Dmitriyev] Transcarpathia now has a difficult situation caused by the mountain rivers overflowing their banks. Large regions have been flooded and many villages have suffered. Assistance is needed in resettling people from the destroyed homes. Are your people participating in the rescue work there?

[Grechaninov] Most actively. It is possible to give many examples of self-sacrificing participation of our subdivisions in all the work. It is difficult even to single anybody out. The people let nothing stop them from rescuing the victims, organizing their evacuation, and giving them blood, food, and medical assistance.

[Dmitriyev] In other words, they are doing their duty honorably. Many people are in need of their help. In this connection a question arises: What about civil defense itself, does it need help from the state? What problems does your department have?

[Grechaninov] During all of 1993 the collective of the staff of the civil defense of Ukraine was working with dedication to improve the country's civil defense system. At the same time objective difficulties, primarily financial ones, are impacting the effectiveness of the measures we are taking. Thus the chief of civil defense is the prime minister. His frequent replacement has a negative impact on the state of affairs...

In order to carry out the difficult task in the region that is affected the specialists need special equipment, instruments, means of personal protection, etc. And all this requires the corresponding material expenditures. Unfortunately, financial matters become worse each year.

Although one should understand that the more money that is invested in measures for prevention of accidents and emergencies, the lower the cost of cleaning up after them.

[Dmitriyev] Nonetheless, your department has a considerable potential of its own. Are any attempts being made to take advantage of internal reserves?

[Grechaninov] Understanding the difficulty of the economic situation in the country, of course, we are assessing its capabilities realistically and searching for additional reserves, including in international activity. In particular, civil defense of Russia has received tens of millions of dollars for delivering humanitarian aid cargo through the UN. And this year we too want to become involved in the implementation of the humanitarian aid programs of this international organization.

We are now very much in need of money. Because we have conceived and are working on one necessary system.

[Dmitriyev] One wonders what it is needed for, if, of course, it is not a secret.

[Grechaninov] Our specialists are working on a system of notification which would automatically inform the civil defense staff if an accident occurs at a dangerous enterprise. And then it would not make any difference whether the manager wanted to inform us of this promptly or not—we would have our own information about what happened. Remember how much time they remained silent about the accidents at the Beloyarsk and Chernobyl nuclear power plants?...

We have already achieved certain results in this area. We are now automatically receiving information from a number of facilities with chemical and radiation danger. But we must make sure that this is a system that will enable us to monitor completely everything that can present a threat to the life and health of the population.

Furthermore, in keeping with the concept of civil defense, each regiment has an emergency rescue battalion on 30-minute alert, and in the brigade there are two. In other words, the personnel of these subdivisions are prepared to move with their technical equipment to the site of the contamination within a half hour. But we are not satisfied with the questions of financing. We need money to buy means of minor mechanization, technical equipment, instruments, etc. The quality of the emergency rescue work depends directly on this.

[Dmitriyev] From all that has been said, one can draw the conclusion that your department has concerns 24 hours a day. Just take ecology. What "presents" the elements sometimes throws in your way...

[Grechaninov] You are right about that. Just yesterday we had to solve a problem that arose before us: Ice was floating on the rivers on the territory of Belarus. So we can expect it on our territory soon as well, on the Dnieper. The threat is that enormous amounts of water can accumulate, and they are capable of washing away dams in the region of the 30-kilometer zone of Chernobyl... So we are now working in close cooperation with the Ministry of Water

Management of Ukraine, the hydrometeorological service, and our Belarusian colleagues.

[Dmitriyev] In other words, you have international ties and contacts as well...

[Grechaninov] Quite right. One of the tasks of our civil defense system is international activity for rendering humanitarian aid and peace-making efforts. We are working on bilateral agreements with our neighboring states—Poland, Slovakia, and Belarus—so that in the event of a situation on both sides of the border it would be possible to coordinate our actions in matters of civil defense and localize the consequences through joint efforts.

Incidentally, in a recent critique of a recent joint strategic staff training session President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk concretized the tasks for the establishment of international contacts of the country's civil defense.

This is what I wanted to note. We have a unique center for modeling and predicting catastrophes. There is nothing like it in Europe. Now our specialists can quickly and concretely model one or another situation and its possible consequences. It has already been tested repeatedly. This makes it possible to promptly take correct and timely actions, beginning with removing people, evacuating them, so that they do not end up in the affected zone, and ending with cleaning up the aftermath.

The center has been visited by representatives of the UN, and apparently this organization is going to ask us to model for other countries the possible variants of the development of events in the case of the appearance of one emergency situation or another.

[Dmitriyev] As I understand it, this order will not be free of charge...

[Grechaninov] Of course it will be possible to earn foreign currency for the state this way.

[Dmitriyev] But how does the interaction between our civil defense and that of neighboring states occur in practice? Are there examples?

[Grechaninov] As one example, I can discuss the following. In Izmail in Odessa Oblast we have a pulp and cardboard combine which has large amounts of chlorine. Last summer there was a fire there which threatened to cause a discharge of a considerable quantity of substances that are dangerous to the health, and not only of city dwellers but also of the population on the territory of the neighboring state—Romania. Within 20 minutes after the signal was received in the civil defense staff headquarters, both the president and the prime minister had on their desks the conclusions and suggestions necessary for making a decision. Our border guards and other departments were promptly notified. The corresponding information was also sent to the Romanian Embassy, for which the government of this state expressed its gratitude to us.

[Dmitriyev] On this holiday I want to wish happiness and good health to you and all who work and serve with you in

the civil defense of Ukraine. And that you have fewer occasions to go to disaster zones!

[Grechaninov] Unfortunately, the number of accidents and catastrophes is not decreasing. Contributions toward the cleanup are immense. And under the conditions of today's economy this is a difficult burden which it has to bear. Therefore, we will do everything we can to protect the country's economy by reducing the number of catastrophes and the difficulty of cleaning up their aftermath. Because there is a certain pattern here. The more powerful and richer the civil defense, the fewer the preconditions for accidents and other emergency situations, and the less it is necessary to spend on cleaning up after them.

#### Navy Press Center Spokesman on Black Sea Fleet Financing

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14 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Petr Pavlyuk, reviewer, Ukrainian Navy Press Center: "On the Matter of Financing the Black Sea Fleet: When Half-Truth is Offered as Truth"]

[Text] A number of articles on the financing of the Black Sea Fleet have recently appeared in the mass media. A number of serious complaints were expressed in them, as well as in Ostankino broadcasts, addressed to Ukraine and its Ministry of Defense. Accusations were made that joint Ukrainian-Russian agreements on the fleet's financing were being violated. A number of figures are cited in this regard. For example, of the total credit of 96,977,700 karbovantsy allocated to the fleet as of 29 October 1993, Ukraine's share is only 22.6 percent, while in recent times it has grown even smaller.

These and other data are cited with the blessing of the chief of the financial service of the Black Sea Fleet. Strange as it may seem, for some reason not one of the authors of the articles tried to discover the opinion of the other side—Ukraine—regarding these truly painful issues, and acquaint readers with it.

To correct this omission I turned to the chief of the financial service of the Ukrainian Navy, Colonel Viktor Kobernik, who had participated as an expert in drafting and adopting the joint Ukrainian-Russian agreement on financing the Black Sea Fleet.

"All numerical computations and financial data need to be meticulously checked in order to confirm or refute them," he emphasized. "Yet there are complaints against Ukraine that its Ministry of Defense should be allowed the possibility to carry out a documentary financial audit of the Black Sea Fleet jointly with representatives of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, in order to determine where money for the fleet is coming from, in what amounts, and where and for what needs it is being spent, who is overpaying, who is underpaying, and so on."

However, initiatives undertaken on this account by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense in February, and then in July of last year, were rejected for some reason by the Russian side. This is despite the fact that according to

statute the military districts (fleets) must undergo documentary financial audits not less than once every two years. And the last audit in the Black Sea Fleet was in July 1991. Had it occurred as required, in 1993, there probably would not have been any need for law enforcement agencies to investigate criminal cases associated with major material and financial abuses in the mine and torpedo arsenal base, and in the Black Sea Fleet fuel service.

The joint agreement on financing the Black Sea Fleet in the transitional period (to 1995), drawn up and initialed in February of last year, foresees participation of Ukraine and Russia in equal shares of 50 percent. This agreement was subsequently confirmed in April 1993.

When the chief of the financial service of the Black Sea Fleet announces that Ukraine's share in fleet financing was only 22.6 percent as of the end of October, and even lower after that, the personnel and the blue and white collar workers of the fleet develop a negative attitude toward the Ukrainian side. It is obviously this goal that the articles recently published on these issues pursue.

However, the sad thing is that lies are being offered as truth, and many things are deliberately not being said, with the blessing of Colonel A. Zhukov. In particular, the chief of the financial service of the Black Sea Fleet has to know that Ukraine provided for 100 percent of the Black Sea Fleet's financing throughout practically all of 1992 and from 1 January 1993 to May 1993. Mutual settlements regarding these expenses have still not been carried out.

Now about how the financial service of the Black Sea Fleet is manipulating the figures.

Yes, according to agreements Ukraine's share should be 50 percent. By Colonel A. Zhukov's calculations this share is presently something else. But once again he is holding back a great deal of information. For example, about the amounts upon which his computations are based. The agreement does not allow unilateral financial actions. Even so, Russia unilaterally decided to introduce payment for the difference between the karbovanets and the ruble into the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense also unilaterally assumed the responsibility of paying the expenses for this item. Thus, these expenses should not be included in Ukraine's percent share.

Nor can the Ukrainian side assume responsibility for half of the expenses of maintaining those vessels and ships that raised the flag of St. Andrew. It would be wrong, after all, for any self-respecting power to pay those who insult its national worth!

Some other nuances of this complex problem could be brought up as well.

As they say, money likes to be counted. And it is precisely such an accounting that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense proposes. It is completely incomprehensible why the RF Ministry of Defense and the Black Sea Fleet are opposed to this. You would think that they should be the ones who are most interested in clarifying and resolving the arising misunderstandings.

I would like to pass along another extremely interesting fact.

In early December 1993 the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense appropriated 21 billion karbovantsy in payment of the Black Sea Fleet's debt to ship repair plants. It wanted to be sure that the enterprise collectives would receive their wages in time. The financing was carried out according to established procedure by the financial service of the Ukrainian Navy. However, on 8 December the chief of the financial service of the Black Sea Fleet returned the money to us with the following explanation: "The indicated amount will be credited to the budget account of the financial service of the Black Sea Fleet by decision of the Black Sea Fleet commander only if the transfer is made directly by the financial directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, and not through the Ukrainian Navy."

It is incomprehensible why the Black Sea Fleet took the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's attempt to finance the ship repair plants through the financial and economic directorate of the Russian Navy as such an insult. And the latter grossly violated the February agreement, which prescribes transfer of money to the Black Sea Fleet through the Ukrainian National Bank, by using the services of commercial structures; for example, to the Omtek-Biznes firm through the Mosbiznesbank. This choice was made by the Russian side. As for why, who knows?

On the other hand, throughout all of 1993 Ukraine insistently offered to continue 100 percent financing of the Black Sea Fleet through centralized mutual settlements with the RF Ministry of Defense through the National Bank (50 by 50 percent), as is foreseen by the joint February agreement. In this case any interruptions in issuing pay and other payments to the personnel would have been excluded.

There is one other tactical maneuver of the Black Sea Fleet command I would like to discuss. It's no secret to us that many Black Sea Fleet admirals and officers capitalize on various loopholes to get their pay in rubles much more often than once a year (when departing on leave). Subsequently converting them into karbovantsy in various ways, they acquire a good "nest egg." This is hardly to the liking of the officers, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers, and employees of the Black Sea Fleet whose position does not allow them to do this.

In short, there are many financial nuances in the Black Sea Fleet, ones which the command has no intention of discussing fully. And as a distracting maneuver, various insinuations are being made and a purposeful effort is being conducted to influence public opinion and arouse negative emotions. It is obviously precisely for these reasons that the Black Sea Fleet will never agree to such inspections, and all the more so to a documentary financial audit. Even though this would be the best way to shed some light on the real state of affairs.

**Radetsky Stance on Black Sea Fleet Issues Disputed**  
*94UM0268A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS*  
*in Russian 2 Feb 94 p 1*

[Article by Yuliya Khaytina: "General, You'll Never Be a Schwartzkopf: Ukraine Continues to Play 'War' With the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] The Black Sea Fleet clearly isn't bored. This week the newspaper KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI published a report from a press conference held by Ukrainian Defense Minister Army General Vitaliy Radetsky: In this own words, Mr. Radetskiy wouldn't want to have to liberate Crimea like the Americans did Kuwait.

This happened not long before the presidential elections in Crimea. On the backdrop of the command-and-staff exercise held by the Ukrainian Armed Forces from 24 to 27 January, the general's uplifted spirits evoked a response from the Black Sea Fleet press center. "The absence of such a desire on the part of General V. Radetsky (to transform Crimea into Kuwait.—Author) inspires great hopes for maintaining peace and stability in Crimea," read a statement by the Black Sea Fleet press center. In this case "the Black Sea Fleet command doubts that the general could become a Schwartzkopf, despite the fact that the army has nurtured many handsome, young and promising generals. Operation Desert Storm, which General Schwartzkopf led, occurred in a totally different situation, and it had nothing in common with the well publicized statement 'Crimea will be Ukrainian or a desert.'" Moreover "the Desert Storm peacekeeping action was carried out under a well-tuned command and control system using common terminology, and it was supported by the military-economic potential of 14 states. On the other hand...the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have a unified command and control system, and assimilation of military terminology is one of the problems. The fact that participation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Kiev was treated by the troops as an exercise inspires confidence in their peaceful nature," the Black Sea Fleet press center subtly notes.

Another unique message came to Black Sea Fleet chief of staff Petr Svetashov in the form of a telegram from Ukrainian Navy chief of staff Aleksiy Ryzhenko: "We will consider the Black Sea Fleet marine brigade to be a FOREIGN FORMATION on Ukrainian territory." "This 'gift' is dedicated to the brigade's exercises," explained acting chief of the Black Sea Fleet press center Andrey Grachev to MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS. "It's as if we don't have the right to conduct exercises without giving advance notice to the Ukrainian side. But there isn't a single document that foresees such a thing in relation to what is still the Russian-Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet."

The Yalta agreement, which declared the Black Sea Fleet to be Russian-Ukrainian, and approved subordination of the fleet's main command to two presidents, was and remains the sole legal basis for actions of the Black Sea Fleet. To its deep misfortune the staff of the Ukrainian

Navy has no right to "consent to" exercises or display any other such attention to units of the Black Sea Fleet.

It is altogether difficult to count the number of "petty" accusations that have been levied against the Black Sea Fleet by Ukraine. Ask Black Sea Fleet commanders why they buy uniforms in Russia, and watch their eyes pop out: "If Ukraine can't make uniforms, are you saying we should go naked?" is the reply. According to our unofficial data, by the way, General Radetsky himself bought eight pairs of uniform trousers for 8,000 rubles, and is now going around in a Soviet officer's uniform.

By the way, the Black Sea Fleet itself gets little pleasure from this "war." The Massandrovskiy Russian-Ukrainian Protocol of 1993, which transfers the Black Sea Fleet to Russia in exchange for cancellation of part of Ukraine's debts, has still not been ratified. The Black Sea Fleet remains in limbo. Black Sea Fleet servicemen are not protected by a single law, inasmuch as "they don't belong" to either country, and Russian-Ukrainian dual citizenship still doesn't exist. Despite all of this, 95 percent of the officers feel themselves to be Russian citizens. Wages have not been paid to servicemen since December. But it would be more than immodest to talk about the collapse of the navy: The Black Sea Fleet took second place among all fleets of the former Union on the basis of the year's results. Black Sea Fleet ships proved their combat capability when they evacuated 60,000 refugees from Poti.

\* \* \*

At his first press conference Yuriy Meshkov, the newly elected president of Crimea, announced that a referendum on self-determination will be held in Crimea in March.

It became known to us from unofficial sources in Kiev that in response to such actions by the Crimean side, Ukraine will not ratify the agreement to remove nuclear warheads from Ukrainian territory.

**Navy Efforts to Balance Budget, Appeal to Populace Noted**

**Russian Version of Financing Disputed**

*94UM0275A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian*  
*8 Feb 94 p 1*

[Unattributed article from Ukrainian Navy press center: "Is the Mirror Guilty of the Eyesore?"]

[Text] A program on Russian radio of February 2 of this year quoted the expression of a representative of the ChF [Black Sea Fleet] command that the delays in paying servicemen in the fleet are occurring owing to the lack of cash at the banks of Ukraine.

The press center of the Navy of Ukraine reports that this is just the latest disinformation. Ukrsotsbank [Ukrainian Social Bank] acting director T.I. Shcherban has informed us that "there has been not a single delay in pay over the course of 1993 due to a lack of cash at the Sevastopol branch of the Ukrsotsbank."

The chief reason for the delays in issuing pay is the absence of funds in the accounts of the Black Sea Fleet, and its many billions in debt.

The city budget is also suffering for the same reasons, since the Black Sea Fleet is not making timely payments for electric power, water, ship repairs, capital construction and other items.

The disruptions in the financing of the fleet often occur because of the unwarranted ambitions of its command. It refused to settle up the amount of 21 million karbovantsi with MO [Ministry of Defense] of Ukraine last year for the financing of the shipyards of the ChF, for example, only because it had gone through the financial service of the Ukrainian Navy.

Certainly no requests whatsoever were received from the ChF by the financial service of the Ukrainian Navy, either in December or in January of this year, for the transfer of funds.

This stance can elicit only surprise. Objecting to the fact that the MO of Ukraine has financed the ChF through the financial service of the Navy, its command for some reason has no objections to the analogous actions by the MO of the Russian Federation, which also finances the ChF not directly, but rather through the economic and financial directorate of the Russian Navy. The ChF also does not object to the financing of its Russian side through commercial structures, and that goes against the requirements of the joint agreement between Russia and Ukraine on questions of financing.

The disinformation in the fleet community on these issues is none other than an attempt by certain parties in the ChF to evoke a negative attitude toward Ukraine and its Ministry of Defense and Navy. That serves only those who are striving not to strengthen friendship and mutual understanding, but rather to fan further the hubbub surrounding the problems of the Black Sea Fleet and further destabilize the situation.

#### **Contributions from Populace Allotted**

94UM0275B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
2 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank Oleh Chubuk: "The Ukrainian Navy—Truly the People's Fleet"]

[Text] More than three hundred million karbovantsi in "net form" for building the Navy of Ukraine have come in since April of 1993 from citizens, institutions, enterprises and organizations around the country. Those sending the funds moreover often indicated their specific purpose. Zaporizhzhya Oblast, for instance, sent 100 million karbovantsi for the construction of housing for naval servicemen, the Ternopil Oblast Union of Officers of Ukraine sent seven million karbovantsi for the construction of the patrol craft Bayda Vyshevetskyy, and the inhabitants of the city of Snyatyna in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast sent more than five million karbovantsi for the construction of the small ASW ship Pokuttya. The mayor of the city of Lutsk sent the Ukrainian Navy written notification of the remittance of 30

million karbovantsi simultaneously with the commissioning of the small ASW craft Lutsk on February 12 of this year.

The naval forces of Ukraine are thus truly the people's fleet, as is proven time and again by the financial assistance that comes to account No. 200141400, MFO 324106 at the Sevastopol office of the Ukrotsbank in the city of Sevastopol.

#### **Bezkorovaynyy Thanks Ivano-Frankivsk Contributors**

94UM0275C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
4 Mar 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "Thanks to the Bankers from the Vice-Admiral"]

[Text] A telegram addressed to head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Administration of the Prominvestbank of Ukraine Ivanny Barny has arrived from Commander of the Naval Forces of Ukraine Vice-Admiral V. Bezkorovaynyy.

He expresses thanks in it to the bankers for their patriotic attitude toward the problems of building the Ukrainian Fleet. The sailors also provide assurances that the funds sent by the bank will be utilized to build housing for Ukrainian sailors and provide social protections for them. The telegram from the vice-admiral is a reaction to the noble deed of the employees of the Prominvestbank administration, who at the end of last year allocated a hefty sum to one of the military units for the construction of housing and other needs of the sailors.

#### **Fate of Aircraft Carrier 'Varyah' in Doubt**

94UM0275D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
4 Mar 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "Giving Up on the 'Varyah'?"]

[Text] The initial plans to refine the Varyah [Varyag] aircraft carrier are impossible, but it could still be made into a floating airfield, feels the new director of the Black Sea Shipyard Ihor Ovdiyenko. Ukraine itself cannot complete the building of this ship, says the head of the largest shipyard in Ukraine. The Varyah meanwhile occupies a quay, creating problems with its utilization and causing expenses for servicing it in a mothballed state. The plant cannot independently resolve the issue of cutting up or selling the ship. A great deal of money has moreover been invested in the Varyah, and courage is needed to dare to give up on it now.

#### **Black Sea Fleet Commander Baltin Disputed**

94UM0275E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
4 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Ukrainian Navy Press Center Senior Officer Captain-Lieutenant Albiy Shydrya: "The Admiral Has Questions, But the Sailors From Ukraine Can Only Remain Silent"]

[Text] Commander of the Black Sea Fleet [ChF] Eduard Baltin, accompanying Mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov during his visit to Sevastopol, himself began asking the

journalists questions instead of giving answers. "Who drew the borders of Ukraine?" asked the admiral. And immediately in the same spirit: "Ukraine had five oblasts within the 1939 borders, and has 26 now. Who has been pursuing an imperial policy—Russia or Ukraine?" (The admiral, by the way, made a "trifling" arithmetical error here, for some reason counting Ukraine with 26 oblasts instead of the 24.)

Noting the embarrassment of the representatives of the mass media, who had in no way expected such attacks directed at Ukraine from the commander of the fleet of the two nations, Admiral Eduard Baltin promised that "our people" would soon be able to meet with him for a more detailed discussion on that topic.

So now here is Admiral Baltin, who has gained a reputation as a cautious commander, not concealing his antipathy toward Ukraine and starting to talk the language of the odious Russian leaders. This visibly reflects the situation in the ChF, whose commander fulfills only orders from the Russian Navy. The uniform of the armed forces of Russia with the corresponding insignia has been introduced in the fleet, in violation of the Yalta agreements. Draftees from Ukraine, making up 50 percent of the fleet, are being indoctrinated in the spirit of loyalty to the Russian leadership... Need we be surprised that the commander of the fleet is now proposing that we think where the state border of Ukraine should really be, starting the division into "ours" and "not ours"?

Just whose interests does the command of the Black Sea Fleet intend to protect on the territory of Ukraine?

#### An-70 Military Transport Aircraft Development, Capabilities

94UM0245A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
27 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric "Details on the Fact": "It Is Called the An-70"]

[Text] NARODNA ARMIYA has already reported that the family of airliners developed at the aviation scientific and technical complex imeni Oleg Antonov has been supplemented with a new aircraft. Its name is the An-70. Three countries—Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan—are planning to build this beauty. That is why the national colors of those countries adorn the fuselage of the first, and as yet sole, specimen of the An-70 transport aircraft. The chief customers are the ministries of defense of Ukraine and Russia, whose cooperation in the development and production of the new transport aircraft is based on an international agreement signed by representatives of the governments of Russia and Ukraine. It is thus understandable that those military agencies have a vested interest in having in the arsenal of their military-transport aviation an aircraft that conforms entirely to all contemporary requirements. So even though the first models of the new military-transport aircraft will appear in the air regiments at best in 1996-97, it is worth becoming acquainted with the An-70 more closely.

The An-70 was created to ship cargo and vehicles, and the need for such an aircraft in the armed forces of Ukraine is explained by the fact that the principal military-transport aircraft today, the An-12, has already become outmoded and is in essence awaiting replacement. The An-70 could indeed become that reliable replacement.

In order to understand better why it is this aircraft that specialists consider an achievement in the field of aircraft construction, we turn to the American [as published] weekly JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, which had publicized the characteristics of the aircraft and commented on them professionally long before the ceremony to roll out the first An-70 had taken place in Kiev. They equated the characteristics of the An-70 with the capabilities of the C-130 base military-transport aircraft of the NATO countries.

American experts feel that creation of the design for a transport aircraft for the VPS [Air Forces] is not a particularly difficult task. It is, however, considerably more difficult to embody in the plans tactical performance characteristics that would fully take into account the contemporary requirements of the troops in the area of transporting personnel and hardware from their permanent base locations to a conflict zone. Effectiveness in the performance of rapid troop movements or their redeployment is defined by the quantity of cargo shipped over a certain time. And it is better in that case to have, for example, two aircraft of smaller dimensions than one large aircraft, since that provides an opportunity to utilize twice as many loading and unloading areas.

Such characteristics as the length of the runway and the capability of the aircraft to perform maneuvers outside the boundaries of it, as well as the overall cost of the aircraft, are important requirements among those posed toward military-transport aircraft. Proceeding from that, foreign specialists indicate that all of those requirements have been well balanced in the design of the An-70. It does not exceed any of the now-existing similar aircraft in dimensions, speed or flight range, but the sum of the characteristics embodied in the An-70 is almost ideal compared to other military-transport aircraft. The An-70, created based on the use of not very complex technologies, will possibly be quite advantageous from the standpoint of acquisition and utilization. Any other aircraft would require additional funds for its production, but the An-70 is able to make the greatest contribution to the state of the world aviation market among other developments of military aircraft.

I would remind you that these conclusions are being drawn by foreign aviation specialists, who can scarcely be suspected of sympathy toward the achievements of Ukrainian aviation designers and aircraft builders.

Now, the characteristics of the An-70 in more concrete detail:

The aircraft can ship cargo weighing up to 30-35 tonnes distances of 4,000-5,000 kilometers at a speed of 750 km/hr.

The aircraft, depending on the missions, has a takeoff weight between 100 and 130 tonnes, and can be based

either at permanent concrete airfields with runways as long as 1,800-2,200 meters, or on short unimproved landing zones as long as 600-800 meters. This means that the An-70 can be utilized on 80 percent of the airfields in the CIS, while foreign aircraft in this class can use only half of all existing airfields. The capability of the An-70 to take off and land on short unimproved landing areas provides an opportunity to deliver cargo directly to its intended destination, which is exceedingly important when one takes into account the requirements of wartime.

The dimensions of the cargo bay of the An-70 medium transport aircraft are of great significance. Its volume is a third larger than that of the Il-76 aircraft, and three times larger than the An-12, Hercules and Transall aircraft.

"The cargo bay of the An-70 makes it possible to transport all of the military hardware and weaponry of the CIS and NATO countries," the advertising prospectus states. In describing the An-70 in more detail, however, I will give the data that were cited by the American specialists evaluating it: "The aircraft can hold an M2/M3 Bradley in non-dismantled form, an M-109 howitzer (the equivalent of our 2S3), a towed howitzer with prime mover, and the PVO-2S6 mobile system with the Sa-11 SAM launcher."

The cargo bay of the An-70, unlike the An-12, Il-76, Hercules and Transall domestic and foreign aircraft, can hold cargo in two rows.

A whole series of innovations were employed in the development and construction of the new medium transport aircraft. I will dwell only on those that have a direct bearing on the operation of the An-70.

A power plant with propfan engines has been installed on a transport aircraft for the first time. The engines were developed and built by the engine builders of Zaporižzhya, and the propfans by the Russian design bureau in the city of Stupino. Taking into account the growing requirements for fuel expenditure, it should be pointed out that it is only 160 grams per tonne-kilometer for the A . By way of comparison, the An-12 required three times as much fuel, and the Il-76 twice as much, as the An-70 for the shipment of 20 tonnes of cargo 3,000 km during their use as the standard medium cargo-transport aircraft.

A system of control of the aircraft equipment that automates the performance of piloting tasks was also used on the An-70 aircraft for the first time in the CIS; this has made it possible to reduce the number of control panels and the demands on the crew. The information-display system was built on the basis of full-color screen indicators that bring up everything the pilots need— piloting and navigational data, information on the functioning, failure and defectiveness of on-board systems and aircraft equipment, reference information and recommendations. Thus, I expect it will be an utter pleasure for the crew of three individuals to fly the An-70.

### **Shortcomings in Industrial Support for Air Forces**

*94UM0245B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
12 Feb 94 p 2*

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya under the rubric "A Journalist Covering a Problem": "The Aircraft Are Out of Order, But the Aircraft Repair Enterprises Stand Idle"]

[Text] A report appeared in the press not very long ago that just half of the aviation hardware of the Air Forces of Ukraine is in a combat-capable state. I will not take it upon myself to refute that information, I would only point out that there are aircraft and helicopters that are not combat-ready or have limited readiness in the 14th Air Army. Moreover, most of them are the rotary-winged craft from army aviation that were until recently under the subordination of the PrykVO [Carpathian Military District]. One of my features already talked about the 17 Mi-26 helicopters that are standing idle without main rotors (NA of 29 December 1993).

Whatever the quantity of faulty aviation hardware, however, it must evoke anxiety among all of the officials connected with it. The more so as it will increase with every day if the appropriate measures are not taken. The paradox consists of the fact that there are getting to be more and more faulty aircraft, while the operation of the aircraft repair enterprises is slowing down or even coming to a halt. It is also worth noting that there are more than fifteen aircraft-repair plants (ARZs) in Ukraine. They are not only capable of repairing all of the disabled aircraft and helicopters, but also of filling orders for the repair of aviation hardware from other states, which would provide quite a bit of currency receipts for the state coffers. But...

I will show how matters look using the example of the aircraft repair plant in Lviv. That collective has been headed for quite a long time now by Colonel Vyacheslav Kupch. He came to that enterprise as a lieutenant to the assembly shop, so he knows the business he is engaged in very well. And this allows him even during these difficult times to keep the "ship" afloat, so to speak, which is quite difficult.

The Lviv ARZ has specialized in the repair of MiG aircraft since its very creation. It has a good technical base, skilled specialists and solid ties with other enterprises for the performance of all repair operations. So they have everything for the performance of their appointed duties. They even recently mastered the repair of the most modern MiG-29 fighter. And that was at their own expense. (The state, through the Ministry of Defense, did not allocate a single karbovanets to them for it).

The enterprise, moreover, started to repair that type of aircraft last year, and has returned six MiG aircraft to their units.

But even greater difficulties have appeared. The first is finances, since the Ministry of Defense has not paid for any of the aircraft. It turned out that the plant workers themselves suffered from their own initiative in mastering repair of the MiG-29...

The difficult situation has also affected the aircraft repair plant in Lutsk, which specializes in the repair of jet engines for aircraft. Here, also at their own initiative and at their own expense, they mastered the repair of the RD-33 engines that are used on the MiG-29. They have repaired several of the units. But they have not been paid a single karbovanets for it. The work has thus been halted at the plant since December of last year. The workers have been sent on "vacation." Many of them have already found new jobs, and certainly will not return to the enterprise. The costly equipment is standing idle. The plant, in short, is collapsing.

The Ministry of Defense, of course, is not failing to settle up with the repair plants out of some whim or ambition. It simply has no money. There is not even enough money, as is well known, to pay the servicemen.

I remind you of the popular saying of penny wise, pound foolish. And when someone hits upon the idea of "economizing" through the payments to the repair enterprises, then we will have to pay not twice as much, but tens of times more. And as early as today. If the ARZ stops working, the aircraft have to be sent to Russia for repairs, and that requires hard currency.

Budgetary financing, of course, is the main source for the enterprises of the Ministry of Defense, but it is far from the only one. They could also find their own, quite significant sources, and that without considerable efforts. Here are a few.

The author of these lines has already had occasion to write about 164 aircraft that have been repaired and are being preserved at the ARZ in Lviv. These are aircraft that are not needed in practice to arm the Air Forces of Ukraine. But other countries could acquire them for their armies. So why not sell that surplus aviation hardware while it can still find buyers, and organize the repair of our own aircraft using the funds received?

This question sounds almost rhetorical, since it has already been asked at various levels more than once. But weeks, months and even years are passing, and no one will make the decision. The aircraft are thus standing idle, growing functionally and physically obsolete, to the benefit of no one. The plant, on the contrary, suffered losses of some 726 million karbovantsy for the upkeep of the aforementioned 164 aircraft last year; the total will be considerably higher this year.

Quite a few repaired engines have accumulated at the ARZ in Lutsk that are also not needed by the Air Forces of Ukraine, and in such quantity that they exceed a five-year supply. They could also be sold. A significant portion of the assemblies that are removed from aircraft destroyed in accordance with international agreements could also be offered for sale. Quite a bit that could be sold abroad, getting profits where there are losses today, could certainly be found at other ARZs as well.

But unfortunately no one is occupied with this. Rather, there is no one to be occupied with it, since the aircraft repair plants do not have the right or the capability, while

the corresponding structure has not been created in the directorate of the Air Forces.

There is yet another way to obtain funds—to perform repairs on the aviation hardware of other states. The Lviv ARZ repaired several aircraft for Poland last year, and was paid in hard currency for it. Those funds, by the way, were spent to master the repair of the MiG-29 and maintain the operability of the enterprise.

The plant will have the opportunity to repair aircraft that are in service with the armies of Western Europe, India and some others in the future as well. But concluding agreements independently at the international level is outside the scope of authority of Colonel Kupch and his subordinates. A coordinating body in the Air Forces directorate is required here once again. It is also required in order to plan and analyze the work of the ARZs and place state orders. Its absence led to the fact that some enterprises last year were engaged in the repair of aviation hardware that is not in service in Ukraine.

A situation has moreover taken shape today where there is not a single order for the targets of the ARZs that would stipulate the product range and volume of repairs of aviation hardware. This means that there is no legal basis for payment for the output for military purposes that would be produced by the enterprises.

There are many other problems as well, connected with the fact that no one wants or is able to coordinate the affairs of the ARZs. They are left, so to speak, to the whims of fate, under the slogan of "every man for himself." So it ends up that Lutsk and some other plants have shut down, while Lviv, in order to survive, is engaged in the production of kitchen furnishings, medical instruments and even the assembly of intercity buses. That is possibly necessary, but the main thing for them is the repair of aircraft for the Air Forces of Ukraine. And they are not letting the plant pursue that business. So it turns out that almost half of the aircraft are out of order, but the aircraft repair plants are standing idle.

## BALTIC STATES

### Electrical Line to Skrunda Sabotaged

94UM0287B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
2 Mar 94 p 1

[SZGV [Northwestern Group of Forces] Press Center article: "Someone Is Obviously Interfering With the Russian Radar"]

[Text] On 28 February at 01:24 am Moscow time, an electrical transmission line support was blown up in the direction of Brotseny five kilometers south of the Russian Army's Skrunda Radar Facility.

A commission consisting of representatives of Latvenergo [Latvian Energy], the criminal police and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Skrunda Radar Site drove out to the site of the explosion. The commission officially established that the explosion of the electrical transmission

line support was sabotage. Two days are required to restore the support. Work began on the morning of 1 March. SZGV [Northwestern Group of Forces] Press Center

#### **Further on Skrunda Sabotage**

94UM0294A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Sergey Knyazkov under the "Events and Comments" rubric: "Explosion Occurred After Midnight"]

[Text]

#### **Who Benefits from Skrunda Radar Station Sabotage?**

As reported in the 2 March edition of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, on 28 February a concrete support of a 110-kilovolt power transmission line was destroyed by an explosion occurring in Ranskaya Volost of Latvia, 5 kilometers from the Skrunda Radar Station. This high-voltage line supplies the Skrunda Radar Station with power.

According to Edgar Birkans, director of high-voltage networks, power transmission from Brotseny was cut off at 00.25 just after midnight on 28 February due to a damaged support. The RLS [radar station] was not affected, however, since it is provided with its own standby power system. The installation is supplied with power via two high-voltage networks emanating from Brotseny and Tukus. The damage was found during a morning troubleshooting foot tour. Birkans states that the damage, which affects only Latvia, is estimated to exceed 4,000 lats.

The scene of the occurrence was inspected by a commission consisting of representatives of Latvenergo, Latvian criminal police, and the Skrunda Radar Station. According to the Press Center of the SZGV [Northwestern Troop Grouping], SZGV Commander Colonel General Leonid Mayorov discussed the incident with Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis. A letter requesting an investigation of the incident was sent to Yanis Skrastinsh, general prosecutor of Latvia.

Laymonis Liyepinsh, chief of Criminal Investigation of the Police Department, said the occurrence will be investigated by the Kuldigskiy Rayon Prosecutor's Office. Bomb specialists have been dispatched from Riga. In addition, the Ministry of Defense and ZEMESSARGA is conducting a separate investigation. Their job of apprehending the offenders will not be an easy one.

Laymonis Liyepinsh considers that a political flavor attaches to the explosion. At a 1 March press conference, representatives of the Tezmemey uk Brivibay, the nationalistic faction of the Latvian Sejm, were unanimous in describing the incident as a "provocation with far-reaching consequences." At the same time, Mr. Yakobson, consultant to the faction, went a step further by saying that "the explosion was arranged by Russia, or at least by those who stand behind her or wish to help her." Well, this sounds like the same old tune: Laying the blame on someone else. As for the explosion, the SZGV Press Center actually made a statement in the Latvian newspapers to the effect that the commission inspecting the scene has arrived

at the official conclusion that the damage caused the transmission line constitutes an act of sabotage.

Finally, Latvian specialists performed a very rapid, high-quality job restoring the damaged transmission line support.

## **CAUCASIAN STATES**

#### **Russian Commissariats Aid Recruitment of Mercenaries**

94UM0279A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Mar 94 p 3

[Articles by Nikolay Usov and Yuriy Shatalov: "'Wild Geese' Return: Russian Military Commissariats Helped Azerbaijan Recruit Mercenaries for War in Karabakh"]

[Text] Ivanovo—The widely publicized incident involving the organized dispatch of volunteers from Ivanovo Oblast to the front lines of that ethnic conflict has for the most part ended successfully for them. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA wrote about this in December of last year. Let us briefly recount what happened.

The police were the first to suspect that something was awry. Everywhere where you looked at the quiet provincial airport, which handles only a few outbound flights, dozens of young men—residents of a number of oblasts in central Russia—had suddenly started gathering. They behaved themselves so brazenly that the police officer on duty had to call the city for help.

The intoxicated youths made no secret of the fact that they were waiting for a plane that would take them to Baku, and from there to the combat zone in Karabakh. None of them really knew what force they would be fighting in—the regular army or some band.

After that there was no word from the "soldiers of fortune" for almost two months. Learning the mercenaries' names posed no difficulty. It turned out that the 17 Ivanovo youths between the ages of 24 and 29 had army experience, and several more than one criminal offense.

And so the "buyers" from Azerbaijan got what they were looking for: A ragtag detachment of cannonfodder ready for action. For money these youths were truly prepared to do anything. And it is hard to believe that the deal was consummated without the tacit consent of military commissariat officials.

Now the Ivanovo mercenaries have returned home; without contracts signed by the Azerbaijan Defense Ministry. Immediately upon payment of the agreed-upon sums, the documents were circumspectly collected from them.

However, the Ivanovo youths were lucky: Only two of them remain in hospitals somewhere. But their "colleagues" from Tambov, Kaluga, and Vladimir suffered both fatalities and missing in action.

And that is essentially the whole story of their voyage of death. The Federal Counterintelligence Service was able to

obtain documentary proof that officials of military commissariats in a number of Russian cities were involved in the illegal recruitment.—Nikolay Usov, correspondent for the oblast newspaper RABOCHIY KRAY.

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**Vladimir**—According to the Federal Counterintelligence Service's Vladimir Oblast Administration, 13 mercenaries returned home to Vladimir, three in zinc coffins.

Who are these young men? How and why did they wind up in warring Azerbaijan? Officers of the Federal Counterintelligence Service Administration who conducted an investigation were able to interview many of the "wild geese" who came back and to speak with their relatives. They learned some things that are much food for thought.

For example, the Vladimir mercenaries' average age was 30 to 35. They were all soldiers and sergeants in the reserve of the former Soviet Army. Almost all of them had families and children. It was also learned that many of them did not have jobs worthy of their ages and health, and so they were unable to properly provide for their families and elderly parents. Necessity forced them to look for good pay in the army. And until a certain point, none of them had entertained the idea of serving in the army of another state. Officials of the Vladimir Oblast military commissariat, to which they had applied, talked about contractual service in Russia's 201st Motorized Infantry Division, stationed in Tajikistan.

But once the final formalities were completed, some of the military commissariat's officers began suggesting that the fellows go to Azerbaijan for three months. They set up a meeting with representatives of that Caucasus republic's armed forces. Many promises were made, far more than a Russian Army recruiter could have made: 250,000 rubles and \$250 for each month of service. In the event of the mercenary's death, his family would receive a guaranteed benefit of 5 million rubles. There was another, no less important detail that was all but decisive in the young men's quickly deciding to go to that "trouble spot."

The fact is that the group was made up largely of mechanics and drivers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and other combat vehicles, whom the recruiters needed. The "buyer" from the Transcaucasus assured the young men that they would not see combat but work primarily in the rear as instructors.

It is also curious that the future mercenaries in Vladimir signed no contracts. They took the "buyer" at his word and, at his request, promised to keep secret everything having to do with their departure for Azerbaijan and service in its army. But on arriving at the front, the "wild geese" found out very quickly that they would not be allowed to sit things out in the rear. One fine day the mercenaries were handed automatic rifles and ordered into battle. They also later learned that they would not be getting the promised \$250. And that is when they began to sober up.

As for the officers of the Vladimir Oblast military commissariat who were directly or indirectly involved in the

recruitment of young Russian men for the Azerbaijan Army, the counterintelligence officers know their identities too. To all indications, they will not be able to avoid some unpleasantries, as the Federal Counterintelligence Service's Vladimir Province Administration has forwarded the findings of its investigation into the mercenaries' recruitment to the military prosecutor.—Yuriy Shatalov, correspondent.

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**From the Editors:** We intend to continue to inform readers of new instances and circumstances involving the recruitment of mercenaries on Russian Federation territory.

## CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

### Opposition Protests Tajik Statement

94UM0286A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 3 Mar 94 p 3

[Report by Oleg Panfilov under the rubric "Tajikistan": "The Opposition Protests MID Statement: Russia's Military Presence in Republic Beefed Up"]

[Text] Tajikistan's Islamic Resistance Council located in the city of Tulukan in the Afghan province of Takhar has disseminated a statement refuting one by the Tajik MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that "militant groups of the Islamic resistance are shelling their (that is, government) formations from the territory of Afghanistan."

Sayyid Abdullo Nuri, council leader, warns that the intrigues involving the statement are a prelude to a new air raid on the camps of Tajik refugees in Afghanistan.

At the same time the Russian military are taking new steps to build up their contingent in Tajikistan. According to reports from a highly placed officer in the Russian Ministry of Defense, Colonel-General Boris Pyankov plans to conduct exercises by "peacekeeping forces" on the territory of the "Tiger Gully" reserve, the only place on the planet where rare kinds of plants and animals have been protected through the efforts of Soviet scientists. The exercises are presently being worked out in Moscow at the headquarters for the coordination of military operations of the CIS countries. According to another version, an echelon of armored equipment has already been sent to Tajikistan.

In the meantime a blockade of rail lines leading into Tajikistan from Uzbekistan continues. More than 1,000 cars of freight had built up at border stations by mid-February, the delay of which is costing Tajikistan around four billion rubles a day. The trains are being plundered, and freight is being pilfered from the broken cars. Uzbek authorities are simultaneously hampering the removal of freight from Tajikistan. According to that same highly-placed officer, Tajikistan's Uzbek population is increasingly expressing dissatisfaction with Tashkent's policy, which is leading to inter-ethnic reprisals. Central Asia's geopolitical structure is now increasingly subjected to the influence of Uzbekistan, which is laying claim to a leading role in the region by blockading Tajikistan.

The officer feels that Russia's role here is actually under threat. In 1993 alone it costs the taxpayers 59 billion rubles to maintain the Russian Army in Tajikistan. The number of casualties is constantly growing, which could lead to dissatisfaction on the part of the Russians, as occurred during the Soviet-Afghan war. While there is a crisis of authority in Afghanistan, neither Moscow nor Tashkent will strive for rapid talks between Dushanbe and the

opposition. Furthermore, the officer states, the buildup of the Russian Army's military presence in Tajikistan is absolutely deliberate. As reported from the mountain regions of Karategin (Garm), military aircraft have carried out raids in the valley each day for the second week in a row. There is forced recruitment into the army in Dushanbe, and confrontations among government groups continue in Kurgan-Tyube.

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

### WIG Design Bureau Struggling to Survive

94UM0261A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian  
No 10, Oct 93 pp 5-7

[Article by Aleksandr Kudinov: "They Fly Above the Waves"]

[Text] A considerable amount of diverse information on surface skimmers has recently appeared in the periodical press. Many of the articles are associated in this case with the name of Rostislav Yevgenyevich Alekseyev and the design bureau he established.

However, some newly formed organizations also claim a role in building surface skimmers. There has been much criticism of the TsKB [Central Design Bureau] for Ground Effect Vehicles imeni Alekseyev. This is why I made a quick trip to Nizhniy Novgorod. V. Sokolov, the chief designer for this field and for surface skimmer planning, explained it to me:

"No matter what is said, the TsKB for Surface Effect Vehicles is a huge organization possessing a design, experimental and production base, and it permits travel along the entire path from an idea to a plan's realization."

Yes, the TsKB endured difficult times in recent years. The work volume of military orders, which were the main source of work, was dramatically reduced, while financing for civilian construction of surface skimmers has not yet been found.

The TsKB drew up a federal program for development of civilian surface skimmer building, with the necessary feasibility study.

The regional association LIKO-Prommarket (general director, V. Litvinenko) was one of the first among commercial structures to become a dependable partner in joint efforts to design passenger surface skimmers based on the Olenok plan. Considering the complexity of the problem's solution and the relatively high cost of the work, the TsKB and LIKO are hoping to attract other investors both in Russia and abroad.

The hope in Nizhniy Novgorod is that assets will also be allocated from the state budget, especially so as to ensure the needed life, reliability and certification of surface skimmers as a new form of transportation. This is unfortunately necessary. Why is it that today's commercial structures are not living badly, and that you could earn more working for them? Because they enjoy tax concessions, and their overhead is lower—no laboratories, no test benches. But despite everything the basic core of qualified designers has survived. Besides the TsKB, the commercial enterprises Amfikon (amphibious vehicles) and Transal (the Alekseyev transporter) are involved in the development of surface skimmers in Nizhniy Novgorod. But as foreign experience shows, the possibilities of small enterprises of this kind are extremely limited.

Three types of surface skimmers are distinguished. The first has a low wing aspect ratio—up to 1. These are known

as craft employing the dynamic principle of support. They have only a rudder, and they possess (conditionally) two degrees of freedom, like a car or a small boat. They are driven by boat captains. Craft employing the dynamic principle of support include, for example, the Volga-2 passenger boat and the Raketa-2 gas turbo-vessel.

The second type is represented by surface skimmers with a wing aspect ratio of up to 3. They have three degrees of freedom, and they fly within the limits of surface effect. They are equipped with an elevator. This type of surface skimmers includes the KM, Strizh, Olenok and Lun.

The third type is surface effect aircraft. When necessary, they can fly at high altitude like airplanes. These are still just plans and models.

Everything that could happen during testing has, including accidents and disasters. In all cases the commissions concluded that crew error was the main cause of the incident. During testing of the Olenok its tail section disintegrated and broke off together with the sustainer engine. But the surface skimmer did not sink, and it was able to return to base on its own power using its starting engines.

The surface skimmers KM, Volga-2 and Raketa-2 were described earlier in the No 11, 1991 issue of KRYLYA RODINY. Other designs are presented below.

The small Strizh surface skimmer is a two-seat craft. It is intended for pilot training. It is capable of taking off and landing on a water and a snow surface. It may be used for patrolling, communications and business flights. V. Bulanov is the chief designer.

Length—11.4 m. Wingspan—6.6 m. Height—3.6 m. Takeoff weight—1,630 kg. Maximum speed—200 km/hr, cruising speed—175/hr. Takeoff run (water/snow)—600/400 m, landing run—350/300 m. Flying range with a passenger—500 km. Ferrying range—800 km. Flying altitude above surface—0.3-1.0 m. Navigability: Takeoff and landing at a wave state of up to 0.5 m, capable of floating at a wave state of up to 1.3 m. Time of a training flight with one person aboard—3 hr, with two—1-2 hr. Engines—two rotary piston water-cooled VAZ-4133, 160 horsepower each. Fuel consumption—0.35 liters/km. The airframe is made from an aluminum-magnesium alloy. Structures are riveted together. The propellers are driven by a cardan shaft through a step-down one-step reduction gear and an automatic clutch. The propellers are five-bladed, 1.1 m in diameter, with fixed pitch. The engine nacelles are equipped with fire warning systems and electrically controlled fire extinguishing systems.

The Strizh is based on shore under an awning (or in a hangar) on a special truck that simultaneously serves during flying as the means of launching and raising the surface skimmer when a ramp descending to a water depth of not less than 1 meter with a slope of up to 6 degrees is present at the base. The surface skimmer is serviced by one mechanic.

The Olenok seagoing surface skimmer was designed as an assault landing transporter for the navy, and it has been in operation since 1979 (chief designer, V. Sokolov). Basic data: Length—58 m. Wingspan—31.5 m. Height—16 m.

Normal takeoff weight—125 tonnes. Overloaded takeoff weight (there is a limit on wave height during takeoff)—140 tonnes. Payload weight—up to 20 tonnes. Maximum fuel weight—28 tonnes. Cruising speed—350 km/hr. Range—1,100 km. Navigability: Takeoff and landing—up to 4 points, floating and flying—4-5 points. Amphibious capability: Emergence onto a relatively even shore with a slope of up to 5 degrees. Basing: Parked on special pontoon platforms or engineered shore platforms. Crew—nine persons.

The Olenok surface skimmer is a cantilever monoplane consisting of a streamlined fuselage with the hydrodynamic elements locating in its lower part, low wings with a low aspect ratio, and an elaborate tail. The fuselage has a relatively simple beam-and-stringer structure, and it is divided in its layout into three sections—nose, middle and tail.

The nose section contains the crew cabin, starting engines and compartments housing the electronic equipment, including a radar station located in the nose tip and covered with a radiotransparent fairing. Depending on the purpose of the surface skimmer the middle section of the fuselage may be designed as a passenger cabin or cargo bay, or it can be filled with special equipment. The tail section contains a compartment housing auxiliary engines and onboard machinery for starting the main engines and maintaining the performance of the surface skimmer's hydraulic and electric systems.


Fuel tank compartments are in the left and right wing panels. As with the fuselage, the wing as a whole is a sealed watertight structure imparting buoyancy to the surface skimmer. The necessary stability and unsinkability are achieved in this case by dividing the lower part of the fuselage and wings into watertight compartments.

The main propulsion unit consists of one sustainer turboprop NK-12MK engine and two starting turbofan NK-8-4K engines designed by N. D. Kuznetsov. The NK-12MK provides for economical cruising, and it is positioned on the surface skimmer's tail, at the intersection of the fin and stabilizer. This relatively high position of the engine is the result of the need for keeping it away from sea spray when the surface skimmer starts, lands and takes its landing run. It also reduces the possibility of salt contamination of the engine in flight by aerosols in the sea atmosphere, the saturation of which is known to depend on height above the surface.

The starting engines work only when the surface skimmer takes off, and they are outfitted with swiveling gas exhaust nozzles for changing the direction of the engine exhaust stream: During the takeoff run—beneath the wing to create an air cushion (blow mode), and during transition to cruising mode—horizontal thrust, accelerating the surface skimmer to cruising speed. As with the engines themselves, the air intakes of the starting engines are designed flush with the outline of the surface skimmer's nose section to reduce drag.

Blowing of the gas streams beneath the wings during the takeoff run helps to reduce hydrodynamic resistance and external hydrodynamic loads, which is especially important when the craft takes off over a rough sea. Blowing is also employed for these purposes when landing the surface skimmer in landing run modes.

The main systems of the surface skimmer—control, hydraulic, electric power supply, life support, radio engineering and navigation support—are designed as aircraft systems. Redundancy and backup of systems and equipment are foreseen, which is necessary for safe operation of the aircraft.



Layout of the 150 Passenger Olenok Surface Skimmer

Initial plans for seagoing surface skimmers intended for different purposes have been drawn up on the basis of the Olenok at the TsKB for Surface Effect Vehicles. The seagoing passenger surface skimmer is intended for high-speed passenger conveyance over inland and marginal seas at a speed of 400 km/hr at a distance of not more than 2,000 from a port. The Lyuks variant carries 65-75 passengers; the single-deck variant carries 100-150; the double-deck variant carries up to 300 persons. There is a crew of five.

The seagoing cargo surface skimmer is intended to convey express cargo. The weight of the cargo is 30 tonnes, and the dimensions of the cargo bay are 21x3.2x3.0 m.

The seagoing arctic geological exploratory surface skimmer is used for geological and geophysical operations in shallow shelf waters of the Arctic Seas, and for their transportation support.

The search-and-rescue surface skimmer is intended for search-and-rescue support to the seagoing fleet, for delivery of emergency rescue teams to places of accidents and natural disasters in the vicinity of offshore drilling rigs, to platforms, and to population centers on the coast, on the shelf and in island zones, and to provide assistance to and evacuate casualties and the public from these places.

The air-sea search-and-rescue system consists of the Mriya airplane and the Olenok surface skimmer. It is intended for effective search and rescue of people from sunken or distressed vessels through the combination of high speed and long range. System takeoff weight—600 tonnes. System speed—800 km/hr. Carrier range—6,000 km. Surface skimmer speed—400 km/hr. Surface skimmer range—2,500 km. Navigability—4-5 points. Number of victims taken aboard the surface skimmer—up to 150 persons.

There are great possibilities for an experimental search-and-rescue surface skimmer currently under construction, code-named the Spasitel (chief designer, V. Krylovskiy). Its detail design was completed in 1991. Construction of the surface skimmer proceeded simultaneously with this at an experimental plant. It is 70 percent assembled. It should have a speed of 450 km/hr. Takeoff weight—400 tonnes. Capacity—up to 500 rescued persons. A hospital fitted out with surgical and resuscitation rooms and a casualty ward is foreseen. Had we possessed this surface skimmer sooner, we may have avoided the tragedy that befell the submarine "Komsomolets," in which 42 persons died. Unfortunately, conclusion of the construction of this unique rescue resource is in jeopardy. The main reason is a lack of financing by the client, a role played by the navy's search-and-rescue service. It would be a pity if this enormous amount of labor is wasted, and the unfinished surface skimmer is scrapped. But this is fully possible in our unpredictable times.

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### Urals Scientific Institute Creates 'Camouflaged' Antennas

94UM0291A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian  
10 Mar 94 p 13

[Article by Vadim Aleksandrov: "Flat Antenna Improves Appearance"]

[Text] Western Europe has a problem, one which is somewhat humorous to us: Large numbers of satellite television receiving antennas are spoiling the view of residential and administrative buildings. American, European, and Japanese firms have attempted to resolve this problem by rendering the antenna flat and unnoticeable. Alas! The laws of physics relentlessly dictate a definite shape, such that antennas continue to assume the configuration to which we have become accustomed.

The above brief introduction should make it clear why the European press ("The Times," in particular), not the Russian, was the first to report the successes attained by domestic electronics specialists. It was the latter, if one is to believe that press, who were able to "trick" the laws of physics to create flat antennas of any configuration which can be easily "camouflaged" to blend with the color of a building. The newspaper accounts were marred by inaccuracies, lacked any mention of the sources of the information, and failed to name the manufacturer. Perhaps that was due to fear on the part of each country that her competing neighboring countries would be the first to get to Russia. Another reason could be that what was reported was nothing more than a false rumor.

Nonetheless, ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondents did manage to obtain a confirmation in the Russian Ministry of Communications: "Yes, something like that was done in the Urals." They were provided an explanation of why the sensational invention was not reported by the domestic press: The antenna was made for military purposes; it is simpler to both transport and camouflage in a combat situation.

Although the Urals are a large area, a single telephone call to the editorial office of VECHERNYY CHELYABINSK was sufficient to "ferret out" the hero of the day: "Yes, it was done here in our city. There has been no need to advertise, since as yet there is nothing to sell."

"We lack the means to tool up for production of the antenna," was an admission made to the ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent by Sergey Ponomarev, who experimented with flat miracle antennas over a long period of time in a laboratory of the Chelyabinsk NII [Scientific Research Institute] of Measurement Technology. The Institute had been contacted by specialists from the USA, Great Britain, Germany, and South Korea who wished to purchase the antenna or acquire patent rights with the intent of undertaking its manufacture.

Ponomarev proceeded to speak at length in glowing terms of the unavailable antenna, finally asking surprisingly: "When will it show up here in Russia? Well, round antennas do not harmonize with detached buildings in our country, also."

## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### U.S. Navy's Role in Missile Defense in Theater

94UM0260A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 11, 1993 pp 70-73

[Article by Col V. Filippov: "Role of the U.S. Navy in Providing Antiballistic Missile Defense in a TMO"]

[Text] Modern U.S. military strategy is based on the assumption that use of armed forces in regional conflicts is to become, now and in the immediate future, the most probable variant of protecting vitally important American interests. The spread of missile weapons into developing countries, the advent of a real possibility for their creation of mass destruction weapons, political instability in the former USSR, and difficulties in suppressing mobile missile systems (from combat experience in the Persian Gulf) are making it necessary to develop and deploy effective antiballistic missile (ABM) systems in theaters of military operations (TMOs) to protect friendly forces and objectives from strikes by operational-tactical and tactical ballistic missiles. A report to Congress by U.S. Armed Services Chairman of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin L. Powell (February 1993) states that "equipped with chemical or biological warheads, the enemy's ballistic missiles can present a significant threat to our mobile forces, which are the principal forces in the USA's new regional strategy."

In accordance with the state's military strategy, the command of the U.S. Navy is activating efforts to create sea-based ABM systems. Three fundamental studies were carried there in 1991: "Requirements on Tactical ABM Systems in 2010" (U.S. Navy Consultative Committee for Scientific Research and Experimental Design Work); "Tactical Sea-Based ABM Systems" (staff of the naval secretary's advisor on armament development and purchases); "Research on Antiballistic Missile Defense" (Scientific Council of the U.S. Department of Defense).

The following conclusions were reached on the basis of this research:

1. The threat of the use of ballistic missiles in a TMO is real, and continues to grow. More than 30 countries have operational-tactical and tactical ballistic missiles, and a large number of countries are aspiring to acquire them. Ballistic missiles already adopted could be upgraded with the purpose of increasing their combat effectiveness. Creation of warheads fitted with mass destruction weapons may be one of the routes of upgrading in this case.
2. Naval forces and resources can make a significant contribution to creating ABM systems in a TMO. The strategy of creating sea-based antimissile systems is based on factors inherent to the navy, such as accessibility to most regions, mobility, flexibility, and the capability for lengthy operation not only to protect the navy's most important facilities but also to defend mobile and expeditionary forces (assault forces), their landing ports, maritime airfields and cities, and other important facilities within their range. In addition such

systems are capable of significantly increasing the effectiveness of regional ABM systems by providing support to ground-based antimissile systems.

It was noted that the modern Aegis ship automated weapon combat control system outfitted with Standard-2 surface-to-air guided missiles is capable of carrying out limited ABM missions. On the whole, its specifications and performance characteristics are not optimized for antimissile defense, but there is a possibility for upgrading them for these purposes.

The foreign press writes that the command of the U.S. Navy has drawn up a plan to create ship ABM systems in two phases. The first entails efforts to upgrade existing ship surface-to-air missile systems for ABM missions in the TMO, while the second entails development of future sea-based antimissile systems. The main elements of the plan for their creation were coordinated with the leadership of the SDI program.

The work of the first phase includes upgrading the Aegis system and the Standard-2 SAM. Changes in the system itself will be insignificant. The MK 99 Mod.2 fire control system and the MK-41 vertical launcher remain as before. Some changes are being made in the program and work algorithm of the AN/SPY-18 radar station, the control and decision making instrumentation, and the displays. The upgrade is most visible in the Standard-2 missile, which is being fitted with a new warhead, an improved homing head and an improved fuze. The upgraded missile will have the greater killing power and speed to destroy operational-tactical and tactical ballistic missiles.

The work of upgrading the SAMs is being carried out by America's Raytheon, which has experience in similar work on the Patriot system, which was used to defeat Iraqi ballistic missiles during combat operations in the Persian Gulf.

The upgrade program was drawn up in such a way that flight tests of the block 4 Standard-2 SAM would begin upon completion of the work of improving the fuze and homing head and creating a new warhead, and that it would be finished in 1995. Ships are to be armed with an antiballistic missile capable of close interception of operational-tactical and tactical ballistic missiles in 1996. It is anticipated that as with the Patriot surface-to-air guided missile, the modernized block 4 Standard-2 missile will be able to effectively hit both aerodynamic and ballistic targets.

The official point of view on the justifications of work in the first phase is based on the following premises:

- the navy already has radar stations and vertical launchers, so all it needs is to develop antiballistic missiles, while the ground forces have to develop new radar stations, launchers and antiballistic missiles for the future ground-based THAAD ABM system;
- naval ships are a mobile force, and they are capable of reaching regions of crisis rather quickly, while deployment of a ground-based ABM system in a TMO would require from 1 to 3 weeks;




Figure 1. Interception of an Operational-Tactical Missile by a Ship Antiballistic Missile System: 1—Launch site of operational-tactical missile; 2—"Ticonderoga" class guided missile cruiser equipped with Aegis system; 3—detection of launching of operational-tactical missile by space resources, and transmission of data on it to ship; 4—relay satellite; 5—detection and tracking of missile by ship resources; 6—destruction of operational-tactical missile by antiballistic missile

Key: 1—Tracking; 2—LEAP

- sea-based ABM systems make it possible for the local command to use them more efficiently in crisis situations, for example in the first days of a conflict, while the naval ABM component in the TMO could afford protection to troop airlifts by providing cover against missile strikes to coastal airfields.

American specialists assert that a zonal ABM system would play the most important role in regions of crisis, because of the 37 potential trajectories of ballistic missiles with a range of around 1,000 km, 26 pass over the water surface. Therefore, presence of a ship carrying an ABM system at the need spot would allow it to destroy a ballistic missile in flight (Figure 1). Moreover, according to estimates of the same specialists, from 50 to 60 percent of the most important cities and industrial centers in the Western Pacific may be protected by sea-based ABM systems.

American ships armed with ABM systems and located in the Mediterranean Sea could defend their bases in Europe from a missile attack from the African coast, particularly in the case of an attack on Italy by Libya, while ships deployed in the Persian Gulf could defeat ballistic missiles launched from countries in the Near East.

Development of the next generation of the Aegis ship automated weapon combat control system, with greater ballistic missile detection and tracking range, is planned in the second phase.

Both individual components of the ABM system (computers, radar stations, radar signal processors etc.) and the software will be subjected to upgrade. There are plans for developing an antiballistic missile capable of fighting operational-tactical and tactical ballistic missiles of the future with a range from hundreds to tens of thousands of kilometers and equipped with different kinds of warheads, including nuclear, chemical and biological. The upgraded Standard-2 SAM and the THAAD antiballistic missile presently being developed for the ground forces (with a planned range of ballistic target destruction of up to 200 km, and an altitude of 150 km) could serve this role.

Concurrently there are plans for improving the control and data transmission system, which will be brought together into a unified system utilizing ground, air and space ballistic missile detection and tracking resources in order to raise the effectiveness of ABM systems. Around 25 percent of the planned appropriations for work to create ABM systems for TMOs in the 1993-1999 fiscal years are being allocated to the navy.

In future upgrading of the Standard-2 SAM, a third Thiokol accelerating stage and the LEAP small homing hyperfast projectile, developed on a competitive basis by America's Boeing, Hughes and Rockwell International, are to be installed in it.

LEAP ammunition, which weighs around 10 kg, will be able to destroy operational-tactical and tactical ballistic missiles due to kinetic energy released upon striking the target. It is to be outfitted with an optical homing head, which will be used at altitudes above 70 km in order to exclude the harmful influence of atmospheric optic effects (distortions of the optical viewing axis, considerable heating etc.) (Figure 2).




Figure 2. LEAP Small Homing Hyperfast Projectile

Work on LEAP technology for the Standard-2 missile was started in 1992. In that same year the first flight test was conducted with the purpose of demonstrating the missile's ability to deliver the LEAP projectile to an altitude above 90 km. The testing was done in the Eastern Atlantic. A target rocket was launched from the eastern missile range at Cape Canaveral, Florida to a distance of 800 km. The tests showed that the Standard-2 SAM can deliver a mockup of the LEAP projectile to an altitude of 110 km, while together with an AN/SPY-1B radar station the Aegis system is capable persistently tracking a ballistic missile and guiding a SAM to a prescribed point.

During the next tests, planned for mid-1993, a Standard-2 is to be launched carrying a mockup of the LEAP projectile of actual size in order to work out the mechanism of its separation from the rocket.

The next three tests of the first series are planned for 1994 with the additional Thiokol third accelerating stage. The shock, vibration and thermal loads will be determined and the operation of the autopilot will be evaluated during these tests. The fairing of the missile is to be jettisoned at an altitude of 80 km and the third stage is to be started to accelerate the LEAP ammunition during the testing. The mockup of the LEAP ammunition is to separate from the accelerating stage 145 seconds after the missile's lift-off (at an altitude of 150 km); all components of the missile, including the accelerating stage, the LEAP ammunition and the work of the homing head will be checked. There are also plans for carrying out a real interception of a

ballistic missile launched from Cape Canaveral to a distance of 1,000 km over the Atlantic Ocean; the intercept will occur at an altitude of 100 km, 800 km from the launch site of the operational-tactical ballistic missile. The target rocket will have a speed of 2-3 km/sec.

After the first series of flight tests are evaluated, the navy will begin the second, which will include five real interceptions of ballistic missiles in 1995-1997. Concurrently, naval specialists will study the experience of associates from the ground forces in creating the THAAD ABM systems, and work out the problems, as necessary, of installing this system or its antimissiles aboard ships.

In the year 2000 the U.S. Navy plans to install ABM systems aboard 22 "Ticonderoga" class guided missile cruisers and 26 "Berk" class guided missile destroyers. According to U.S. Naval specialists, sea-based ABM systems equipped with the Standard-2 SAM carrying LEAP ammunition (Figure 3), deployed by the western and eastern shores of America, could be used to repel a limited nuclear missile strike against the USA.




Figure 3. Standard-2 Sea-Based Antiballistic Missile Carrying LEAP Ammunition: 1—Booster, 2—second stage; 3—third accelerating stage; 4—LEAP ammunition; 5—faring; 6—homing head; 7—control instrumentation; 8—control engines

In order to afford protection to Marine Corps units against missile strikes, the Improved Hawk SAM system with which they are armed is to be upgraded. This system contains an AN/TPS-51 radar station capable of identifying ballistic targets and calculating the trajectory, the launch point and the warhead's point of impact. In addition, the radar station can detect small targets like cruise missiles. Data are

transmitted automatically by communication lines from the radar station to Improved HawkSAM system batteries. The range of detection is 740 km for ballistic targets and 550 for small targets. The radar station has a device for automatic determination of its coordinates, the same as the kind in SAM batteries.

Tests carried out at the White Sands Proving Grounds (New Mexico) in May 1991 confirmed the capability of the radar station for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles. During the tests it persistently tracked and transmitted information to the SAM system, which was located 120 km from the missile's launch site and 85 km from the SAM battery. There are plans for acquiring nine AN/TPS-59 radar stations for Improved Hawk missile systems possessed by the Marine Corps.

The war in the Persian Gulf confirmed the operational and strategic necessity of creating ABM systems in a TMO, including sea-based ones, to neutralize the threat from ballistic missiles in regional conflicts. The American plans for creating ABM systems in TMOs are acquiring an increasingly more integrated and definite nature. The timetable and directions of development of technology have been determined rather specifically. However, the possibility of further adjustment of the technical makeup of TMO ABM systems, including sea-based systems, is not excluded. The USA generally possesses sufficient financial, economic and technical possibilities for deploying such systems by planned deadlines.

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